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Preface
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate the reasons why firms do
often adopt inefficient technologies even when superior ones are widely
available, and to assess their consequences. From a macroeconomic per-
spective it has been emphasized that differences in the adoption and dif-
fusion rates of technology have a significant impact on economic growth
and development, affecting output and productivity differentials among
countries. The importance of these issues explains why the understand-
ing of the determinants of technical change has attracted a great deal of
attention by both theorists and applied economists.
A firm’s technology choice and its timing rests on the expected costs
and benefits of adoption, which in turn are a function of a number of
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors. Several such factors have
been investigated in the literature, giving rise to patterns of technol-
ogy adoption more or less successful when brought to the data. One
single feature of technology adoption that is widely emphasized is the
role of technology-induced spillovers. This dissertation, after surveying
the major approaches to technology adoption found in the literature
and stressing their drawbacks, studies the effects on firms’ choices of
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technology-induced pro duction externalities that are largely consistent
wi th the empirical evidence and whose relevance has not b een previously
assessed. The thesis central claim is the existence of a causal link between
the effects of firms’ choices of a technology and wages. The choice of tech-
nology determines an increase in workers’ productivity and consequently
an improvement of their occupational alternatives, that can transfer on
the wages a firm must pay in order to retain its employees.
It is shown, first in an efficiency wage partial equilibrium framework
and then in a simple general equilibrium setting, that the presence of pro-
duction externalities of the sort described above can lead to inefficient
technology adoption by firms, so that they may not have an incentive to
upgrade to the technological frontier, remaining stuck with old and in-
efficient technologies. Finally, the possibility of technology misallocation
is investigated from a normative point of view, characterizing Pareto-
efficient allocations and discussing the role of government interventions
to overcome or mitigate market failures.
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1Introduction
There is a wide agreement among economists and policy makers that
technology is a major engine of development and growth. The forces
governing innovation as well as the adoption and diffusion of technologies
have attracted the attention of both theorists and applied economists,
and it is generally agreed that one of the fundamental determinants of
economic growth and of changes in productivity is the adoption and
diffusion – even more than the invention – of new technologies. The
processes leading to the adoption of a technology, however, are far from
simple and well understood, and their investigation poses a number of
puzzling issues.
As Rosenberg (1976a, p.191) put it, there are two striking “characteris-
tics of the diffusion process: its apparent overall slowness on the one hand,
and the wide variations in the rates of acceptance of different inventions,
on the other”. Although superior technologies are available, many coun-
tries remain often stuck with old techniques, which certainly contribute
to explain the significant and persistent differences in output levels that
are observed, and the tendency to a widening gap in technology adoption
between the US and the major Western European countries and between
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the latter and the great majority of less developed countries (see, for ex-
ample, Maddison, 1995, Ben-David, 1994, and Sala-I-Martin, 1994). As
noted by Lucas (1990), the fact that more capital does not flow from rich
countries to poor countries is at odds with economic theory, and more so
in a world characterized by high (physical and human) capital mobility
and by rapid diffusion of information. Quite similar considerations hold
when one takes a microeconomic view point. It is often the case that su-
perior technologies are available and well known within a given industry,
but firms are not as quick as expected in jumping to the technological
frontier, even when such a jump is not that costly.
The investigation of the reasons why not all countries and firms adopt
the best available technologies, or of why not all of them use technol-
ogy as a driver to promote economic progress and profits to the same
extent, has stimulated an impressive body of research and prompted a
variety of explanations on the engines of technical change and its appar-
ent slowness. What technologies are adopted and used is the solution to
a twofold problem. First, they are obviously the more or less intended
result of invention. Second, regardless of their theoretical impact, only
those techniques that get to be adopted, and diffuse, play effectively a
role. In this dissertation we focus on this second problem and, narrow-
ing further down the object of our investigation, we concentrate on the
determinants of the choice of a technology by a firm.
Although it bears many important macroeconomic implications, the
decision to adopt a technology is ultimately an individual one, made
by comparing the marginal benefits of adoption – often to be evaluated
under uncertainty and in presence of limited and asymmetric information
– with the costs of scrapping the technology currently used.1 Hence, the
1 In this perspective, the diffusion of a technology is, at the end, the aggregate outcome of the
individual decisions to adopt it. It is, however, to be noticed that individual decisions are affected in
several respects by others’ decisions (that influence, for example, the number of users, the definition
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choice and the timing of adoption are a function of its expected benefits
and costs, that are eventually affected by the economic conditions of the
country (industry) in which the firm operates. The core of the problem
lies in identifying the determinants of such benefits and costs.
To do so requires, in turn, to be more precise about what technology
is. Throughout the dissertation we construe the concept of technology
broadly, interpreting it not only as human and physical capital avail-
able to firms (embodied in techniques or machines), as it is often done
in the literature, but also as improvements in the organization of pro-
duction and of labor markets, in managerial and governance practices,
or in products’ quality (reflecting, for instance, changes in consumers’
tastes). More generally, our view is consistent with that of technology
as knowledge stressed, for instance, by the theories of endogenous tech-
nical change that have been developed beginning in the early Nineties
(see Aghion and Howitt, 1998, and Grossman and Helpman, 1991, for
overviews). The emphasis on knowledge highlights that technology is –
at least to some extent – non rival (so that the marginal costs for addi-
tional firms to use it are negligible), and that the returns to investments
in technology are not fully appropriable. This lack of appropriability en-
tails that the benefits stemming from the adoption of a technology are
partly public, in that they do not entirely accrue to the adopter but
to other agents as well (firms and individuals alike), by adding to their
technical knowledge. Much of the literature on technology adoption has
indeed emphasized, both at the theoretical and at the empirical levels,
the role played by knowledge spillovers (and by many other sources of
technology-induced spillovers), pointing out that in most cases they lie at
the heart of the choice to adopt (or to delay the adoption of) a technology.
of a standard, or the speed at which the benefits and costs of a new technology are assessed), so that
the study of diffusion processes is not just a problem of simple aggregation.
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It is here worth to underline two further and apparently unrelated
issues, to which we will return in the dissertation. First, it has been
stressed, both by theorists and applied economists, that the emergence
of externalities (spillovers) following the choice of a superior technology
renders strategic interactions among the parties affected by the decision
about technology particularly important, and likely to influence the firm’s
choice itself. Second, it is widely agreed that there exists a strong com-
plementarity between recent (after the Second World War) technological
advances and workers’ skills, that has in turn determined the emergence
of a marked skill premium. A recent literature has further exploited this
complementarity to link the technology-induced skill premium to the ob-
served increase in wage inequality, both between and within classes, thus
suggesting a direct relationship between technology and wages “interme-
diated” by the process of workers upskilling.
This thesis aims to contribute to the technology adoption literature by
building on the two issues reported above, and by focusing on the nexus
between the labor market – or better the wage structure – and firms’
technological choices. The existence of a relationship between labor (and
wages) and technology is certainly not new: the role of labor endowments
and the impact of wages on technology adoption and diffusion have been
extensively investigated, and some attention has also been devoted to
the effects on adoption of the strategic interactions between workers and
entrepreneurs.
The novelty of our approach, however, is that it establishes, and as-
sesses the relevance of, a causal link between a firm’s decision to adopt a
technology and the level of the wages it has to pay afterwards. The basic
idea is rather intuitive. When a firm adopts a new technology, its workers
may benefit from an upskilling process providing them with the abilities
needed to operate the new technology. As far as the advancement in work-
ers’ skills is transferrable (for example, when it takes the form of general
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human capital), increasing productivity in alternative employments, it is
likely to induce an improvement of their outside options. This, in turn,
results in an increase of workers’ bargaining power in their relationship
with the firm. Insofar as this translates into higher wages, technology-
induced externalities – whose importance is ultimately determined by
the weight of knowledge spillovers – affects the firm’s incentives to adopt
the technology in the first place, possibly delaying or blocking technology
adoption.
It is worth reaffirming that our argument is well rooted into the empir-
ical evidence on recent technical change and on the distribution of wages,
that – as already pointed out – depicts a marked complementarity be-
tween technology and skills, and a surge in wage inequality consistent
with (if not caused by) the observed patterns of technical change. Both
the upskilling associated to the adoption of superior technologies and the
resulting increase in wages it induces, together with strategic interactions
between workers and firms, are indeed the major building blocks of our
theory, adding a further dimension to the debate on technology adoption
that has not been emphasized in the literature. Strangely enough, in fact,
the impact of technology externalities on the wage structure as a factor
affecting technology choices has not received much attention, in spite of
the available evidence.
The dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents the major stylized facts that theories of technology
adoption and diffusion have to face, and discusses the main theoretical
contributions to the investigation of technological choice advanced in the
literature, broadly organized according to the determinants they focus
on. A special attention is devoted to the engines of technological change
(the role of complementarities, of strategic interaction and of labor mar-
kets and wages) that are closer to the spirit of those emphasized in the
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dissertation, so to render evident the similarities and differences in their
treatment by alternative approaches.
Chapter 3 introduces the conceptual framework that constitutes the
guiding thread for the models formulated in the core chapters of the the-
sis. The chapter’s goal is twofold. First, it discusses the building blocks of
the adopted setting confronting them with the existing literature. In par-
ticular, it investigates the link between the externality driven approach
of the dissertation and the contributions on strategic complementarities,
emphasizing the role of technology-induced externalities and of imper-
fect competition in the labor market as sources of strategic interaction
between firms and workers. Furthermore, as the main theme of the thesis
rests on the externalities linking the choice of technology to the wage
structure, the chapter assesses their relevance by focusing on the rela-
tionships between technical change and wage distribution and inequality.
Second, it develops the formal setting for the models investigated in
the core chapters of the dissertation (Chapters 4 - 6), by working out a
static reformulation of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage setup
and illustrating its properties and implications. In particular, it is argued
that the adoption of an efficiency wage framework provides a natural
way to formalize the wage setting process and to relate firms’ technology
choices and workers’ outside options.
Chapter 4 studies a partial equilibrium model with efficiency wages
built for a small imperfectly competitive economy in which consumers
can earn a living – and all production activities are carried out – either
in the subsistence (self-employment) or in the industrial sector of the
economy. The latter is characterized by the presence of one firm only
that is price taker in the goods market and a monopsonist in the labor
market, and produces a consumption good by using labor as the only
input in production besides technology. The key feature of the model
is that it assumes the existence of a direct link between the reservation
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utility of workers and the firm’s technology – via technology driven
externalities – that renders workers’ reservation wages a function of the
technology adopted by the firm (i.e. workers’ participation constraints
endogenous in the firm’s technology). The main purpose of the chapter
is to investigate the firm’s technology adoption problem and to show that
the nexus between the choice of technology and wages can be responsible
for an inefficient technology to be adopted. A final section illustrates
the main ideas and results of the model for a Cobb-Douglas economy,
performing a series of comparative statics exercises. The same example
will be used to illustrate the framework and results of Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 5 further investigates the effects of the links between market
power and technology on firms’ choices by extending the analysis to a
general equilibrium economy, that allows us to fully account for the feed-
back effects originated by the strategic interaction between the firm and
its workers. Although the structural characteristics of the economy are
essentially the same introduced in Chapter 4, the link between workers’
outside options and the firm’s decisions is here modeled explicitly. It is
shown that the firm’s choice of technology affects workers’ productivity
when self-employed through a (technology-induced) positive production
externality that, in turn, increases their outside options and possibly
their wages, thus imposing a negative pecuniary externality on the firm.
Technology adoption by the market sector firm is investigated under two
different scenarios: one in which the firm takes the externality it gener-
ates upon the self-employed workers as an exogenous parameter (that is
labeled Cournot-Nash case), and the other in which it takes it into ac-
count when choosing technology (the von Stackelberg case). It is shown
that the Cournot case amounts to neglect the role of externalities, which
implies that the firm’s decisions do not entail neither labor nor technol-
ogy misallocation. Conversely, the von Stackelberg case is one in which
the firm is more sophisticated and the effects of externalities are inter-
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nalized, so that the adoption of a superior technology can be dampened
by its expected impact on wages.
Finally, Chapter 6 deals from a normative perspective with the sources
of non-marketed relations (pecuniary and production externalities) re-
sponsible for the possibility of technology misallocation. First, it charac-
terizes the Pareto efficient allocations that would be achieved by a social
planner internalizing all sources of externalities and compares them with
the market allocations derived in Chapter 5. Second, it studies alter-
native government policies to mitigate or overcome market failure. In
particular, it is proven that first best subsidization is always capable to
achieve Pareto-efficient allocations. Similarly, second best instruments in
the form of Pigouvian subsidies on technology are always welfare en-
hancing, while interventions on labor demand have an ambiguous effect,
so that either a tax or a subsidy can stimulate the choice of a superior
technology and increase welfare.
A short final chapter contains a brief summary and discussion.
2The Adoption and Diffusion of Technology:
Theories and Empirical Evidence
In analyzing technology adoption and its implications for growth, a great
part of the literature has conceptually concentrated on two different is-
sues, either separately or combining them: the problem of technology
choice and that of technology diffusion. Furthermore, for the latter, most
of the attention has been devoted to the diffusion of new technologies
and less emphasis has been placed on the increase of the usage of exist-
ing technologies, that however – on the light of the available empirical
evidence – is at least as important as the other.
The emphasis on the modelling of the nature and characteristics of
the diffusion processes of a technology hides indeed a more fundamen-
tal underlying question, related to the identification of the engines of
technology adoption. Several explanations on the mechanics of how and
why a technology spreads have been advanced, but in many cases they
remain agnostic on why a technology is chosen in the first place. Quite
obviously, the two issues – of choice and diffusion – are interdependent
and, moving backward, understanding the mechanics of diffusion helps
ex ante in identifying the best candidates for successful adoption. The
investigation of the determinants behind the adoption of a technology,
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whatever a new or an already existing one, assumes however a prominent
role. Such a question can be addressed from many different angles and
at many different levels – focusing on the individual adopter’s charac-
teristics, or on the properties of the industry in which it operates and,
even more generally, on those of the economy at large.
There is a rich empirical literature emphasizing the factors that are
most likely to influence technology adoption – and hence productivity
growth – and their disparities across countries. A correspondingly rich
theoretical literature has developed focusing on these determinants and
on the mechanism by which they end up affecting technology choice.
This chapter, starting in Section 2.1 from an analysis of the character-
istics and of the more consolidated approaches in modeling technology
diffusion, focuses on the factors behind the choice to adopt a technology.
Coherently with most of the literature on this topic, and with the frame-
work adopted in the core chapters of the dissertation, the attention is
concentrated almost exclusively on real factors (and especially on labor
market imperfections), neglecting the role of financial variables or cap-
ital market imperfections, without however implying that they do not
matter. The discussion of the available empirical evidence (mainly at the
cross-country level) in Section 2.2 presents the major stylized facts that
theories of technology adoption have to face. Finally, the main section
of the chapter (Section 2.3) discusses and evaluates, in the light of such
stylized facts, the main theories of technology adoption advanced in the
literature, broadly organized according to the engines of adoption they
focus on. Section 2.4 contains some concluding thoughts.
2.1 Modeling Technology Diffusion
Almost all empirical studies about technology adoption, beginning with
the seminal studies by Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961, 1963), stress
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that the typical technology diffusion curve is roughly S-shaped: adop-
tion is slow at first, it accelerates while spreading among potential users
and then it slows down again when the market for the technology be-
comes saturated. This dominant stylized fact concerning the dispersion
in the timing of technology adoption has traditionally been investigated
by means of two classes of models.1 The first, known as learning or epi-
demic model, assumes that not all agents (possibly with identical tastes)
are informed about the existence of a superior technology at the same
time. They are supposed to “learn” about the technology and acquire
the knowledge to operate it from their neighbors. Thus, as time passes
more people will adopt the technology until the market becomes satu-
rated and the process slows down again. Even though, as observed by
Geroski (2000), technologies (especially the new ones) take often longer
to be adopted than it takes for information to spread, the epidemic model
has the merit to emphasize the role of information flows – typically in
the form of technology-induced knowledge spillovers – in adoption and
diffusion processes. As we will discuss in some details throughout the
chapter, a large and ever growing literature deals with the importance
and the impact of spillover effects, emphasizing the variety of forms that
the speed, the pattern and the extent of knowledge flows can take.
At the core of the issue stays, however, the widely accepted stylized
fact that the knowledge of a technology (and the skills necessary to im-
plement it) is very costly to produce but very easy to reproduce, and
that firms are in most cases unable to appropriate all the benefits de-
riving from the technological innovations they introduce.2 Both Mankiw
(1995) and Parente and Prescott (2000), for example, think at techno-
1See Hall (2004), Hall and Khan (2003), and Geroski (2000) for extensive surveys of the literature
on technology diffusion.
2Bernstein (1988), Nadiri (1993), Griliches (1992), and Geroski (1995a,b), among many oth-
ers, document the (inter- and intra-industry) spillover effects associated to R&D and technological
choices. And Keller (2002a) analyses the spatial distribution of technological knowledge. A further
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logical knowledge as a form of knowledge widely available to firms and
individuals in all countries, although their views differ on its impact in
the explanation of cross-country productivity and technology differences.
The role of information flows and learning in technology diffusion has
been the object of careful investigation beside the classical formulation
of the epidemic model. A recent stream of literature – that looks at
technology adoption as a problem of investment under uncertainty in the
real options framework developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) – argues
that information plays a major role in the adopter’s decision problem (see,
for example, Stoneman, 2001). While the benefits of adoption are mainly
received throughout the life of the acquired technology, and are thus
uncertain, the corresponding costs are incurred at the time of adoption
and are typically sunk (especially those associated to the learning of
the technology). The presence of sunk costs of adoption – determining
irreversibility of the investment – implies that there is an option value
in waiting before sinking the adoption costs, so that firms may have an
incentive to delay adoption. It is as if the potential adopter holds a call
option to adopt the new technology that can be exercised at any time.
As for any other option, there is an advantage to exercise the option
when it is “deep in the money” (i.e. when the expected benefits are
well above the costs) providing a reason for delaying adoption. When
acquiring information on a technology is costly, agents may decide not to
acquire “complete” information about its benefits and costs, in order not
to incur these search costs. Similarly, the expected benefits of adopting
a technology may be difficult to assess precisely at first, increasing the
associated risks. Only when time passes and more information is acquired
expected benefits and risks can be re-evaluated. The existence of such
stream of literature investigates the flows of knowledge spillovers based on patent citations data; see,
for instance, Jaffee, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) and Jaffee, Trajtenberg and Fogarty (2000).
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learning and search costs in an uncertain environment, combined with
risk aversion, are likely to slow down technology adoption.3
This literature is to some extent related to a series of contributions
– dealing more generally with the existence of strategic complementar-
ities in discrete choices – on the determinants of implementation deci-
sions and on the possible sources of delays. Shleifer (1986) emphasizes
that firms may have an incentive to bunch their inventions and time the
adoption of new techniques when aggregate demand and profits are high,
exploiting the demand complementarities stemming from the underlying
interactions between agents.4 As for the possible reasons to delay choices,
Chamley and Gale (1994) and Gale (1996a) point to the importance of
information flows, stressing that agents may endogenously have an incen-
tive to delay their actions, even in the presence of a cost of delay, in order
to learn from the information created by others. Similarly, Gale (1996b)
emphasizes the fact that the actions undertaken by an agent can directly
affect the returns of others, making in some cases rational for the agent
to postpone her decisions.
By emphasizing the role of information (and the associated costs of
learning), along with that of uncertainty and of the adopter’s attitude
toward risk, this stream of literature extends the logic of the epidemic
model by adding to the picture the consideration of some of the adopter’s
characteristics – like the costs of acquiring information reflecting her
ability to learn and her attitude toward the risk – that remain however
exogenously given.
3Since uncertainty usually reduces over time, risk taking adopters are the first to choose a superior
technology, with risk averse users following (which is compatible with the S-shaped curve).
4The model has been one of the first to establish a systematic relationship between growth and
cycles via endogenous technology implementation cycles. See also Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993)
for a study of the link between the business cycle and the replacement of old machines.
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A further stream of contributions (see Arthur, 1989, and Geroski, 2000)
focuses on the observation that different variants of a technology can
reach the market, and that the first stages of the adoption process require
the choice among them. For the first adopters the choice is indeed an in-
vestment choice. If, due to several possible factors, one variant is preferred
to the others by the early adopters, more information will be generated
about that variant. As information spreads, subsequent adopters will be
less and less willing to experiment with other variants and herd behavior
will be observed (see Banerjee, 1992; and Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and
Welch, 1992), locking adopters in the initially chosen variant. This, in
turn, generates bandwagon effects (typically labeled as information cas-
cades in this literature), with late adopters imitating the early ones and
choosing the same variant, without incurring their costs. The early stage
of technology diffusion, being affected by a variety of reasons, may look
as stochastic. Only when the choice of a given variant is established and
lock-in occurs (a sort of legitimation process) the real diffusion of the
technology will start. Quite intuitively, many firms will wait for others
to make the initial (costly) choice (i.e. free-riding on their efforts), and
only when it becomes clear which variant is the successful one a burst of
adoption will be observed; with the whole process likely to give rise to
a S-shaped curve. Jovanovic and Lach (1989) and Jovanovic and Mac-
Donald (1994) focus on processes of this type, by emphasizing the role
of social learning.
What matters most for the adoption and diffusion of a technology,
according to the approach just outlined, are thus the early choices on
different variants of a technology, which are the major determinants of
the subsequent adoption. The most important open issues consist then in
investigating what are the factors determining – or at least influencing
– such choices or, in other words, what are the main characteristics of the
early adopters and of the “environment” (i.e. industries and countries) in
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which they operate. The emphasis on the characteristics of the adopter
and of the environment are indeed the imprint of the second class of
models traditionally used to explain the S-shaped diffusion curve. These
models, often labeled as probit models, are in fact based on the heterogene-
ity between adopters. In their classical basic formulation (well antecedent
the real options approach), these models derive the S-shaped curve by
assuming that potential adopters believe that the distribution of values
for the new product is normal, that the cost of the product is constant (or
monotonically decreasing over time), and that they adopt the new tech-
nology when their personal valuation of it is above its cost (or a certain
threshold function of the cost). The differences in the timing of adoption
are thus related to the heterogeneity of the potential adopters, allowing
for the investigation of the impact of several firm- (and country-) specific
potential determinants of technology choice.
Although both the epidemic and learning type diffusion models – be-
ing able to shed light on the mechanisms by which a technology gets
adopted and spread in the economy, and to fit the stylized facts – have
been very popular in the technology adoption literature, the fundamen-
tal underlying problem of what are the factors driving the choice of a
technology deserves further investigation. The following sections focus
on this issue, first by summarizing the empirical evidence on technolog-
ical choice and diffusion, and second by surveying the main classes of
theoretical models studying the determinants of technology adoption.
2.2 Empirical evidence and stylized facts
A wealth of information on the determinants of technology adoption
comes from cross-country studies investigating the disparities between
different economies, both at the macroeconomic and at the microeco-
nomic level (in terms for example of institutions, degree of development,
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factor endowments, and education). Recent empirical studies show that
a significant part of the productivity differentials among countries is due
to differences in the used technologies and especially to the delays in the
adoption of superior technologies, as emphasized among many others by
Caselli and Coleman (2003) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).
Most of the theories studying the cross-country technology adoption
problem explain the choice of different technologies in different countries
by stressing the role of some sort of transfer and/or adjustment costs.5
The major problem is then to identify the sources of such costs, or even
more fundamentally, the variables affecting technological choices.
A very clear indication emerging from the available cross-country em-
pirical evidence is that the adoption and diffusion patterns of most major
technologies have two main common features (see, for instance, Comin
and Hobijn, 2004). First, technology adoption follows a trickle down
mechanism that is robust across technologies and over time: most tech-
nologies are adopted first in leading countries and trickle down, often
with substantial delays (although the rate of convergence in technology
adoption has increased after the Second World War), to lagging coun-
tries that catch-up with the leaders, at least partially.6 Second, there
are significant lock-in effects in technology adoption, meaning that firms
continue to invest in non-frontier technologies well after a new technol-
ogy has been introduced. This second observation restates the stylized
fact already stressed above that technology adoption is a slow (S-shaped)
process.
A variety of factors influences technology adoption and contributes to
explain both the trickle-down adoption mechanism and the firms’ lock-
5See, among many others, Jovanovic and Lach (1989), Parente and Prescott (1994), Grossman
and Helpman (1991), and Anant, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1990).
6This is widely confirmed by the literature on convergence. See, for instance, Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1997), and Sala-I-Martin (1997).
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in in existing technologies. The empirical literature (see, among others,
Klenow and Rodrìquez-Clare, 1997 and Easterly and Levine, 2001) has
documented a strong correlation between growth rates – and levels –
of productivity (technology) and output per capita. This suggests that
technology adoption is significantly affected by the level of economic de-
velopment, and especially so for technologies in the earlier phases of their
life cycle, confirming the leading role of rich countries both in the inven-
tion and in the diffusion of new technologies. In the long run there are,
however, other factors affecting the adoption and diffusion processes of
a technology. Econometric investigations (see, among others, Comin and
Hobijn, 2004, Caselli and Coleman, 2001, Cohen and Levinthal, 1989,
and Wozniak, 1987) suggest that besides real GDP per capita, coeteris
paribus, education has a prominent role in explaining cross-country dis-
parities in technology adoption. Krueger and Kumar (2004) argue that
education, when compared to labor market rigidities or product market
regulation, plays a major role in explaining US-Europe technology-driven
growth differences. In particular, they maintain that a change in the focus
of European policies from skill-specific education towards more general
and flexible educational choices at the upper secondary level might re-
duce the growth gap between US and Europe that has emerged since
the mid-1980s. It is interesting to underline that, whereas GDP proves
to be important both across technologies and over time, education has
played a more important role after the World War II. Moreover, while
in the period before 1970 secondary education has been the most rele-
vant educational variable to affect adoption patterns for skill-intensive
technologies, in the post-1970 period college level degrees have been the
ones to matter most. This is consistent with the view of complemen-
tarity among new technologies and college level skills, documented in
the literature: see for example Caselli and Coleman (2001), showing that
income and human capital are the main determinants of computers adop-
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tion (together with trade openness and the overall investment rate in the
country), or Acemoglu (2002a) relating the increase in the U.S. college
wage premium for the last sixty years to the demand of skilled workers.
Also trade related variables, and especially the degree of openness of
a country, play a role in the adoption of superior technologies, not nec-
essarily in the form of direct adoption of more advanced technologies,
but seemingly more in terms of knowledge spillovers arising from the re-
lationships with more advanced trading partners, that allow a country
to better operate the adopted technologies.7 Institutional factors play a
role as well. Data conform to intuition suggesting, on the one hand, that
a more effective executive – in enforcing property rights and in deal-
ing with the potential distortions originated by interest groups – has
a positive effect on the intensity of technology adoption. On the other
hand, a more “effective” legislative power might have a negative impact
on adoption, since it increases the incentives for incumbents to lobby the
legislator in order to block the adoption of superior technologies. These
incentives are, however, reduced when the degree of party fractionaliza-
tion in the parliament becomes higher (see, among the others, Grossman
and Helpman, 2001). Finally, technology adoption is in many cases pos-
itively and significantly affected by the interaction among technologies,
and especially by the intensity with which previous (frontier) technolo-
gies have been adopted. This suggests that the accumulated knowledge
reduces adoption costs, by downsizing the importance of lock-in effects
(i.e. reducing switching costs), and – as far as it is transferrable across
technologies (meaning that the old and the new technologies require com-
plementary skills at least to a certain extent) – reduces the chances that
leapfrogging will emerge.
7See Keller (2002b) for a survey, both at the theoretical and empirical levels, on international
technology diffusion.
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The overall picture that seems to emerge from the cross-country empir-
ical literature is that – besides the role of GDP per capita and human
capital (proxied by primary and secondary education, and by tertiary
college level education starting in the seventies) – the type of political
regime (spreading of parliamentary democracies), and trade openness
have been important drivers behind the rapid catch-up of many coun-
tries in the post-war period.8 The degree of homogeneity among advanced
countries in terms of the above dimensions has increased after the sec-
ond world war, rendering technology less localized, as stressed by Keller
(2002a). This in turn has implied a reduction of technology adoption bar-
riers, leading towards a more uniform diffusion of technological knowledge
across advanced economies (i.e. and thus towards an increase of the speed
at which technologies trickle down from leaders to followers). It is, how-
ever, important to recall that, although providing useful evidence and
highlighting the stylized facts characterizing adoption processes, interna-
tional comparisons do not reveal the whole set of determinants behind
technology adoption, being limited both by data availability and by com-
parability issues (that necessarily imply to exclude factors that are not
available for all countries included in the sample). There are many mi-
croeconomic determinants – for which only case or sectorial studies are
sometimes available – that are left out of the analysis, even though they
are very likely to be important determinants of the choice of a technology,
as it will be stressed in the next section.9
8This literature is closely connected with the contributions dealing with growth and development
that emphasize the role of these factors. A recent empirical literature focuses, in fact, on the impact
on growth of exogenous factors such as available resources, infrastructures and political regimes.
See, for instance, Barro (1991), Sala-I-Martin (1997), Hall and Jones (1997), and Sachs and Warner
(1997).
9 See Hall and Khan (2003) for a recent survey focused on the major microeconomic factors playing
a role in the choice of technology, both at the theoretical and at the empirical level.
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2.3 Theories of Technology Adoption
Many theories have been developed to explain technology adoption based
on different classes of relevant variables. One obvious way to evaluate
their “performance” is to make them to face the facts; i.e. to scrutinize
their ingredients and logical implications in the light of the stylized facts
and empirical evidence. In doing so, the survey in the following pages
classifies the different models on the basis of the main engines that are
responsible for the choice of technology.
2.3.1 The vintage capital models
One of the most popular theories of technology adoption remains the
vintage capital model, developed almost half a century ago by Johansen
(1959) and Solow (1960) to study the growth of the capital stock both
along the intensive and the extensive margin. The main underlying as-
sumption in this type of models is that of a persistent increase in the
quality of the new vintages of capital goods. In most models applying
the vintage capital model logic to technology adoption (besides the clas-
sical references to Johansen, 1959, and Solow, 1960, see, for instance,
Laitner and Stolyarov, 2003), the above assumption has the major im-
plication that firms (or countries) have an incentive to invest only in
frontier technologies, i.e. those embodying the highest quality capital
stock.10 Once a new vintage has been introduced there is no longer gross
investment in older vintages and the fraction of the capital stock em-
bodying older vintages capital depreciates reducing over time. In this
sense, new technologies always dominate older ones and, once available,
should be implemented instantaneously. At the microeconomic level, this
implies that once a superior technology becomes available there should be
10Parente (2000) is an exception in that firms do not necessarily adopt the frontier technology
when switching technologies.
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no firms adopting a different technology, so that firms always adopt the
frontier technology only. At the macroeconomic (cross-country) level, vin-
tage capital models suggest that less developed countries, adopting new
technologies intensively in order to build up their capital stock, should
catch up with respect to richer ones, whose capital stocks remain (at
least partly) stuck in older technologies.11 The fact that countries with
lower GDP build up their capital stock by investing in frontier technolo-
gies should in turn imply the existence of a negative correlation between
technology adoption and real GDP. Unfortunately, however, both im-
plications of the vintage capital model – the adoption of the frontier
technology with no delays and the “catch up” hypothesis – are not con-
sistent with the stylized facts described above. Indeed, many technologies
are subject to long implementation periods in which older technologies
continue to be adopted (meaning that there is a lock-in period in which
old non-frontier technologies still dominate) and, moreover, there is no
clear evidence of a negative correlation between real GDP per capita
and technology adoption. On the contrary, rich countries are typically
the first to adopt new technologies.12 In this sense most of the vintage
capital literature, while establishing a link between capital accumulation
and technology adoption, fails in explaining the disparities in technology
adoption both across firms and across countries.
The question left open by the classical formulation of the vintage cap-
ital model on why firms keep adopting non-frontier technologies has
prompted, since the early 1990s, a new stream of literature often re-
ferred to as vintage human capital models (see, for instance, Jovanovic
11The same holds true at the firm level. Firms having invested in relatively new vintages of capital
stock have an higher opportunity cost (especially if the installed capital is specific and hence the
capital costs are sunk) to switch to a superior technology with respect to firms with older and less
valuable vintages.
12There seems, however, to be a correlation between the economic cycle and the scrapping of old
technologies, with increasing rates observed during recessions. See Caballero and Hammour, 1994.
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and Nyarko, 1996; Chari and Hopenhayn, 1991; and Brezis, Krugman and
Tsiddon, 1993). The unifying feature of these models is the idea that op-
erating a given technology workers accumulate experience, or in other
words acquire (technology) specific human capital, whose value would be
lost (or substantially reduced) if a new technology is adopted, obviously
provided technologies are not complementary to a sufficient extent. This
fact reduces the incentives to adopt a superior technology, generating a
sort of lock-in effect, and explain why firms and workers stick to older
technologies and continue to invest in them even when superior technolo-
gies are at hand. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), for example, show that
the scrappage of experience due to the adoption of a superior technol-
ogy generates a lock-in effect that can be so significant as to prevent the
adoption of frontier technologies.13
Although economic history provides several examples of situations in
which vintage human capital can be important (i.e. technologies for which
there is little doubt that the accumulation of technology specific skills can
account for the delays in the adoption of technologies that would replace
those skills), there are many technologies that do not seem to require
significant technology specific skills and many others that are comple-
mentary to previously developed technologies, rendering the accumulated
experience easily transferrable.
Moreover, as stressed by Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993) and like
in the classical vintage capital model, the countries (or industries) that
have invested the most in a given set of technologies should be those
13As shown by Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000), a similar argument holds for physical capital as
well. If old capital has a in-house value that is not recognized by the market, there is an opportunity
cost in replacing it. As a consequence, the adjustment of technology (in the form of capital inputs)
can be delayed. Furthermore, it may be asynchronous even for strongly complementary inputs. Firms
may in fact be able to “reduce the fixed costs of repeated upgrades by upgrading an input by a lot,
and then waiting for the quality of the other input to catch up” (Jovanovic and Stolyarov, 2000, p.
15).
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that have the most to suffer, in terms of loss of accumulated experience
(specific skills), in switching to a new technology. This suggests that, if
vintage human capital arguments are the main explanations for the ob-
served adoption lags, there should be leapfrogging in the choice of differ-
ent technologies, and a negative correlation between technology adoption
and real GDP per-capita. Thus, as the vintage (physical) capital model,
the vintage human capital model suggests that poorer countries should
be the first to adopt a superior technology, implying the validity of the
“catch up” hypothesis; an implication, however, that is not confirmed
by the empirical evidence. Differently from the vintage (physical) cap-
ital model, the human capital one predicts, nevertheless, that there is
lock-in in older technologies, allowing for the possibility of long delays in
technology adoption.
2.3.2 The innovator-imitator model, general purpose technologies and
network effects
The unanswered question why richer countries tend to innovate and adopt
technologies first, while laggards are slower to adopt and mostly imitate
the technologies introduced by the “leaders” has been recently investi-
gated by a further class of models known as innovator-imitator models.
Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002) argue that the prospect of knowledge
spillovers flowing from leader countries (firms) to followers may induce
the followers to reduce their efforts in order to free ride. Moreover, since
by investing more a follower would see reduced its ability to copy others
in the future (under the assumption that the more one knows the less
can learn from others), laggards do not have an incentive to invest as fast
as they would otherwise. This may explain why some firms (countries)
innovate and adopt superior technologies first, while others delay their
adoption and do not have an incentive to catch up as long as there are
free-riding opportunities. Along the same lines, Barro and Sala-I-Martin
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(1997), building on a Romer (1990) type growth model, claim that long
run growth is driven by the introduction of new technologies by lead-
ing countries, while the other countries find it more convenient to copy
the technologies adopted by the leaders, due to the lower costs of im-
itation with respect to invention and development. As far as imitation
costs remain low, followers are fast growing and catch up the leaders.
However, as more inventions get copied, imitation costs tend to rise low-
ering the growth rate of the followers that end up lagging behind the
leader persistently.14 Both models, by stressing the strategic role of im-
itation and adjustment costs, are successful in explaining equilibria in
which the (rich) leader countries are the first to adopt new technologies
while the others are lagging behind. They fail, however, in identifying
the leaders and the followers, that are exogenously given in both cases.
In other words, they are unable to isolate the determinants of adoption
disparities, and thus to explain one of the two stylized facts discussed
above, i.e. the observed lock-in old technologies.
A theory that fits both stylized facts has been proposed in the late
nineties by Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), that focus on the adoption
of exogenously given General Purpose Technologies. The central tenet of
the theory is a rather intuitive one: the first countries to adopt a technol-
ogy are those needing the least expenses in complementary innovations
(technologies) and having the biggest increase in demand when adopt-
ing at an early stage. The delay in adopting a technology depends on
the time needed to implement complementary innovations.15 To better
understand how complementary innovations are to be intended, it is use-
14The main point in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1997) is to show the emergence of a pattern of
conditional convergence. As they stress, in their model of technology diffusion, the increasing costs
of imitation play the same role of diminishing returns to capital in the Neoclassical model.
15Richer countries are typically those having the more complementary technologies to a new tech-
nology already in place.
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ful to stress that general purpose technologies are particularly exposed
to network effects, relating the value of a technology to the number of
agents using it. These effects can be both direct, meaning that the bene-
fit from adopting a technology is directly proportional to the size of the
network, and indirect, when the benefit is increasing in the availability
of complementary goods. Both types of network externalities, by influ-
encing the expected benefits from a technology, have a significant impact
on its adoption, both via a lock-in effect (the incentives to try a different
technology decrease in the diffusion of the established one) and a risk-
creating effect (early adopters making the wrong choice can end up being
stuck with a technology failing to generate the network externalities it is
in principle capable of).16 As mentioned above, this is especially true for
general purpose technologies as stressed, for example, by David (1990) –
focusing on the introduction of the electric dynamo – and by Brynjolfs-
son and Hitt (2000), as well as Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)
– investigating the diffusion of information technologies – that high-
light, respectively, the role of the physical and managerial reorganization
of business as complementary innovations to the adoption of a superior
technology.
2.3.3 The role of factor endowments
The specific factors most likely to explain adoption disparities still remain
to be identified. One first explanatory candidate in this respect relies on
the diversities in factors’ endowments between countries and industries
– or more precisely on the differences in the stocks of physical (i.e. the
state of the capital goods sector) and human capital (i.e. the skill level of
workers, or the level of education) – likely to generate relevant switch-
16See, for instance, Farrell and Saloner (1986), Cabral (1990), and Choi (1997). The impact of
network externalities is documented by the empirical literature as well: see, among others, Saloner
and Shepard (1995).
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ing costs between an established technology and a new one. As stressed
by Rosenberg (1976a), if a technology requires complementary skills and
capital goods that are costly or need time to be acquired, then adoption
may be delayed. Similarly, Mankiw (1995) relates the differences in tech-
nology choices and per-capita income across countries to the availability
of complementary factors, and particularly of physical and human capi-
tal. The same applies to the supply of engineering capacities: if they are
inadequate, the step between the conceptualization of the idea and the
effective adoption of the technology may take longer. A similar argument
holds also for human capital as highlighted for instance by Lucas (1990
and 1993), who stresses the positive link between the level of education
and the adoption of advanced technologies, as well as the role of human
capital externalities in favoring investment in already rich countries.
From a theoretical perspective, there are several ways in which factor
endowments and factor prices can influence technology adoption. On the
one hand, a technology can be complementary to a specific factor of pro-
duction, so that the (marginal) value of the technology is increasing in the
level of that factor. As emphasized by Jovanovic (1998), factor-technology
complementarity has an important impact on technology adoption: a
country (or firm) lacking that factor will adopt the technology (if it
does) after a country that has a rich endowment of it. On the other
hand, as stressed by Acemoglu (2002a), when the price of a factor is
relatively high, firms have an incentive to adopt technologies that allow
them to save on that factor (factor saving technologies), suggesting that
technology and factors of production can be substitute. This explains,
for example, why technology adoption tends to be strongly influenced
by the prevailing wage rates in the market: the higher the wage rate, the
more profitable the adoption of labor saving technologies.17 Moreover, the
17See, more generally, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) for a discussion of the link between wages and
technology dispersion in a setting with costly search to gather information about jobs.
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higher the wage rate the higher the value of time and, thus, the higher
the incentives to adopt time-saving technologies. Hannan and McDowell
(1984a, b), for example, illustrate the relevance of this channel for ATM
adoption in the banking industry, documenting a strong positive corre-
lation between the prevailing wage rate and the adoption decision. The
link between technology adoption and the prices of factors of production
is stressed also by Zeira (1998) – with respect to capital goods – who
emphasizes that technological progress requires increasing quantities of
capital, whose price has thus an impact on technical change.
A further, and more general, channel relating technology and factor
endowments (stressed, for instance, by Basu and Weil, 1998, Acemoglu
and Zilibotti, 2001, and Caselli and Coleman, 2003) is based on the idea
that the successful implementation of a superior technology requires an
appropriate set of endowments or, more generally, an adequate level of
development.
The available empirical evidence tends to confirm that factor endow-
ments, broadly defined, play a significant role in technology adoption.
For example, as predicted by the appropriate technology models, Comin
and Hobijn (2004) find that the dispersion in technologies across coun-
tries is larger than the dispersion in income per capita levels. Among
factor endowments, the endowment of human capital plays an important
role. For instance, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) find that the speed at
which a country adopt new (typically skill-biased) technologies is related
to its human capital endowment. Similarly, Caselli and Coleman (2001)
show that high levels of education are an important explanatory variable
for the adoption of computers at the cross-country level, confirming the
relevance of capital-skill complementarity. More generally, as it will be
discussed in greater details in the next chapter, for a great part of the
20th-century (and most so since the Seventies) technical change has been
significantly skill-biased (see, for example, Goldin and Katz, 1998). This
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bias has been a response to profit opportunities, which are in turn a con-
sequence of the increase in the supply of skilled workers. Coherently with
this observation, Acemoglu (1998, 2002a) proposes a theory of directed
technical change based on the idea that technology adoption is directed
toward the more profitable areas. Two main factors are responsible for
the profitability of a technology: a price effect and a market size ef-
fect. The first recognizes that technologies mainly used in the production
of more expensive goods are demanded more, so that improvements in
these technologies are more profitable. The second points to the fact that
technologies that are used by a greater number of workers are more prof-
itable, because a larger market size allows for greater sales and profits.
The market size effect is indeed what accounts for the skill-bias in recent
technology adoption according to this theory: the more skilled workers
are available, the more profitable the adoption of skill-complementary
technologies.
2.3.4 Market structure, firm size and strategic interaction
The above discussion suggests that factors of production play a key role
in driving technology adoption (and productivity) differentials. Nonethe-
less, other variables have an important explanatory power as well. Among
them, several “supply” determinants – in addition to the availability of
complementary inputs (skills and capital goods) – may play a signifi-
cant role in explaining the patterns of technology diffusion.18 Examples
of these effects are the technological expectations about the improvements
in a technology after its introduction, the pace of advancements in the
technological frontier, the discovery of new uses of a technology (and
therefore the expectations on users and market growth), and the im-
18See Sutton (1998) for a comprehensive analysis of the links between market structure and tech-
nology, and Cheung and Pascual (2001), among others, for an empirical investigation of the effects
of product market structure and technology diffusion on productivity differentials.
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provements in old technologies stimulated by the introduction of a new
one. For instance, Rosenberg (1976b) claims that a rapid rate of tech-
nological change may induce a slow rate of technology adoption (diffu-
sion) because of the fear by potential adopters to saddle themselves with
a “soon-to-be-obsolete” technology. Conversely, whenever technological
change slows down, technology adoption accelerates because of the ex-
pectations by adopters that the technology frontier will not move fast.
Hence, expectations about the pace of technological advancements play
an important role in technology adoption and diffusion.
More generally, on the one hand, the efficiency gains from a technology
are much bigger after its introduction (because the imperfections are
gradually eliminated, complementary inputs and processes are developed
and new markets and uses for the technology are possibly identified),
and thus its diffusion is a function of the induced improvements to it.19
On the other hand, firms producing an existing technology that is a
close substitute for a new one can strategically improve their technology,
or engage in competitive practices aimed at slowing (or blocking) the
diffusion of the new technology.20
The industrial organization literature has emphasized the role of strate-
gic interactions between competing firms as a factor that can substan-
tially affect the timing of adoption (see, for example, the early paper by
Kamien and Schwartz, 1972 and, for a textbook treatment, Tirole, 1994).
Firms (especially those for which a superior technology complements ex-
isting activities) may have an incentive to adopt earlier – anticipating
19These observations describe a legitimation process of the new technology similar in many respect
to the standard setting processes. On this point see, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985), and Farrel
and Saloner (1985, 1986).
20This can contribute to explain the persistence of old technologies and the self-interested resistance
to new technology as documented, among others, by Mokyr (1990, 2002). More generally, the role
of suppliers, and the degree of upstream competition, in the adoption and diffusion of a technology
has been widely investigated in the technology diffusion literature (see, for instance, Geroski, 2000).
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that the market will get crowded and returns will decrease – to be able
to establish entry barriers to pre-empt rivals, or to exploit product differ-
entiation (on the last point, see Schmalensee, 1982). On a related note,
confirmed by the available empirical evidence, incumbent firms are slow
in adopting superior technologies in markets where entry barriers are
high. Furthermore, firms whose existing activities would suffer from the
introduction of a superior technology have an incentive to delay adoption
in order to avoid rent-displacement effects.
Since Schumpeter’s and Arrow’s contributions on the incentives for in-
novative activity (Schumpeter, 1942; Arrow, 1962) the influence of mar-
ket structure and firm size in the diffusion of (new) technologies has
been widely investigated (see, among others, Reinganum, 1981a,b, and
Quirmbach, 1986). The classical Schumpeterian argument points in the
direction of a positive impact of firm size and market structure on tech-
nology adoption, holding that big firms and those controlling a large
market share are more likely to adopt new technologies since they are
better equipped to sustain the costs associated to the initial investment
in a superior technology. This is so for a variety of reasons. First, only
firms having sufficient market power find adoption profitable, since profits
are decreasing in the degree of competition. Second, in presence of asym-
metric information and hence imperfect capital markets, bigger firms may
have an easier access to the financial resources necessary for the introduc-
tion of a new technology, besides being eventually better able to attract
the human capital and the physical resources that are needed. Third,
big firms have typically more diversification opportunities to spread the
risks associated to the introduction of a new technology in the presence
of uncertainty, that can otherwise substantially slow down the diffusion
of a technology (as discussed in Section 2.1). Fourth, the presence of
monopoly power renders imitation more difficult and increases the ex-
pected duration of rents (see, among others, Davidson and Segerstrom,
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1998). Finally, as far as a new technology is generating economies of
scale, larger firms are quicker in adopting it because they can capture
the economies of scale more quickly and spread the adoption costs across
a larger number of units.21 Since adopting a technology can require costly
investments (in terms, for example, of complementary inputs, workers’
training, loss of production time, and network effects), in the presence
of an uncertain demand, firms are likely to be uncertain whether and
when they will be able to recover such costs. As a consequence, it may
be possible that they decide not to adopt (or to postpone adoption),
even when it is clear that the adoption would increase productivity or
product quality. In these cases, being a large and well established firm
in the market, and hence having the possibility to count on customers’
commitment and stable relationships, can improve the coordination of
decisions and the incentives for adoption.
There are, however, strong arguments pointing in the opposite direc-
tion and suggesting a negative impact of market power and firms’ size
on technology adoption.22 Some theoretical studies have indeed analyzed
issues of innovation and diffusion in perfectly competitive environments
(see, as recent examples, Boldrin and Levine, 2002a, 2002b). The classi-
cal argument – put forth by Arrow (1962) – builds on the idea that
in a competitive environment a new entrant has more to gain than a
monopolist from the introduction of an innovation, as the latter would
21The Schumpeterian stream of the endogenous growth literature has largely focused on the role of
monopoly rents as a stimulus for innovative activity (see, among the others, Aghion and Howitt, 1992
and Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos, 1990). Also, there is a rich empirical literature reporting a
positive correlation between firm size and (the speed of) technology adoption. Hannan and McDowell
(1984a, 1984b) have found evidence of the relevance of the above factors for the adoption of ATM
by U.S. banks in the Seventies. Similar results have been found in a more recent study by Saloner
and Shepard (1995). Rose and Joskow (1990) have documented the same correlation for the electric
utility industry.
22One of the most well known empirical studies finding evidence of a negative correlation between
firm size and technology adoption is the one by Oster (1982) focusing on the steel industry.
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replace part of its existing profits (rents) by innovating, while such (ex-
tra) profits would be completely new for the entrant. Hence, a (perfectly)
competitive environment is more favorable to innovation.
Along the same lines, Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) sug-
gest that product market competition increases firms’ incentives to in-
novate in order to escape it, and that imitation is beneficial in that it
promotes more frequent “neck-and-neck” competition. In addition, an
increase in competition, by lowering market prices, can have a positive
impact on the diffusion of a new technology.23 Furthermore, the decision
making process in large firms may be slow due to excessive bureaucrati-
zation, and the adoption of superior technologies can be discouraged by
the impact of lock-in or network effects. Large firms may, in fact, have hu-
man capital and physical resources sunk in the old technology, rendering
expensive the adoption of a new technology that requires different types
of resources, as already noted when discussing the importance of factor
endowments for technology adoption. The same holds true for networks
when the adoption of a technology implies the re-design of the standard
on which the network is based; and for firms having a solid customers
base, for fears that the new technology will not be well suited for their
customers’ needs (see, for example, Christensen, 1997).
2.3.5 Trade, institutions and private interests
Other environmental and institutional variables, besides those directly
related to the firm’s activity or the industry’s structure considered above,
are likely to be important in technology adoption. One of such variables,
investigated by the recent literature in a cross-country perspective, is
23Beside the role of technology improvements, the degree of competition in the sector supplying
the new technology has an impact on adoption. This has been the case, for example, in the mobile
telecommunications industry, as documented by Gruber and Verboven (2001) and Parker and Röller
(1997) for the European Union and the United States, respectively.
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trade.24 A major feature of the last three decades has been the increased
globalization in production and the greater volume of trade between the
OECD countries and the less developed countries.
From a theoretical perspective, trade has several effects. On the one
hand, Grossman and Helpman (1991) stress that countries importing
more goods get more exposed to new technologies and are, thus, more
likely to adopt them. This effect is known as push effect: imports embody-
ing new technologies typically imply a high level of knowledge transfer,
that in turn induces spillover effects – via a learning process – that are
likely to stimulate the adoption of superior technologies. Caselli and Cole-
man (2001), for example, document the importance of the push effect for
the adoption of computer technology and its diffusion across countries;
and Caselli and Wilson (2004) generalize the analysis disaggregating the
imports of various types of equipment and explaining the differences in
investment composition in terms of the degree of complementarity of each
type of capital with other factors whose abundance differs across coun-
tries. Moreover, in the second half of the Nineties a number of papers has
emphasized the existence of a relationship among productivity levels and
investments in research and development by trading partner, confirming
the relevance of international R&D spillovers and thus the importance of
trade for international technology diffusion (see, among others, Coe and
Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1997; and Keller, 2002b,
for a review of the subject).
24See Keller (2002b) for a comprehensive survey discussing the significance of further channels of
international diffusion of technology in addition to trade, and namely the impact of foreign direct
investment. Recent works have shown that international technology diffusion is an important source
of productivity growth and of per-capita income differentials in OECD countries (see, among others,
Eaton and Kortum, 2001, and Keller, 2002a). Furthermore, as stressed by Keller (2002b), its impor-
tance is even more evident in poorer and developing countries, for many of which foreign technologies
are likely to be the most important sources of productivity growth . Strong technology diffusion, by
equalizing differences in technologies across countries, qualifies thus as an important force toward
convergence in income, especially in a world experiencing increasing levels of economic integration.
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On the other hand, Holmes and Schmitz (2001) consider a model in
which domestic producers use a significant amount of resources in order
to protect themselves against foreign competitors.25 These attempts are,
however, unable to effectively protect domestic producers against foreign
competition – the argument goes – and, when trade barriers are elim-
inated, firms start spending their resources more productively to sustain
the international competition, which in turn promotes innovation. This
is a pull effect: trade liberalization forces firms to become more com-
petitive, reducing the monopoly power of domestic firms and stimulating
technology adoption as a result (as well as the efficiency in the utilization
of domestic resources and in pricing behavior).
Finally, a third and related effect of trade passes through the change in
relative prices, affecting technology profitability. As argued by Acemoglu
(2003a), trade creates a tendency for the price of skill-intensive goods to
increase and this (via the price effect discussed in Section 2.3.3) directs
technical change, by rendering skill-biased technologies more profitable
and thus stimulating their adoption.
Comin and Hobijn (2004) find that trade exposure and international
competitiveness, via the combination of the three effects just described,
might have played a non-negligible role as a driving force behind technol-
ogy adoption for the majority of the world most industrialized countries,
especially after the Second World War.
A further set of variables likely to contribute significantly in shaping
technology adoption is related to the role of institutions: ranging from
the design of the political institutions and of the legal system them-
selves to the potential influencing power of private (social, political and
economic) interests. Economic history (see Comin and Hobijn, 2004, for
25This has been often argued to be the case for the manufacturing sectors of developing countries,
that have traditionally been protected and heavily regulated. On the point and its implications see
Tybout (2000).
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anecdotal evidence) provides plenty of cases in which the introduction
of a new technology threats the interests of some categories of people
that, therefore, try their best to prevent its adoption in order to con-
tinue appropriate the rents granted to them by the previous technology.
For example, this might be the case of unions representing workers being
displaced by the adoption of labor saving technologies. At the opposite,
but for the same reasons, there are agents – those controlling a specific
technology – pushing forward its adoption in order to reap the rents it
yields: for example, firms supplying a specific technology getting involved
in lobbying activities to keep or increase their market power.26
It is immediate to see that the conflicts among different interests may
result in significant barriers to technology adoption. Parente and Prescott
(1994, 1999, 2000), for instance, emphasize the importance of this type
of factors in blocking the adoption of superior technologies. They focus
on the role of monopolistic agreements, showing that the existence of a
coalition of labor suppliers, selling their input under monopolistic condi-
tions to all firms, can prevent the entry in the industry of other coalitions
(of workers) having access to a superior technology, but over which the
original coalition does not have monopoly rights, blocking therefore its
adoption. They also show that the elimination of these barriers promotes
the adoption of superior technologies and leads to significant increases
in productivity, proving to be an important determinant of the level of
development.
The self-appearing importance for technology adoption of institutional
factors, and of the issues related to the enforcement of property rights,
prompted a literature on the impact and (endogenous) design of different
26Caballero and Hammour (1998), for instance, argue that technology choices are influenced by
the presence of specific quasi-rents – with “appropriated” factors excluding the others – and
stress the role of institutions, in the long run, to alleviate the macroeconomic consequences of rent
appropriation.
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institutional frameworks. Not surprisingly, there is a wide consensus that
democracies, along with strong and well developed judiciary systems, are
better equipped to preserve property rights and prevent interest groups
from blocking the adoption of superior technologies.27 Institutions play
an important role in determining the enforceability of contracts as well,
which in turn can have relevant implications on the adoption and diffu-
sion of new technologies. As shown by Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini
(2003), as far as entrepreneurs enter into long-term contract relationships
with financial intermediaries, limited contract enforceability, by inducing
financial frictions, can substantially delay the diffusion of specific tech-
nologies, adding to the list of complementary explanations for the delays
in technology adoption.28
On a related note, a stream of literature has investigated the rela-
tionship between vested interests’ (distorting) influence and the form of
government (see, for instance, Bordignon, Colombo and Galmarini, 2003;
and for a comprehensive analysis Grossman and Helpman, 2001), showing
how the splitting of competencies between central and local governments
may reduce the distortions associated to lobbying activities, while local
governments are more vulnerable to them.
2.3.6 Government intervention
Technology adoption can be affected in various ways by government inter-
vention, as stressed among others by Hall and Khan (2003) and Geroski
(2000). It is well known that there are several interacting sources of si-
27See, for example, the discussion in Comin and Hobijn (2004), and especially Lizzeri and Persico
(2003). As for the link between property rights enforcement and economic development see, among
others, North (1981 and 1991); and, for a theoretical analysis of the impact of the allocation of
property rights on innovative activities, see Aghion and Tirole (1994).
28This finding is consistent with the evidence discussed by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) for
information technologies, as well as for other technological revolutions, as reported by Freeman and
Soete (1997).
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multaneous market failures associated to the development, the adoption
and the diffusion of technology. Issues related to the appropriability of
a technology benefits, the deterioration of incentives in the presence of
spillovers, the misalignment of profits and social benefits, just to cite a
few, render the problems associated to technology adoption (and devel-
opment) quite similar to those posed by public goods (see, for instance,
Spence, 1984).29 There is, then, a need for public intervention. As far as
the above problems relate to innovations, the most immediate form of
intervention is through the design of patent protection schemes aimed at
allocating intellectual property rights, taking into account trade-offs like
the one between static and dynamic efficiency, or that between develop-
ment and diffusion of innovations. This is the object of a vast stream of
literature dealing with innovation.30 However, as our interest is more in
the adoption of already available technologies, we focus instead on two
of the most direct forms of public sector intervention directly affecting
them: fiscal instruments and regulation.31
First and foremost governments can use a wide array of fiscal instru-
ments to promote public policies that stimulate or, conversely, slow down
(generating switching costs) the adoption and diffusion of a technology.32
Various types of subsidies are, indeed, available to improve efficiency and
29As an example, the presence of knowledge spillovers entails that firms do not reap all the benefits
from their investments because of free-riding effects (imitators, in fact, do not suffer the costs of
developing the technology), and this reduces their incentives to adopt new technologies.
30 See Crespi (2004) for a brief survey of the relationships between patents and innovation and,
more generally, for a multi-perspective analysis of the determinants of innovation.
31 In doing so, we leave aside the investigation of many other potentially important issues, such
as the impact of institutional reforms on technology adoption and diffusion. It is enough to think,
for example, to the possible consequences of reforms that lead to a greater enforcement of contracts,
or that affect the distribution of property rights. Furthermore, also informal institutions that are
difficult to change in the short run are influenced by institutional reforms; and, in turn, changes in
the environment impact on technology adoption processes.
32 It is important to note that not only the particular instrument used, but also the timing (es-
pecially when the choice between different variants of a technology are considered) and the extent
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to promote the building up of physical and human capital in order to
help the adoption of superior technologies. Furthermore, it is worth notic-
ing that fiscal instruments, besides improving efficiency and help solving
problems of “underprovision”, can have a direct role also in shaping the
characteristics of the adoption process; for example, by introducing taxes
to discourage the adoption of old and inefficient technologies.
Second, public policy affects technology adoption through regulation,
both directly by means of various forms of economic regulation (via their
impact on market structure and competition); and indirectly through
more general forms of regulation (not necessarily of a direct economic
content). There are, in fact, forms of regulation – for example, those
designed for environmental purposes– that can either prohibit or require
the use of certain types of technologies, thus dampening or stimulating
the adoption of specific techniques. More generally, regulation influences
the variables in which firms compete and, in doing so, may direct the
adoption of certain types of technologies (as it is most evident in the
presence of standard setting policies). Focusing on economic regulation,
consistently with what emphasized when discussing the impact of market
structure and firm size, interventions granting large market shares to
incumbents, and rendering the entry of new firms more difficult, can
reduce the incentives to adopt cost-reducing superior technologies, but
at the same time increase the expected benefits of adoption if only a
limited number of firms is operating in the market. Similarly, antitrust
authorities and a regulatory environment promoting competition (as well
as the implementation of strategic trade policies) may either stimulate
– by lowering prices, providing the right incentives to existing firms, or
establishing favorable conditions for new entrants – or slow down – by
(how selective the policy is) of policy interventions are likely to influence the technology adoption
process.
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eliminating the possible “Schumpeterian” advantages related to firm size
and market concentration – the technology adoption process.
Finally, it is worth noting that, besides the impact of the government
as policy maker (via its role of tax setting agency and regulator), public
procurement can be an important tool of technology policy on its own.
The public sector, in fact, is very often a heavy consumer of technol-
ogy, and an informed one as well as relatively insensitive to price, so its
behavior can somehow lead the diffusion process of a technology.
2.4 Concluding Thoughts
The analysis in the previous sections highlighted several issues that the-
ories of technology adoption must deal with. All the available evidence
stresses that technology diffusion processes follow a S-shaped pattern,
with adoption being slow at first, indicating the existence of (possibly
significant) delays in the diffusion of superior technologies. This finding
is further confirmed by cross-country investigations, showing that tech-
nology adoption follows a trickle down mechanism that is robust across
technologies and over time. Most technologies are adopted first in leading
advanced economies, and subsequently, but often in a delayed manner,
spread to lagging countries. A variety of theories have been advanced to
investigate adoption dynamics, mostly focusing on the role of different
determinants for the patterns of technology adoption.
There are at least three aspects of the theories surveyed above that are
worth stressing once again in the light of the technology adoption frame-
work we will develop in the following chapters. First, the theories most
consistent with both stylized facts – the slowness of adoption and the
observation that leading firms (countries) are adopting first – are those
relating to the so called general purpose technologies. Their key feature is
the claim that the first firms (economies) to adopt a superior technology
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are those needing the least expenses in complementary innovations (tech-
nologies) and observing the biggest increase in demand when adopting
at an early stage. The first part of the statement amounts to say that the
incentives for the adoption of superior technologies increase the higher
the complementarity between the old technology and the new one.
Second, both the empirical and the theoretical literature have stressed
the role of labor, and more generally of human capital, in the adoption
of superior technologies. For instance, the relationship between workers’
characteristics and technology adoption, the impact of wages or the role
of labor as a complementary or substitute factor of production affecting
the choice of a technology have been widely emphasized.
Third, a number of contributions (see, in particular, Parente and Prescott,
1994, 1999) has focused explicitly on the impact of the strategic interac-
tions between workers and firms in the choice of technology, highlighting
the role of market power as a “driver” of technology adoption. More
generally, the relevance of strategic behavior and interaction among the
parties involved in the adoption and diffusion processes has received at-
tention in the literature, especially by the models focusing on the micro-
economic determinants of adoption.
As it will become clear in the following chapters, both the complemen-
tarity among technologies and the emphasis on labor markets and human
capital, as well as the role of strategic issues (namely the interactions be-
tween workers and firms’ decisions), will be the main ingredients of the
models developed starting in Chapter 4 of the dissertation.
3Technology-Skill Complementarity and
Efficiency Wages: a Conceptual Framework
for Technology Adoption
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is conceived to lay out the structure and the underlying
conceptual framework of the models of technology adoption that will be
developed in the dissertation.
In Chapter 2 we stressed that various sources of spillover effects have
an impact on firms’ decision to adopt a superior technology. We aim at
contributing to this debate by highlighting the role of a general class of
spillovers (taking the form of production externalities in our most general
setting) stemming from the choice of a firm to adopt a superior technol-
ogy. In the next chapters we will argue that a firm decision to adopt
a superior technology may directly benefit its employees, by increasing
their wage rates. Intuitively, this is so because once the firm adopts a
new technology its workers can acquire a set of “superior” skills that are
needed to operate it (we might think as an example to the skills associated
to computer literacy). The nature of the “learning” process by which a
worker’s upskilling takes place is not dealt with explicitly in the disserta-
tion. It is, however, clear that it can take various forms like, for example,
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learning by doing, on-the-job use, or formal training in the technology.
As far as the advancement in workers’ human capital is transferrable to
alternative uses (improving their productivity elsewhere), it is likely to
induce an improvement of their outside options. This, in turn, results in
an increase of workers’ bargaining power.1 Finally, to the extent that a
higher bargaining power translates into higher wages, technology-induced
production externalities (spillovers) may be enough to reduce the firm’s
incentives to adopt the technology in the first place, thus delaying or
blocking adoption.
There are three main ingredients to the argument just outlined: a spe-
cific source of complementarity between technologies, the existence of
spillovers (externalities) originating from such complementarity and, fi-
nally, the presence of strategic interaction between workers and firms
(combined with specific market structures) affecting wages and, thus,
technology adoption. We consider them in turn.
3.2 Technology adoption and strategic interactions
The literature surveyed in Chapter 2 dealing with the determinants of
technology adoption stresses the role of several sources of strategic inter-
actions and complementarities, especially between factors of production
(and in particular labor, or human capital) and technology. Complemen-
1There is a literature in training – somehow related to our argument (although usually taking
the opposite perspective that the benefits of market power in setting wages are appropriated by
employers) – that investigates the firms’ incentives to train in relation to the workers’ ex post
opportunities, when training is at least partially transferrable, there are poaching externalities and
imperfect competition in the labor market. See, among many others, Stevens (1996), Booth and
Zoega (1999), Booth, Francesconi and Zoega (2002), and Gersbach and Schmutzler (2001). More
to the point, Acemoglu (1997) investigates the interaction between training and innovation and its
impact on wages. Similarly, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) develop a theory relating the firm’s
incentive to provide general free training (providing workers with skills that can spill over to other
employers) with the degree of the firm’s ex post monopsony power and with the presence of labor
market frictions compressing the wage structure, respectively.
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tarity and strategic interactions are at the center stage in this dissertation
as well. The driver of (inefficient) technology choice in the conceptualiza-
tion briefly summarized in the introduction to this chapter lies ultimately
on the increase in wages induced by the adoption of a superior technol-
ogy, whose extent can possibly be enough to delay or block the choice of
the technology by a firm in the first place. The increase in wages follow-
ing adoption is determined by the strategic behavior of workers in their
relationship with the firm. In fact, if as a consequence of the adoption of
a superior technology workers’ outside options improve (i.e. there is com-
plementarity between technology and outside options), they will require
a higher wage to stay with the firm.2 As will become more apparent in
the next chapters, in our framework the main determinant of inefficient
technology choices depends on the nature of the strategic interactions
between firms and workers induced by the technology itself.
In some respects, our argument is related to that developed by the lit-
erature isolating the sources of complementarity and investigating their
implications for the behavior of the economy in the framework of coor-
dination games or, more generally, in that of supermodular games (see
Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, and, for a textbook treatment, Cooper, 1999,
and Vives, 1990 and 1999). Although we do not work directly in such a
framework, our analysis bears many conceptual similarities with it. The
key feature of the coordination games setting (as developed, for exam-
ple, by Cooper and John, 1988) is, in fact, that the actions of players
are strategic complements, in the sense that they give rise to positive
spillovers. Strategic complementarity is such that higher actions (like in-
creased effort or activity) by one player introduce an incentive for the
2This argument is somehow related to an idea recently developed by a stream of the innovation
literature trying to endogenize the level of knowledge spillovers. Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003),
for example, argue that firms may have an incentive to compete for each other’s R&D employees
since successful bids for a competitor’s employee result in a cost reduction for the firm.
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others to take a higher action as well, i.e. the best response function of
a player is increasing in the actions of the other.3 In this setting, the
inability of agents’ to coordinate their choices – what is often labeled
as coordination failure – can determine the emergence of a multiplicity
of (Pareto-inferior) equilibria.4
For strategic complementarities and coordination failures to arise, how-
ever, one needs to abandon the standard general equilibrium Arrow-
Debreu framework with complete contingent markets. Quite obviously,
in fact, in the Arrow-Debreu framework all choices by agents are coor-
dinated through the market mechanisms, there are no frictions and no
agents have the ability to influence prices. Moreover, coordination failure
can not emerge in a perfectly competitive environment, where the First
Fundamental Welfare Theorem holds. Once disposing of complete contin-
gents markets, there are several possible factors that can be responsible
for the emergence of strategic complementarity: from production exter-
nalities to the presence of imperfect competition and market power, to
search frameworks with trading externalities and thick markets, to the
timing (synchronization) of economic activity and the externalities in-
duced by information flows.5
Both production externalities and market power are going to play a
prominent role in our models, even though in different ways than those
3Obviously, the opposite occurs if there is strategic substitutability.
4More precisely, strategic complementarity can give rise to multiple equilibria that, in the presence
of positive spillovers, can be Pareto-ordered as shown by the literature on supermodular games.
5Although not playing an explicit role in our setting, the issues of timing and delay are central
to the problem of technology diffusion, as it has been emphasized in Chapter 2. For a more general
treatment of the timing, synchronization and implementation of discrete choices see Cooper (1999).
The literature on complementarities and interactions has highlighted also the role of the exter-
nalities arising from the trading process, when the Walrasian auctioneer does not work properly. In
this case, complementarities rest usually on thick market effects: the more people searching in the
market for trading partners, the lower the costs of search. See, for instance: Diamond (1982), Howitt
and McAfee (1988), or Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) for a search theoretic model of money demand.
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generally emphasized in the coordination games literature. These con-
tributions, in fact, have focused on several different sources of strate-
gic interaction among agents occurring through the production function
(technological complementarities), without however paying much atten-
tion to the technology choice of firms as a possible source of externalities.
As an example, in Bryant (1983), strategic complementarity arises from
the assumption that the productivity of an agent is a function of the effort
levels exerted by others, and inefficient equilibria (coordination failures)
can emerge due to imperfections in the contracting process, or to market
incompleteness. More generally, a vast literature with a macroeconomic
flavor has been developed investigating a broad range of issues, but tech-
nology adoption typically does not play a role neither as an engine of
complementarity, nor as an object of investigation.6
Similar observations apply to the contributions where the departure
from the Arrow-Debreu framework originates from the introduction of
imperfect competition. The presence of market power is a source of com-
plementarity in that it is responsible for the strengthening (with respect
to the general equilibrium model) of the interactions among agents. In
the coordination games literature these interactions are typically induced
by the standard Keynesian income-expenditure relationships, a feature
common to many Keynesian models of price rigidities. The key feature of
these models are aggregate demand externalities stemming from income
effects: the higher the output of other producers in the economy, the
6The study of the business cycle in presence of strategic complementarities has often been at the
center stage in the coordination games literature. To make a few examples, Benhabib and Farmer
(1994) study how the presence of social returns to scale affects the stability properties of the steady
state equilibrium. Durlauf (1991) investigates how the existence of dynamic local complementarities
between neighboring agents can induce multiple equilibria in the absence of shocks. Cooper and
Johri (1997) assume that the productivity of a worker is affected by the level of activity of the others
and show how i.i.d. shocks both in technology and taste propagate. Finally, Weil (1989) and Bryant
(1987) study the emergence of multiple equilibria in presence of technological spillovers arising from
the presence of increasing social returns (but constant returns at the individual level).
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higher the aggregate expenditure and, as a consequence, the higher the
demand and the output of the individual producer. The importance of in-
teractions among producers (in the same or different industries) induced
by demand spillovers, together with that of non-convexities in technology,
can lead to multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria and coordination failure.7
It is worth noticing that Cooper (1994), in a study dealing with the corre-
lation of productivity and output in presence of demand shocks, provides
an interesting application of the above arguments to a technology choice
problem. He shows that, depending on the strength of the linkages in
sales across sectors, there might emerge equilibria in which firms have an
incentive to choose low productivity (and thus inferior) techniques, even
if more productive technologies are available. The idea is related to those
we will develop in the next chapters. However, while in Cooper (1994) the
choice of technology is determined by spillovers on the demand side (in-
dependent from technology), in our framework it will be the technology
itself to generate (technology-induced) spillovers ultimately affecting its
choice. In this respect, our setting is somehow closer to that proposed by
Puhakka and Wissink (1995) who focus on the role of cost externalities in
Cournot competition. If applied to problems of investment in technology,
their model is such that an increase in an industry’s output stimulate
R&D investments. Successful innovations, in addition to reduce the costs
of the innovating firms, benefit other firms reducing their costs of pro-
7Most of the macroeconomic literature on imperfect competition and demand complementarities
has focused on two main classes of models, differing in terms of the sources of market power. The first
is that of multisector models, characterized by strategic substitutability between a small number of
firms in any given market and strategic complementarity across sectors, which depicts the possible
emergence of multiple equilibria, underemployment and multiplier effects (see, for instance, Hart,
1982; Weitzman, 1982; and the discussion in Cooper, 1999). The second is that of monopolistic
competition, where market power arises from the degree of substitutability between products. In these
models, multiple equilibria can arise because of strategic complementarity in prices. See, for example,
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), or Ball and Romer (1990), where the multiplicity of equilibria emerges
from the decisions of firms to change their prices in the presence of menu costs.
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duction because, for example, the knowledge of the technology spills over
to them. The two authors, however, do not model the sources of such
externalities and limit themselves to state their positive impact on the
cost function.
3.3 Spillovers and market power
Although we do not adopt a coordination games framework, it has been
stressed above that there are several conceptual similarities between it
and the approach of this dissertation. In particular, (production) exter-
nalities and market power are two key ingredients of our analysis as well.
We need, therefore, to be more precise about their nature and the role
they are going to play. As it has been emphasized in the previous sections,
our framework builds upon a specific source of complementarity between
the workers experienced with a technology and the firm adopting that
technology. The source of such complementarity lies in the existence of
technology-induced spillovers – in the form of production externalities
– affecting workers’ wages, and the reason why these spillovers play a
role resides in the imperfectly competitive (labor) market structure we
are assuming.
3.3.1 Technology-induced spillovers: the link between wages and
technology
The strength of our argument rests ultimately on the relevance of the
labor market driven externalities originated by the adoption of supe-
rior technologies, that increase workers’ (transferrable) knowledge – or
better determines (requires) an upskilling of the labor force – and is
ultimately responsible for the improvement of their outside options. Bet-
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ter alternatives, in turn, translate into an increase of wages that, in our
framework, is driving the possibility of inefficient technology adoption.8
There are, thus, two points that have to been shown to corroborate our
argument: the existence of a positive relationship between technological
change and workers’ skills; and that of a positive link between human
capital and wages.9
The 20th-century experience of the USA, and of many other OECD
countries, sheds light on both issues, confirming the importance of the
mechanism we are focusing on. Returns to schooling have risen since the
Seventies of the past century, generating a rapidly increasing skill pre-
mium. Over the same period, a substantial increase in wage and income
inequality (even among similarly educated workers – the so called within
group inequality) has been observed. As reported by Acemoglu (2003b),
the college premium has increased by over 25% between 1979 and 1995.
Moreover, in 1995, a worker in the 90th percentile of the wage distrib-
ution was earning 366% more than a worker at the 10 percentile, while
the difference was 266% in 1971. Although several explanations have been
proposed for the observed dynamics of the labor market and of the wage
structure (the inequality within and between educational groups), there
is a broad consensus that technical change is a major engine driving
8The idea of workers’ mobility as a source of spillovers dates back to Arrow (1962). In a recent
paper, D. Cooper (2001) discusses an innovation framework in which workers can take advantage of
information acquired on the job by migrating to rival firms. Furthermore, Dalmazzo (2002) considers
a setting – building upon Kremer’s (1993) “O-ring” theory of production – in which firms adopting
complex technologies end up paying higher wages to workers.
9We documented a host of technology driven spillover effects in Chapter 2. Several contributions
stress the link between workers’ human capital and their outside options. For a survey of these
issues see Booth and Snower (1995). More generally, Acemoglu (1996) shows the existence of social
increasing returns in human capital accumulation in presence of matching imperfections in the labor
market and ex ante investment by firms and workers, emphasizing the importance of human capital
externalities for development.
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the dispersion in the distribution of wages.10 Over the last sixty years,
technological change appears to have strongly favored skilled (or, more
generally, educated) workers over those unskilled, supporting a notion
of technology-skill complementarity that is now widely accepted (besides
the early contributions by Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Griliches (1969)
see, among others, Autor, Krueger and Katz, 1998; Berman, Bound and
Machin, 1998; Caselli, 1999; Allen, 2001; Aghion, 2002).11 The supply
of educated workers has greatly increased over the past decades, and
yet returns to education have risen, suggesting an increase in the de-
mand for skilled workers sufficient to overcome the increase in supply.12
Furthermore, the skill-bias in technology adoption has accelerated since
the late Seventies of the last century, possibly driven by the diffusion of
information technologies even though it seems to be a more general fea-
ture common to many modern technologies (see, for example, Bartel and
Lichtenberg, 1987 and 1991; Machin and van Reenen, 1998; and Autor,
Krueger and Katz, 1998).13
10For studies of the wage distribution and of earnings inequality – especially in relation to (skill-
biased) technological change – see Goldin and Margo (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Galor and
Tsiddon (1997), Acemoglu (1998, 1999, 2002b), Katz and Autor (1999), Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull
and Violante (2000), Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) and Violante (2002), as well as Gottschalk
and Joyce (1998) for cross-country comparisons, and Brown and Campbell (2002) for a survey on
the impact of technological change on work and wages.
11The idea that technical progress is skill-biased must not be taken at face value. Several of the
19th-century advances in technology have indeed been skill-replacing, substituting skilled artisans
with unskilled manual labor (see David, 1975). Whether technology will be skill-biased or not is
ultimately related to the profitability of employing skilled versus unskilled workers.
12The increase in the demand for skills and inequality has an important explanatory variable in
skill-biased technological change. However, it must be noted that other factors – like the changes in
the organization of production (as reported, for instance, by Acemoglu, 1999; Caroli and van Reenen,
2002; and Bresnhan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002) or in labor market institutions (see, among others,
Card, 1996; and Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante, 2002) – can be important as well.
13For theoretical underpinnings on the skill-bias in technology adoption, see the discussion in
Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.3), and especially the references to Acemoglu (1998, 2002a).
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The empirical evidence presented above – documenting the skill bias
in technical progress and its strong positive impact on the wage structure
– poses a subtle interpretation issue concerning the main ideas, outlined
above, on which the next chapters of the dissertation build. On the one
hand, it confirms the importance of the links between technology, skills
and wages we are focusing on. On the other hand, however, it suggests
that the technologies that are adopted (at least in advanced countries) are
indeed those requiring more skills and paying higher wages. One might
therefore be tempted to conclude that although the adoption of superior
technologies determines an increase in the wages paid by firms, this effect
must be of a second order, given that the observed pattern of technology
adoption is strongly skill-biased. In other words, the increases in pro-
ductivity associated to the adoption of a superior technology more than
compensate the corresponding increases in wages, so that firms should
always adopt the frontier technology. Otherwise, for example, we should
observe the adoption of technologies complementing unskilled workers
as it has been for most of the 19th-century. This conclusion, however,
reflects the observed characteristics of technical change, while we focus
on the determinants behind the decision of a firm to adopt a superior
technology (and indirectly on the speed of the diffusion process). The
interactions we suggest between technology and wages might well be re-
sponsible for delaying the adoption of specific technologies (and the speed
of their diffusion) – a feature common to almost all technologies as we
have shown in Chapter 2 – and nonetheless technical progress can re-
main skill biased. In other words, we focus on the mechanics of adoption
(i.e. on the choice problem faced by the adopter) and not on the overall
characteristics of the resulting technical progress.
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3.3.2 The role of market power
Market structure is the second building block of our framework and plays
a crucial role in determining the final impact of the interactions between
workers and firm. The improvement of workers’ outside options can trans-
late into an increase in wages only disposing of the assumption of a per-
fectly competitive labor market. Workers must have bargaining power in
the wage determination process – which implies an imperfectly compet-
itive labor market – to be able to “cash” their better alternatives. In
the absence of such market power, the firm would pay workers at their
marginal productivity internalizing all rents arising from the adoption of
a superior technology.
Labor market power is, however, still not enough for inducing the adop-
tion of inferior technologies. No inefficiencies would , in fact, be observed
if firms are able to transfer the increase in wages on the price of their
final products. In this case, they would remain able to appropriate all
the benefits associated to the adoption of a superior technology by trans-
ferring the increases in the cost of labor to final consumers. In other
words, a combination of perfectly competitive goods markets, i.e. price
takers firms, and of monopolistic factor markets is the ideal setting for
technology-induced spillovers to have an impact on wages, and for them,
in turn, to affect firms’ technology choices. It is worth observing that
the assumption of perfect competition in the goods market can be –
to some extent – relaxed, without loosing much in terms of results, al-
though this conjecture will not be developed further in the dissertation.14
As far as firms do not have the ability (for a host of possible reasons:
limits to their price making ability, economic regulations, etc.) to transfer
the whole increase in costs on the price of the final good, the increase in
14Throughout the dissertation we will maintain the assumption of perfectly competitive product
markets.
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wages can still have a distortionary impact on technology choices. The ab-
sence of perfect competition in the labor market is, however, fundamental
to the argument. The distortionary “transmission mechanism” between
spillovers, wages and technology would be lost under the assumption of
price taking behavior in the labor market, which would cancel the impact
of spillovers on wages and, consequently, the source of inefficiencies in the
choice of technology.
3.4 The efficiency wage framework
From the above discussion, it emerges quite clearly that the adoption
of a superior technology can be substantially affected by the existence
of strategic interactions (complementarities) stemming from the presence
of technology-induced externalities and market power. Strangely enough,
however, many theoretical contributions dealing with technology adop-
tion still dispose of the role of the strategic interactions arising in the
labor market, often focusing on perfectly competitive environments and
representative agent frameworks.
We depart from this assumption. The basic structure of the models we
will work with – in order to study the interactions between the decisions
of a firm to adopt a technology and workers’ outside options (wages)
– builds upon the efficiency wage setting formulated by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984).15 As we will stress in the next chapters, such framework
provides a natural way to model the relationships between technology,
outside options and wages by means of workers’ individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints. In this respect, it proves to be
a suitable setting to investigate technology adoption problems where the
15More generally, we will use a simple principal-agent approach following the contract theory
literature. For a general textbook treatment see, among others, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo
(1997), Salanié (1997), and Laffont and Martimort (2002).
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main restraints to the firm’s choices about technology pass through their
impact on wages.
It is therefore worth to delve into the details of a simplified static
reformulation of the Shapiro and Stiglitz’s theory we will use as the
backbone for our models.
3.4.1 A reformulation of the efficiency wage model by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984)
Shapiro and Stiglitz focus on the informational asymmetries arising in
the relationship between employers and employees to explain involuntary
unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon. This form of unemploy-
ment stems from the inability of employers to costlessly monitor the effort
exerted by workers. In a perfectly competitive framework, in which all
employees receive the market wage and there is no unemployment, if a
worker is caught shirking she can be fired, but she suffers no penalty for
her conduct since she will be immediately re-hired. Thus, with imper-
fect monitoring, workers have an incentive to shirk. If a firm wants to
induce workers not to shirk, it must pay more than the market wage,
so that if a worker is fired she suffers a punishment. Since all firms will
raise their wages to induce no-shirking, labor demand will decrease and
unemployment will emerge. The presence of involuntary unemployment
(job rationing) in equilibrium works as a discipline device, making sure
that a fired shirker is not able to immediately find another job.
The Shapiro and Stiglitz model studies a simple general equilibrium
economy characterized by significant principal-agents problems, where
all the emphasis is on incentive effects. While the original model is set in
continuous time (with infinitely lived agents), we simplify and reformu-
late it in a static framework, in the spirit of the models we will develop
later in the dissertation.
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The economy is populated by N¯ identical workers (so that being fired
carries no stigma) characterized by the individual utility function U(w, e),
where w denotes the wage received and e the level of effort exerted.
All workers are assumed to be risk-neutral and the utility function is
separable, so that – after normalization – U(w, e) = w−e. All workers
can provide two levels of effort only: a minimal one (e = 0) or a fixed
positive one (e > 0). When unemployed a worker exerts no effort and
receives unemployment benefits w¯ > 0. When caught shirking a worker
is fired, which turns out to be the firm’s optimal policy in equilibrium.
Differently from Shapiro and Stiglitz’s original model, however, we do
not allow for the possibility that a worker separates from her job for
exogenous reasons.16
Each worker maximizes her individual utility by choosing the level of
effort to exert. If she does not shirk, she retains her job and gets a wage
w. If shirking, there is a positive probability c that she is caught, in which
case she is fired and enters the unemployment pool. The worker decides
whether to shirk or not by comparing the utility she gets from shirking
with that from non shirking. Denoting with V ns, V s and Vu the utility
levels of a non shirker, of a shirker and of an unemployed, respectively,
they are
V ns = w − e (3.1)
V s = (1− c)w + cVu. (3.2)
The worker does not shirk if and only if V ns ≥ V s, i.e. if and only if
w ≥ e
c
+ Vu ≡ wˆ, (3.3)
16The introduction of a turnover rate affects the rate at which workers are hired out of the unem-
ployment pool and hence their utility level when unemployed that, in turn, affects the no-shirking
constraints faced by other firms. Due to this externality, firms’ choice of wage packages will not be
optimal.
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where Vu will be defined in Equation (3.5). Equation (3.3) has been la-
beled by Shapiro and Stiglitz as no-shirking condition (NSC) and makes
clear that a worker has an incentive not to shirk only if there is a penalty
with being unemployed.17 It is immediate to notice that the critical wage
wˆ that the firm must pay to satisfy the NSC is increasing in the level
of effort required and in the utility when unemployed, and decreasing in
the probability of being detected shirking.
There are M (i = 1, ....,M) identical firms in the economy, each of
them characterized by a production function Qi = φ (Ni), generating an
aggregate production function Q = Φ (N), where
Φ (N) := max½
Ni| Σ
i
Ni=N
¾ X
i
φ (Ni) . (3.4)
We assume that Φ0 (N) > e, so that full employment is efficient. Ni
denotes firm i’s effective labor force. Each non-shirker worker contributes
one unit of effective labor; shirkers contribute nothing. The monitoring
technology of firms (c) is given exogenously and it is imperfect, in that
firms can not monitor effort by observing output.
Firms compete in offering wage packages – consisting of a wage w
and of unemployment benefits w¯ – satisfying the NSC constraint. As
for unemployment benefits, each firm has an incentive to make them as
small as possible. This is immediate from Equation (3.3): an increase
in w¯ amounts to an increase in Vu, which determines an increase in the
wage needed to satisfy the NSC. Moreover, since there will be equilibrium
unemployment, firms have no difficulties in hiring the labor they need and
thus reduce w¯ as much as possible, until its minimum legal level if any.
Concerning w, each firm offers a wage just sufficient to induce a worker
to exert the desired level of effort, meeting the NSC with equality, i.e.
17The NSC constraint embodies both the individual rationality (or participation) and the incentive
compatibility constraints encountered in the standard formulation of the principal-agent literature.
We will often adopt this terminology in the models developed in the next chapters of the dissertation.
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w = wˆ. Each firm’s labor demand follows by equating this wage rate
with the marginal product of labor (φ0 (Ni) = wˆ), so that the aggregate
inverse labor demand is Φ0 (N) = wˆ.
Each individual firm’s behavior is determined by the utility of an un-
employed worker (labeled as reservation utility), Vu, that is the market
variable affecting the wage any firm must pay in order to induce non-
shirking behavior. The equilibrium level of Vu depends in turn on the
probability that an unemployed worker can find a job (the aggregate job
acquisition rate), which we denote with a. Formally, we have
Vu = (1− a) w¯ + aU¯, (3.5)
where U¯ denotes the utility associated to the outside options – i.e. to the
wage offers (net of the disutility of effort) a worker receives if employed by
another firm – available to the worker. Substituting Equation (3.5) for
Vu into the NSC (3.3), we get what Shapiro and Stiglitz call the aggregate
NSC
w ≥ e
c
+ (1− a) w¯ + aU¯. (3.6)
Since all firms are identical, at a symmetric equilibrium they will all
offer a wage satisfying the aggregate NSC and therefore U¯ = w, so that
Equation (3.6) can be rewritten as
w ≥ e
c
1
1− a + w¯. (3.7)
Finally, by letting a = 1 − u – where u denotes the unemployment
rate (u =
¡
N¯ −N
¢
/N¯), the constraint (3.7) becomes
w ≥ e
c
1
u
+ w¯ ≡ wˆ. (3.8)
By inspection of Equation (3.8) we can see that the threshold wage
satisfying the aggregate NSC is increasing in the level of effort and in
the unemployment benefits, and decreasing in the monitoring technology
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c and in the unemployment rate u.18 Let us examine these properties
in turn. On the one hand, the higher the unemployment rate, the lower
the job acquisition rate and, hence, the higher the punishment associated
with being fired, so that a smaller wage is required to induce non-shirking.
Similarly, a better monitoring technology (higher c) increases the prob-
ability that a shirker is caught, reducing the wage the firm must pay.19
On the other hand, the higher the unemployment benefits, the higher the
utility of an unemployed worker and, thus, the lower the punishment of
being unemployed, rendering bigger the wage required to induce workers
not to shirk. Finally, a rise in the level of effort increases workers’ disu-
tility from working and, therefore, increases the wage the firm must pay
to induce non-shirking behavior.
Moreover, and most importantly, it is immediate to observe that the
NSC is inconsistent with full employment. If N = N¯ , 1/u→ +∞, and all
shirking workers would be hired again immediately. This eliminates the
punishment associated with being fired and workers have an incentive to
shirk.
Equilibrium occurs when it is optimal for all firms – taking as given
wages and employment levels at other firms – to offer the going wage
instead of a different one. The individual firm, being small, takes the ag-
gregate unemployment rate (and thus the aggregate job acquisition rate)
as given and offers (at least) the wage wˆ. The firm’s labor demand de-
termines the number of workers employed by each firm. The equilibrium
18Note that, from the aggregate NSC (3.8) with equality, it is immediate to derive the inverse
aggregate labor supply, i.e.
N = N¯
µ
1− e
c (wˆ − w¯)
¶
.
19 Shapiro and Stiglitz consider also the case in which monitoring is endogenous, so that employees
can trade off a stricter monitoring (higher c) with higher wages as methods of discipline. By increasing
wages, employment is reduced and workers have less incentives to shirk. This allows firms to save
resources on monitoring. In general however, due to the externalities between firms, monitoring
intensities will not be optimal.
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FIGURE 3.1. Market equilibrium
wage and employment levels (w∗, N∗), depicted in Figure 3.1, 20 are then
defined by the intersection of the aggregate NSC (3.8) – substituting for
the traditional labor supply locus – with the aggregate labor demand,
i.e.
Φ0 (N) =
e
c
N¯
N¯ −N + w¯, (3.9)
where we have taken into account the definition of u. No firm has an
incentive to offer a wage higher than w∗, as at this wage workers are
exerting the desired level of effort (and they have no incentives to shirk)
and the firm can hire all the labor it needs. At the same time, no firm
offers a wage lower than this level, because it would induce shirking
behavior on the side of workers. Equilibrium unemployment serves as
an effective discipline mechanism in deterring shirking behavior and it
is involuntary from the workers’ point of view.21 They would work for
the firm at a lower wage, but their promise not to shirk is not credible.
20All figures illustrating the model are drawn for a decreasing returns to scale aggregate production
function.
21As Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) themselves put it, there might be other discipline devices that can
be effective under specific circumstances, based for instance on the heterogeneity of workers (so that
fired workers would loose their reputation if fired), on the existence of costs imposed on dismissed
workers (like the loss of specific human capital), or on the design of performance bonds.
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Firms’ inability to perfectly monitor the effort of their employees is thus
the cause of equilibrium unemployment.
The equilibrium condition (3.9) allows for comparative statics exercises
focusing on the NSC (right-hand side of Equation (3.9)). A decrease in
the monitoring technology c, an increase in the effort e or in the unem-
ployment benefits w¯ imply, at any given level of employment, an increase
in the wage required to induce non-shirking behavior. As represented in
Figure 3.2, the NSC curve shifts upwards while the labor demand curve
is unaffected, which determines an increase in the equilibrium wage and
in the level of unemployment.22
It is easy to show that the unemployment equilibrium described above
is not Pareto optimal. Assume that firms’ ownership is equally distributed
among the N¯ workers. A social planner maximizes the representative
22The impact of w¯ is stronger in the original Shapiro and Stiglitz’s model, where changes in the
unemployment benefits affect labor demand as well. In this sense, their model provides a possible
explanation for wage sluggishness. Due to the NSC, following an inward shift of the labor demand
schedule, wages can not fall enough to compensate for the decrease in labor demand. Wage cuts will
take place only after the unemployment pool starts growing.
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worker’s utility subject to the NSC and to the resource constraint:



max
w,w¯,N
(w − e)N + w¯
¡
N¯ −N
¢
s.t. w ≥ ec
N¯
N¯−N + w¯
wN + w¯
¡
N¯ −N
¢
≤ Φ (N)
w¯ ≥ 0,
, (3.10)
where the first constraint is the NSC and the second one the feasibility
constraint.
From the assumption of workers’ risk neutrality it follows that unem-
ployment benefits are to be set at their minimum acceptable level, i.e.
w¯ = 0 (or the legal minimum).23 Problem (3.10) simplifies to



max
w,w¯,N
(w − e)N
s.t. w ≥ ec
N¯
N¯−N
wN ≤ Φ (N)
. (3.11)
Figure 3.3 illustrates the social optimum and compares it with the
market solution. Note that, as long as Φ0 (N) > e, indifference curves
are steeper than the average product curve and thus the social optimum
(w∗∗, N∗∗) occurs at the intersection between the NSC and the average
product locus. The social optimum implies both higher wage and employ-
ment levels than the market equilibrium (occurring at the intersection be-
tween the NSC and the marginal product of labor locus), that is optimal
only in the constant returns to scale case in which Φ0 (N) = Φ (N) /N.
Intuitively, the inefficiency of the market equilibrium stems from the fact
23By differentiating the Lagrangean corresponding to Problem (3.10) with respect to w and w¯ one
gets
Lw = N + λ− µN ≤ 0 = 0 if w > 0
and
Lw¯ = N¯ −N − λ− µ
¡
N¯ −N
¢
≤ 0 = 0 if w¯ > 0,
where λ and µ are the Lagrangean coefficients associated to the NSC and the feasibility constraint,
respectively. By the NSC it is w > 0, and hence it must be Lw = 0. Since λ > 0, µ > 1. This
implies Lw¯ < 0 and thus w¯ = 0. Notice that the optimality of w¯ = 0 would not carry over under
workers’ risk aversion if they can be separated from their jobs for exogenous reasons. The market
equilibrium, however, would always be characterized by w¯ = 0 or the legal minimum. This might
provide a rationale for mandatory minimum benefit levels.
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FIGURE 3.3. Social optimum and market equilibrium
that firms perceive a private cost for employing an additional worker (w)
that is higher than the social cost (e), thus employing too few workers.
Each firm fails to internalize its impact on the monitoring and wages
that the other firms have to sustain to induce non-shirking behavior of
workers.24
As emphasized by Shapiro and Stiglitz, the “natural” (market equi-
librium) rate of unemployment is too high and hence there is a scope
for government intervention. The most direct instruments available to
achieve Pareto improvements in this setting are wage subsidies financed
by means of a tax on profits, that are equivalent to the introduction of
a tax on unemployment reducing the incentives to shirk. As shown in
Figure 3.3, a Pareto efficient allocation can be reached by taxing away
all profits and introducing a wage subsidy s. It is interesting to note that
such a policy would not lead to Pareto improvements if the ownership
of the firms is not in the hand of workers. A wage subsidy financed via
24Firms also fail to internalize the fact that hiring a new worker they are reducing the unem-
ployment pool, thus making less severe the threat associated with being fired. This effect moves in
the opposite direction with respect to the previous one, which however dominates. As observed by
Shapiro and Stiglitz, this result does not carry over to more general models.
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profit taxation would in fact worsen the position of firms’ shareholders.
The Pareto optimality of the equilibrium depends then on the distribu-
tion of wealth.
3.5 Summary
This chapter investigated the main issues and outlined the formal frame-
work that constitute the backbone for the models that will be developed
in the next chapters. We discussed the conceptual similarities of our
externality driven approach with the literature on strategic complemen-
tarities (and coordination games), highlighting the existence of strategic
interactions between a firm’s choice to adopt a technology and the outside
options available to the workers operating that technology. The sources of
complementarity lie both in the existence of technology-induced spillovers
(externalities) originating from the strategic interactions between firms
and workers and in the presence of imperfect competition in the labor
market.
We stressed how technology-induced externalities, combined with mar-
ket power, determine a positive and increasing relationship between tech-
nology and wages. The role played by imperfect competition (the presence
of market power) in the labor market is crucial in this respect, providing
for a “transmission mechanism” between technology adoption and wages.
In particular, we emphasized what would be lost by studying technology
adoption in a perfectly competitive framework, stressing that under the
assumption of price taking behavior in the labor market, there is no way
for the strategic interaction between workers and firms – stemming from
the technology-induced production externalities – to affect wages and,
hence, firms’ choice of technology.
The relevance of our argument as a possible engine of technology adop-
tion rests ultimately on the actual importance of the spillovers effects
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(externalities) linking the choice of technology to the wage structure.
By borrowing from the literature on the relationships between technical
progress, wages and inequality, we documented a robust empirical ev-
idence confirming the existence of a direct causal relationship between
(skill-biased) technical change and the wage distribution. Furthermore,
we reported on the evidence of a positive and accelerating skill pre-
mium induced by technology for the past several decades, which supports
the view of an increasing relationship between technology adoption and
wages.
Finally, the last part of the chapter formalized a static reformulation
of the efficiency wage framework à la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) – con-
stituting the backbone for the technology adoption models that will be
discussed in the remaining of the dissertation –, working out its compar-
ative statics and welfare implications. As it will become clear in the next
chapter, this setup allows us to model both the presence of market power
in the labor market – providing a framework for the formalization of the
wage setting process according to the standard efficiency wages argument
– and the link between firms’ technology choices and workers’ outside
options, by making endogenous their outside options (i.e. their partic-
ipation or individual rationality constraint) with respect to the firm’s
technology.
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4Technology Adoption and Efficiency
Wages: A Partial Equilibrium Model
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses technology adoption by developing the ideas and
building on the framework outlined in Chapter 3. Our basic underlying
question is that of investigating why many firms choose to use inferior
technologies even when better ones are widely available. In Chapter 2 we
have emphasized that inefficient technology adoption seems to be a par-
ticularly important problem for firms operating in less-developed coun-
tries. As noticed there, the empirical literature supports the view that
monopsonistic power in the factor markets is much more diffused in poor
(and technologically under-developed) countries than it is in rich and de-
veloped countries. Such a view is definitely not new. It dates back to the
Classics, being central both in A. Smith’s and A. Marshall’s thought, and
it often resurfaces in the debate. It seems, therefore, natural to investigate
what are the relationships between market power and technology adop-
tion processes that impede the adoption of superior technologies instead
of favoring it.
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To restate our main claim: the presence of market power in the labor
market can slow down the adoption of superior technologies, and thus
technical progress, driving instead the adoption of inefficient technologies,
even in the absence of coalitions of workers or forms of coordination.1
In this chapter we develop a partial equilibriummodel studying a small
economy, characterized by the presence of a self-employment sector, that
we label as subsistence sector, and one industry, in which operates a price
taker firm, selling its good on the international market. However, the la-
bor market is monopsonistic and, given technology, labor is the only input
of the production function. For simplicity, we assume that it is impossi-
ble for other firms to enter the industry. This impossibility can be due
to institutional constraints or market imperfections (e.g. the distribution
of property rights, or the presence of financial markets’ imperfections),
as well as to the absence of infrastructures or the relevance of political
variables (like the presence of political instability or dictatorships), which
make the entry of competitors impossible or unprofitable. This implies,
in particular, that workers can not transform in entrepreneurs strating
new firms even when the adoption costs of technology are nil. Workers
can therefore be in one of two situations only: either they are employed
by the firm, or they are unemployed (since there are not other employers
available). When unemployed, workers receive their subsistence means
from the subsistence sector, that is here assumed as a shortcut to model
workers’ outside options.2
We focus on the decision of the firm to adopt a superior technology. On
the one hand, assuming that the introduction of a new technology does
1The latter are indeed the main factors inducing inefficient adoption in the Parente and Prescott’s
(1999) framework discussed in Chapter 2.
2 In a more general setting, one can encompass a wide variety of possible outside options: employ-
ment at other firms, starting a new firm, and so on. we dispose of these extensions as they are not
central to our argument.
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not affect the demand for the produced good, the firm should observe an
increase in its profits. On the other hand, the adoption of a superior tech-
nology has the consequence that employed workers can “learn” the tech-
nology just by using it. In other words, its adoption induces an increase
in the level of human capital of employed workers: for instance, through
some sort of learning process, that we assume to be instantaneous for
simplicity. As anticipated in Chapter 3, as far as this learning process in-
creases the level of workers’ transferrable human capital, it seems natural
to assume that workers will be able to put at work the increase in their
human capital in the subsistence sector, both using it directly or trans-
mitting it to unemployed workers. The improvement in workers’ human
capital, in turn, increases the productivity of workers in the subsistence
sector and thus their reservation wages or, in a more general framework,
their bargaining power, for example, through the organization in unions.
In other words, the adoption of a superior technology generates spillover
effects, which increase the reservation utility of workers. As stressed both
in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3, the impact of such spillovers on wages is
well documented by the empirical literature, showing that the knowledge
of a technology – and the skills to implement it – are very costly to
produce but very easy to reproduce, and that firms are typically unable
to appropriate all the benefits deriving from the technological innovations
they introduce.
A firm needs, therefore, to offer higher wages to workers, if it wants
them to accept its offer and exert the desired effort once employed. The
associated increase in costs can be enough to induce the firm not to
adopt a superior technology. Obviously, if both the firm and the workers
are perfectly informed about the advantages and the costs associated
to the adoption, then they can design bargaining procedures to allocate
and distribute the net gains from the adoption of a better technology.
However, workers have an incentive to bind themselves in a credible way
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to the agreements signed with the firm only if the wages they receive are
high enough. Otherwise, whatever the structure of the agreement, they
will try to take advantage from the available outside options.
From a modeling perspective, as anticipated in Chapter 3, the formal
structure of our partial equilibrium economy resembles closely that of a
uniperiodal reformulation of the efficiency wage model by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), outlined in Section 3.4.1 of Chapter 3. The main novelty
of our model economy with respect to the one by Shapiro and Stiglitz is
that, here, the participation constraint of workers becomes endogenous
in the firm’s choice of technology – with workers’ reservation utility
increasing in the firm’s choice of technology – and, therefore, it can
not be taken as automatically satisfied by assumption. As it will become
clear in the next sections, it is exactly this endogeneity to determine the
possibility of inefficient technology adoption.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 characterizes the la-
bor market and studies the workers’ decision problem. Section 4.3 fo-
cuses on the firm’s profit maximization problem and derives the result
of inefficient technology adoption. Section 4.4 investigates labor market
equilibrium, determining the equilibrium levels of employment and wage.
Finally, in Section 4.5 all the results of the chapter are worked out for
a Cobb-Douglas economy, that is subsequently used as a benchmark for
comparative statics exercises. A summary of results and some specific
extensions are presented in Section 4.6.
4.2 The workers
There are N¯ identical consumers/workers and, at any point in time, each
of them can be either employed by the firm or unemployed, in which
case we assume that she is self-employed in the subsistence sector of the
economy
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Each worker supplies one unit of labor, receives positive utility from
consumption and finds it costly to exert effort. We assume that the in-
stantaneous utility function is separable and that workers are risk neutral,
i.e.
U (w, e, T ) = w − v (e) + γπ (N,T ) , (4.1)
where N denotes the number of workers employed by the firm, T is the
technology it adopts, w is the wage paid, v(e) is a function capturing
the disutility of effort and γπ (N,T ) is the quota of the firm’s profits
going to each worker.3 Assuming that the firm is owned by a benevolent
social planner and that profits are equally distributed to all agents in the
economy (or, which is the same, that the firm is a corporation equally
owned by all agents in the economy), it is γ = 1/N¯ .4 We will maintain this
assumption throughout the dissertation, coming back to its implications
in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2).
As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we assume for simplicity that the
disutility of effort can take only one of two values v(0) = 0, when the
worker exerts no effort, and v (e) = e > 0, when the worker exerts the
level of effort required by the firm, i.e. when she does not shirk.5 Each
worker not exerting effort while working for the firm is subject to a prob-
ability c, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, of being caught shirking, in which case she is fired.
We assume that the probability c – representing the firm’s monitor-
3To be more precise, indicating individual consumption with x, each consumer faces the decision
problem n max
x,e
x− v (e)
s.t. x ≤ w + γπ (N,T )
,
form which it is appearent that one can immediately write (4.1) without loss of generality.
4This is only one of many possible profit distribution schemes, but it has the advantage of mak-
ing possible direct comparisons between the firm problem and the planner problem, which will be
introduced later.
5The assumption that the disutility of effort is equal to the level of effort exerted itself is without
loss of generality in the present framework; e is treated as an exogenous parameter mainly on grounds
of analytical simplicity, and such an assumption will be maintained throughout the dissertation. We
will come back to the role of e in Chapter 5 (Section 5.5.2).
70 4. Technology Adoption and Efficiency Wages
ing technology – is given exogenously. Such an assumption could be
relaxed by letting c to be a function of the technology adopted by the
firm. However, if it is evident that there might be a relationship between
the technology operated by the firm and its monitoring technology (c),
the sign of such relationship is in general ambiguous.6 Once a worker is
fired, the probability to be re-hired determines the length of the unem-
ployment spell. Notice that whenever new technologies are labor saving,
when a superior technology is adopted the number of employed workers
tends to diminish (given output). It becomes therefore easier for the firm
to hire the needed labor force from the pool of unemployed, and more
difficult for a fired worker to be re-hired. In order to ease the exposition
and to further highlight the impact of the firm’s technology choices on
wages, we make the assumption that
Assumption 4.1 The probability that a worker is hired again by the firm
once fired is equal to zero.
Assuming a job acquisition rate equal to zero for fired workers amounts
to rendering most severe the punishment associated with shirking, thus
lowering the wage required to induce non shirking behavior. Finally, we
also exclude the possibility that a worker can separate from her job for
exogenous reasons (i.e. when not shirking). Our conclusions would remain
unaffected by the introduction of a positive probability to leave the job,
along the lines discussed in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Notice that we slightly abuse terminology as we refer to unemployment
and self-employment as synonymies. In a strict sense there are no unem-
ployed agents in our framework since all workers that are not employed by
6We will come back to this point on Chapter 5. Notice also that, besides the relationship between
monitoring and technology, there are other dimensions with respect to which c could be made en-
dogenous to the model. For instance, as noticed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.1), Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) discuss how firms and workers can exchange stricter monitoring (costly for the firm) with
higher wages.
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the firm are in the subsistence (self-employment) sector of the economy,
which we take as a shortcut to model the workers’ outside options. This
is different with respect to Shapiro and Stiglitz’s setting, where outside
options are modeled by means of the probability to be hired by one of the
identical (and in finite number) firms populating the economy once un-
employed. This probability is, in general, lower than one so that workers
can remain unemployed, in the proper sense, receiving an exogenously set
unemployment benefit. This abuse of notation is, however, innocuous as
it will be apparent that, once we allow for it, all of Shapiro and Stiglitz’s
observations about involuntary unemployment go through.
If unemployed (self-employed) an individual obtains utility U¯(T ) in the
subsistence sector of the economy: a function of the technology adopted
by the firm, on which we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.2 U¯(T ) ∈ C2, ∀T À 0 : U¯ 0 (T ) > 0.
That is, we assume that the reservation utility is an increasing func-
tion of technology because of the positive spillover effects associated to
technology adoption processes. In order to eliminate the possibility of
heterogeneity between (skilled) employed and (unskilled) unemployed
agents, we assume that once a superior technology has been introduced,
its knowledge diffuses instantaneously. We could as well assume the pres-
ence of a union (or of institutional constraints) linking the firm’s wage
structure to the technology chosen and not to individual skills. If the firm
does not have the opportunity to pay lower wages to the newly hired
workers, the heterogeneity among skilled and unskilled workers disap-
pears. Notice further that we assume that the firm’s technology choice
does not affect the decision of a worker to shirk or not to shirk. In a
more sophisticated formulation, however, one could assume that a non-
shirker worker can learn the technology faster and in a better way than a
shirker, benefiting more of the spillover effects induced by the technology.
72 4. Technology Adoption and Efficiency Wages
This would make shirking more costly, contributing to relax the incentive
compatibility constraint.
Finally, although there are several possible explanations for the exis-
tence of a relationship between the firm’s technology adoption decision
and consumers’ reservation utility (i.e., workers’ outside options), in this
chapter we take it as given. We will focus on the determinants of workers’
outside options in Chapter 5, where we will introduce a general equilib-
rium model economy, by rendering fully endogenous the factors affecting
the reservation utility. Here we only provide a qualitative argument, con-
firming that U (w, e, T ) and U¯(T ) are modeled in a coherent way. We may
think that both the disutility of effort (when an agent is employed by the
firm and when unemployed) and the reservation utility are functions of
agents’ skills. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that skills are
increasing in the technology adopted by the firm, which allows us to
write both the disutility of effort and the reservation utility as functions
of technology. Since in our setting we assume that the disutility of effort
can take only one of two values (0, e), we do not need to model explicitly
the relationship between technology and disutility of effort. Finally, since
the reservation utility is increasing in skills, that in turn increase with
technology, we can write directly U¯ (.) as an increasing function of T .7
Workers maximize their utility by solving a decision problem with re-
spect to the effort level. As in the Shapiro and Stiglitz model, they com-
pare the levels of their expected utility when exerting effort and when not
exerting effort. However, while the original Shapiro and Stiglitz model is
set in continuous time, we can limit our attention to a static problem (as
in our formulation of their model presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1),
given that we assume the probability to loose the job and the probability
7The analysis would not change if we allow for a generic disutility of effort as a function of
technology, provided that we assume that the skill improvement associated to the adoption of superior
technologies decreases the disutility of effort.
4.2 The workers 73
to be re-hired once fired being equal to zero. We denote with Vu, V ns and
V s the utility of an unemployed, of a non shirker and of a shirker worker,
respectively
Vu = U¯(T ) +
1
N¯
π (N,T ) (4.2)
V ns = w − e+ 1
N¯
π (N, T ) , (4.3)
V s = (1− c)w + (1− c) 1
N¯
π (N, T ) + cVu. (4.4)
Workers will not shirk if and only if
V ns ≥ V s,
which, after some algebraic manipulations, leads to the no-shirking con-
straint (or, adopting the terminology of principal-agent theory, workers’
incentive compatibility constraint)
w ≥ U¯ (T ) + 1
c
e, (4.5)
that is
c
1− c [V
s − Vu] ≥ e. (4.6)
Constraint (4.6) highlights the fact that, in the absence of a credible
punishment phase following shirking, all workers have an incentive to
shirk: if V s = Vu Condition (4.6) can not be satisfied. It is also immediate
to check that the individual rationality (participation constraint) of a
non shirker worker – V ns ≥ Vu, that is w ≥ U¯ (T ) + e – is implied by
Condition (4.5).
In our model, the decision on the level of effort depends crucially on
the technology adopted by the firm. Let
wˆ (T ) := U¯ (T ) +
1
c
e (4.7)
denote the no-shirking wage, that satisfies the worker’s individual ratio-
nality constraint as well. Workers do not shirk if the wage paid by the
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firm is at least equal to wˆ (T ), which is the minimum wage that must be
paid in order to induce a worker to exert effort. It is straightforward to
observe that wˆ (T ) is increasing in the utility of the unemployed worker.
The latter, in turn, is increasing in the technology adopted by the firm,
clarifying the role of the choice of technology in rendering endogenously
binding the participation constraint of workers. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz
original framework, wˆ increases when the level of effort e exerted by a
worker increases and when the probability c she is detected shirking de-
creases. The bigger c, the bigger c
1−c and therefore the lower the premium,
(V s − Vu), needed to induce a worker not to shirk.8
4.3 The firm
The production sector consists of one industry in which one firm only
operates, that is price taker on the good market and price maker on the
labor market.9 We assume without loss of generality that the good’s price
is equal to one, so that the model is formulated in real terms. The firm’s
production function is Φ (N, T ), where T is the technology adopted by
the firm and N the labor input used when the adopted technology is T .
A worker provides one unit of effective labor if she does not shirk, while
her contribution to output is zero when she shirks.
8Notice that V s is a function of c. By defining ϕ (c) = V s − U¯(T ) and by using De L’Hôpital’s
theorem we have:
lim
c→1
c
1− c
ϕ (c) = w − Vu > 0,
and
lim
c→0
c
1− c
ϕ (c) = 0 < e < w − Vu,
where the latter inequality follows directly from the individual rationality constraint by making use
of (4.2). Thus, there must exist a value c such that if c < c the no-shirking constraint (4.6) is never
satisfied, and if c > c it is always satisfied.
9The price of the good is set by the competition on the international markets in which the firm
operates, and the latter takes it as exogenously given.
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In this model, technology enters the production function exactly as
capital in standard models. However, as already stressed in the previous
chapters, it may be useful to think at technology in a broader sense, for
example, extending its meaning to the firm’s organizational processes or
the management’s characteristics. The following assumption is made.
Assumption 4.3 Φ (N, T ) ∈ C2, ∀ (N,T )À 0 : ∂Φ(N,T )∂T > 0, ∂Φ(N,T )∂N >
0 and ∂
2Φ(N,T )
∂N2 < 0.
Given that labor is the only input in the production function besides
technology, technological progress is labor saving – meaning that supe-
rior technologies increase the productivity of labor–whenever ∂
2Φ(N,T )
∂N∂T >
0.
The firm’s problem amounts to decide what technology to adopt among
those that are available, as defined by the closed interval [0, Tmax] , Tmax >
0, where they are indexed and ranked by their efficiency. That is, T = 0
denotes the worst technology and T = Tmax the best one among those
available. We assume, for simplicity, that there are no direct technology
adoption costs and we do not model explicitly a market for technology.
This seems to be without loss of generality given our purpose. In fact, the
explicit introduction of a price and/or of a direct cost associated to the
adoption of a superior technology would further reduce the incentives
for the firm to adopt it, reinforcing the impact of spillovers. However,
given the absence of adoption costs and/or of a price for technology, one
might argue that workers themselves have an incentive to introduce a
superior technology, as their reservation utility (i.e. outside options) is
increasing in it. The implicit assumption here is that a technology can be
introduced by the market sector firm only; so that workers can benefit
from the technology only after it has been adopted by the firm.10
10A natural way to justify this assumption would be to argue that the choice of a technology entails
costs (like those for experimenting among the available alternatives, or the price of the technology
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4.3.1 The social planner problem
The benchmark to define the best available technology is given by the
first best solution of a benevolent social planner’s decision problem. We
assume that the planner’s objective function is an utilitaristic social wel-
fare function, so that she maximizes the sum of the firm’s profits and the
utility of all employed and unemployed workers.11 Therefore its problem
can be written as:
max
T
[Φ (Nns, T )− w (Nns + (1− c)Ns) + (w − e)Nns+
+w (1− c)Ns + cNsU¯ (T ) +
¡
N¯ −N
¢
U˜
i
, (4.8)
where N = Nns +Ns, and (Nns, Ns) denote respectively the number of
shirker and non-shirker workers at any point in time, and U˜ denotes the
reservation utility of never-employed workers. We write Nns instead of
N in the production function to highlight the fact that only non-shirker
workers contribute to production. By rearranging the terms, Problem 4.8
can be rewritten equivalently as
max
T
Φ (Nns, T ) + cNsU¯ (T )− eNns +
¡
N¯ −N
¢
U˜ . (4.9)
The solution of Problem (4.9) is
T¯ := argmax
T
n
Φ (Nns, T ) + (cNs) U¯ (T )− eNns +
¡
N¯ −N
¢
U˜
o
.
(4.10)
itself) that an individual can not bear, even in the presence of fairly efficient capital markets. Such
justification is obviously at odds with the assumption of technology being a costless “input”. One
should instead, and more realistically, assume that there are positive adoption costs (and/or a positive
price for technology). However, as our focus is on investigating the impact of technology induced
spillovers/externalities, we keep such costs in the background, letting them artificially equal zero.
Note, moreover, that besides being coherent with the empirical evidence (as stressed in Chapter
2), the assumption on the absence of direct adoption costs and instantaneous spread of (available)
technological knowledge is quite common in the literature not focusing explicitly on such costs as
the main engines behind technology adoption (see, among others, Zeira, 1998, and Basu and Weil,
1998). We will further come back to the implications of the absence of an adoption cost (or a price)
for technology in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.2).
11This is coherent with the profit distribution scheme introduced in Section 4.2.
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Given that c, e, and U˜ are independent of the adopted technology, and
since, for all N , Φ (Nns, T ) and U¯ (T ) are monotonically increasing in
T , T¯ is a constant function of N . Therefore, a benevolent social plan-
ner, whose objective is to maximize the social welfare function, adopts
technology Tmax, i.e. T¯ = Tmax.
4.3.2 Technology adoption and labor demand
The firm’s objective consists in the maximization of the profit function
under the worker’s no-shirking constraint, that, as it has been noticed
above, satisfies the individual rationality constraint as well. Therefore, it
solves the optimization problem:(
max
N,T
Φ (N, T )− wN
s.t. w = U¯ (T ) + 1ce
. (4.11)
We will start concentrating on interior solutions, without taking into
account the additional constraints 0 ≤ N ≤ N¯ and 0 ≤ T ≤ Tmax.
Problem (4.11) can be solved in two steps. In the first one we maximize
the profit function with respect to technology, given N , while in the
second step, once the optimal technology as a function of N has been
determined, we will solve the problem in N .
By substituting the participation and incentive compatibility constraint
into the profit function and by maximizing it with respect to T , given
N , we have
max
T
Φ (N,T )−
³
U¯ (T ) +
e
c
´
N. (4.12)
The first order condition is
∂Φ (N, t∗ (N))
∂T
− U¯ 0 (t∗ (N))N = 0, (4.13)
where the function t∗ (N) denotes the argmax of Problem (4.12). In order
to guarantee the concavity of the objective function in T , we assume
Assumption 4.4 U¯ 00 (T ) > 1N
∂2Φ(N,T )
∂T 2 , ∀T > 0.
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Assumption 4.4 requires that, for all T , the impact of changes in tech-
nology on the reservation utility is greater than the impact on the mar-
ginal productivity of technology for the firm.12 It is straightforward to
observe that the objective function is always concave when ∂
2Φ(N,T )
∂T 2 < 0.
Given the concavity of the objective function, the first order Condi-
tion (4.13) is both necessary and sufficient for a maximum of the firm’s
technology adoption choice, given N .
It is immediate to prove the following proposition showing that, under
the assumptions we made on Φ(N,T ) and U¯ (T ) and given that T¯ is not
a function of N , i.e. T¯ = Tmax, there exists one and only one technology
(different from the maximal one) which satisfies Condition (4.13) and is
a maximum of Problem (4.11).
Proposition 4.1 (Existence) Let Assumptions 4.3 and 4.2 on Φ(N,T )
and U¯(T ) hold, and assume that, ∀N ∈
£
0, N¯
¤
, the following boundary
conditions
(1) 1N
∂Φ(N,T )
∂T |T=0> U¯ 0 (T ) |T=0,
(2) 1N
∂Φ(N,T )
∂T |T=TMAX< U¯ 0 (T ) |T=TMAX ,
hold. Then, ∀ N , there exist an interior solution t∗ (N), 0 < t∗ (N) <
Tmax to Problem (4.11).
(Uniqueness) Under Assumption 4.4, the above solution t∗ (N) is
unique.
12By using the first order condition (4.13), it is easy to study the sign of t∗ (N) . Applying the
implicit function theorem we get:
dt∗ (N)
dN
= −
∂2Φ(N,t∗(N))
∂T∂N − U¯
0(t∗ (N))
∂2Φ(N,t∗(N))
∂T2
− U¯ 00(t∗ (N))N
.
Since, given the assumption on the concavity of the objective function, the denominator of the
previous expression is always negative, the sign of dt
∗(N)
dN depends on the sign of the numerator.
In particular, in case of labor-saving technological progress, both U¯
0
(t∗ (N)) and
∂2Φ(N,t∗(N))
∂T∂N are
positive, and thus the numerator will be negative if U 0(t∗ (N)) > ∂
2Φ(N,t∗(N))
∂T∂N .
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Proof. (Existence) Given the boundary Conditions (1) and (2), since
both Φ(N, T ) and U¯(T ) are differentiable, existence follows by the inter-
mediate value theorem.
(Uniqueness) Follows immediately by Assumption 4.4 guaranteeing the
concavity of the objective function in T .
Notice that Assumption 4.4 is required to prove the uniqueness of
the equilibrium only, while it plays no role for existence. Uniqueness,
however, is not a central issue in our framework, that revolves around
the existence of an internal solution showing the possibility of inefficient
technology adoption. If there is more than one interior solution, one could
simply select the “best” (i.e. the superior one) among them.13
Under the assumptions of Proposition 4.1, three possible cases can oc-
cur. When ∂
2Φ(N,T )
∂T 2 < 0 and U¯
00 (T ) > 0 the conclusion stated by the
proposition follows immediately from boundary Conditions (1) and (2).
When ∂
2Φ(N,T )
∂T 2 > 0 and U¯
00 (T ) > 0, both ∂Φ(N,T )∂T and U¯
0
(T ) are increas-
ing functions. By continuity and monotonicity, from Conditions (1) and
(2), it follows that ∂Φ(N,T )∂T and U¯
0
(T ) intersect in the interval (0, Tmax)
and such intersection is unique under Assumption 4.4. Similarly when
∂2Φ(N,T )
∂T 2 < 0 and U¯
00 (T ) < 0 both ∂Φ(N,T )∂T and U¯
0
(T ) are decreasing func-
tions and existence follows, again by monotonicity and continuity, if the
boundary Conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, while uniqueness is guar-
anteed by Assumption 4.4. Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 provide a graphical
representation of the logic behind Proposition 4.1.14 It is straightforward
to observe that whenever Conditions (1) and (2) are not satisfied it is pos-
sible to reach corner solutions in which the firm might choose the worst
13Dropping the uniqueness of the equilibrium could be of some interest in a framework character-
ized by the presence of competing firms, where it would allow to study the issue of firms’ coordination
in technology adoption, hence highlighting, for example, the working of standard setting processes.
14 In these figures the functions 1N
∂Φ(N,T )
∂T and U¯
0 (T ) are represented as linear functions only for
convenience. It needs not necessarily to be the case.
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FIGURE 4.1. Determination of t∗ (N) when ∂
2Φ(N,T )
∂T 2 > 0
and U¯ 00 (T ) > 0
technology available (in which case innovations are completely absent),
as well as the best technology available (on the technological frontier)
Tmax. In particular, the latter will always be the case if
∂2Φ(N,T )
∂T 2 > 0 and
U¯ 00 (T ) < 0.
From an economic point of view, Condition (1) states that, when start-
ing from very low technologies, the marginal increase in workers’ reser-
vation wage is lower than the increase in the marginal productivity of
technology induced by the adoption of the better technology. This seems
to be quite intuitive. Consider, as an example, the case of a firm that
operates a form of large-scale agriculture in which there are barriers to
entry induced by the allocation of property rights on the land. A superior
technology with respect to traditional methods in which each worker is
responsible for all the phases of cultivation can consist in a new tech-
nique requiring a worker to specialize in just one particular phase of the
production process. Such technological upgrading would be nothing more
than a better division of labor, similar to the one discussed by A. Smith.
Quite obviously, all workers should be able to use both technologies and
we can expect that the induced spillover effects benefiting workers are
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not particularly significant. However the new division of labor can greatly
improve the firm’s profitability.
Condition (2) requires that exactly the opposite occurs in the case the
best (i.e. highly ranked) technologies are adopted. Marginal productivity
should be growing at a slower pace than the reservation utility of workers.
In this case, spillover effects are so significant to induce the firm not to
innovate. In the framework of the previous example, this may be the case
of the adoption of technologies based on the genetic selection of seeds,
which imply a great deal of human capital to be used, but do not require
significant investment in fixed capital. This, in turn, implies that workers
may be able to apply the knowledge they acquire even in the subsistence
sector, thus increasing their reservation wage. Therefore, the marginal
gain for workers (associated to the adoption of an advanced technology)
culd be higher than the gain for the firm.
In the case in which superior technologies determine an increase in mar-
ginal productivity (depicted in Figure 4.1), that is ∂Φ
2(N,T )
∂T 2 > 0, spillover
effects are high enough for an inefficient technology to be adopted when
Assumption 4.4 holds and boundary Conditions (1) and (2) in Proposi-
tion 4.1 are satisfied. The inefficiency result is thus driven by the impor-
tance of the spillover effects themselves. It is worth stressing once again
that the channel through which spillover effects and monopolistic power
on the labor market can block technological progress is a strategic one,
that depends on the relationship between the reservation utility of work-
ers and the technology adopted by the firm, via the technology-induced
spillovers. Although the nature of these spillovers is not modeled explic-
itly here, as argued in Chapter 3, one might think they stem from the
transferable human capital originating from the worker’s ability to man-
age a certain technology. A worker’s expertise with a technology is a cost
for the firm, which the latter can not transfer on the workers themselves
or on the good price (due to the price taking assumption). By learn-
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ing a technology workers acquire better skills and increase their level of
knowledge which, in turn, increase the value of their outside options (i.e.
their utility level in the subsistence sector). Thus, on the one hand, the
adoption of a superior technology increases the productivity of employed
workers and the profits of the firm. On the other hand, it implies an
increase in the cost of labor induced by the presence of spillovers related
to the fact that workers learn (for convenience instantaneously) the new
technology. This, in turn, implies an increase in their reservation utility,
provided they can exploit their knowledge elsewhere, and consequently
an increase of the wage the firm must offer in order to induce workers to
accept its employment offer and to exert the required level of effort (as in
the standard efficiency wage model). That is, the participation constraint
of workers becomes endogenous in the technology choice. The adoption
of a new technology can determine an increase in the wage sufficient to
induce a profit-maximizing firm not to adopt the superior technology, in
order to avoid the impact of induced spillovers on the cost of labor.
It is straightforward to show that, in the absence of technological
spillovers and taking the price for the product to be given exogenously –
as it is the case in a perfect competition setting – the firm would adopt
the best technology available, Tmax, for any level of N . This follows im-
mediately from the fact that the profit function is increasing in T , which
is available at no cost. That is, our firm would behave as a benevolent
social planner. Without technological spillovers, the firm would in fact
be a price taker both on the product market and on the labor market. It
would not take into account that its decision to adopt a new technology
influences the reservation utility of workers and hence their wages (via its
impact on their reservation wage and individual rationality constraint).
In the absence of spillovers, the participation and incentive-compatibility
constraints (i.e. w = U¯ (T ) + 1ce) need still to be verified in equilibrium,
but there is no longer a direct correlation between utility (wage) and
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technology. The technology adoption problem of the firm becomes there-
fore
max
T
Φ (N,T )− wN
and since Φ (N,T ) is increasing both in T and N , for any N , it is
argmax
T
{Φ (N,T )− wN} = Tmax.
This confirms once more that the possible adoption of inefficient tech-
nologies derives from the price making assumption and from the pres-
ence of workers’ “bargaining” power in the labor market. These features
are responsible for the emergence of the spillover effects that make the
reservation utility and the wage of workers endogenous with respect to
the technology. Through this channel, they influence the firm’s decisions
rendering the adoption of superior technologies more costly, and hence
originating the inefficiency result.
4.4 Labor market equilibrium
Once the optimal technology t∗ (N) has been determined as a continuous
function of N , we must check if, given t∗, there exists a N∗ maximizing
the firm’s objective function. Since the profit function is continuous both
in T and N and it is defined in a closed and bounded interval, given t∗,
there must exist a value N∗ 5 N¯ , maximizing profit. By Proposition 4.1,
we know that, atN = N∗, there exists a technology t∗ (N∗) which is away
from the boundary even ifN∗ is on the boundary, i.e. t∗ (N∗) < T¯ = Tmax.
We can now determine the equilibrium levels of employment and wage.
The adopted technology, t∗ (N∗), determines immediately the equilibrium
level of the wage, w∗ := wˆ (t∗ (N∗)), the firm must offer in order to
induce workers to accept an offer and to exert the required level of effort.
Moreover, the labor demand at an interior solution (i.e. 0 < N∗ < N¯)
determines the equilibrium level of employment in the industry; i.e. the
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number of workers employed given the equilibrium wage. Formally, given
t∗ (N), the firm’s maximization problem is
max
N
Φ (N, t∗ (N))− wˆ (t∗ (N))N. (4.14)
The number of workers employed in equilibrium, N∗, must satisfy the
first order conditionµ
∂Φ (N∗, t∗ (N∗))
∂N
+
∂Φ (N∗, t∗ (N∗))
∂T
· dt
∗ (N∗)
dN
¶
= (4.15)
= wˆ (t∗ (N∗)) +
∂wˆ (t∗ (N∗))
∂T
· dt
∗ (N∗)
dN
N.
By observing that the first order Condition (4.13) in the technology
adoption problem can be written as
∂Φ (N∗, t∗ (N))
∂T
=
∂wˆ (t∗ (N∗))
∂T
N,
we have:
∂Φ (N∗, t∗ (N∗))
∂T
· dt
∗ (N∗)
dN
=
∂wˆ (t∗ (N∗))
∂T
· dt
∗ (N∗)
dN
N.
Therefore, Condition (4.15) is satisfied whenever
∂Φ (N∗, t∗ (N∗))
∂N
= wˆ (t∗ (N∗)) . (4.16)
In order to determine N∗, it is therefore enough to guarantee that the
equilibrium wage, given the adopted technology, is equal to the marginal
productivity of labor.15
It is important to note that, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz model and for
the same reasons, in our model it is impossible to reach a full employment
equilibrium satisfying at the same time the participation and incentive
constraints of workers, and thus there is involuntary unemployment in
equilibrium. If, at T ∗ := t∗ (N∗), it is optimal for the firm to employ all
15 It is a matter of standard algebra to solve for the equilibrium values of technology and employ-
ment for given functional forms. This is done in Section 4.5 for a Cobb-Douglas economy.
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available labor force and there are no significant costs associated with
being fired (loss of reputation, moving costs and so on), the threat to
be fired and never re-hired by the firm is not a credible one and, thus,
all workers would have an incentive to shirk. Assumption 4.1 establishes
that the probability to be re-hired by the firm once fired is equal to 0.
This assumption would be untenable at a full employment equilibrium.
To better see the point, let the job acquisition rate for an unemployed
worker to be greater than 0 and denote it with a, 0 < a ≤ 1. Indicate
with K 6= 0, 0 < K < N , the number of fired workers, i.e. the flow of
workers per unit of time into the subsistence sector of the economy. The
flow of unemployed toward the industry (i.e. out of subsistence) per unit
of time is a(N¯−N+K). At a stationary state these flows must be equal,
i.e.
a
¡
N¯ −N +K
¢
= K ⇒ a = K¡
N¯ −N +K
¢ .
WheneverN → N¯ , it is a = 1; hence a fired worker would be immediately
re-hired by the firm.
Only the presence of equilibrium unemployment makes the threat of
firing credible. Therefore also in our model equilibrium unemployment
constitutes a discipline device for workers.
At the equilibrium wage, w∗ = wˆ (T ∗), the firm can hire all the workers
it needs and the latter have an incentive to exert the required effort. There
is no reason for the firm to offer wages higher than wˆ (T ∗) and of course
there is no incentive to offer wages below wˆ (T ∗), because they would
lead to a shirking behavior by workers.
Equilibrium unemployment is involuntary. Unemployed workers would
not be employed by the firm even if they are willing to accept a wage
lower than wˆ (T ∗) because, due to the imperfect monitoring mechanisms,
they would not be able to credibly signal themselves as non-shirkers.
4.5 An example: Cobb-Douglas economy 87
4.5 An example: Cobb-Douglas economy
In this section, we apply the framework introduced above by considering
specific functional forms for the reservation utility function of workers
and for the technology adopted by the firm. More precisely, we assume
that the firm is characterized by the Cobb-Douglas production function
Φ (N,T ) = ATαNβ, (4.17)
where 0 ≤ T ≤ Tmax, 0 ≤ N ≤ N¯ and A is a scale parameter, that
can be interpreted, for example, as an exogenous component of technical
progress.
Workers’ reservation utility function is of the type
U¯ (T ) = T γ. (4.18)
On these parameters, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 4.5 γ > 1 > α > 0.
Assumption 4.6 1 > β > 0.
Assumption 4.7 βγ > α.
These assumptions for the Cobb Douglas specification meet those made
for the general case discussed in previous sections. Notice, however, that
Assumption 4.5 is more restrictive than the corresponding Assumption
4.2 introduced in Section 4.2. Thus in the following pages, we will limit
ourselves to illustrate a special case only of the general analysis per-
formed above. In particular, we will consider an economy such that the
technology of the firm is concave both in T and N , while the workers’
reservation utility is convex in T . Both the concavity of the firm’s produc-
tion function and the convexity of the reservation utility in technology
are not required in general, and we did not restrict our theory to these
cases indeed. It is also immediate that in the Cobb-Douglas specification
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considered here technological progress is of the labor saving type in that
∂2Φ(N,T )
∂N∂T > 0.
Notice, finally, that for all remaining variables and parameters we will
stick to the notation introduced in the previous sections of the chapter.
4.5.1 The choice of technology and employment by the firm
We first solve the firm’s profit maximization and characterize the choice
of technology and labor demand by the firm using the same approach
developed in Section 4.3.2.
The firm’s profit maximization problem is
max
T,N
Π (T,N) = ATαNβ −
h
T γ +
e
c
i
N, (4.19)
where we already substituted for the individual rationality and no-shirking
constraints (defined by Equation (4.7) in Section 4.2) that for this Cobb-
Douglas economy takes the form
w = T γ +
e
c
. (4.20)
Given N, the technology adoption problem of the firm is
max
T
ATαNβ −
h
T γ +
e
c
i
N, (4.21)
which is represented in Figure 4.4.
The first order condition of Problem (4.21) is
αATα−1Nβ − γT γ−1N = 0
and, for T 6= 0,
αANβ − γT γ−αN = 0 (4.22)
⇔ t∗ (N) :=
µ
αA
γ
Nβ−1
¶ 1
γ−α
. (4.23)
Notice that, given Assumption 4.5, the second order condition for a local
maximum is satisfied:
α (α− 1)| {z }A
<0
Tα−2Nβ − γ (γ − 1)| {z }
>0
T γ−2N < 0. (4.24)
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In order to derive labor demand, we substitute t∗ (N) for T into Prob-
lem (4.21) and we maximize with respect to N
max
N
A
µ
αA
γ
Nβ−1
¶ α
γ−α
Nβ −
"µ
αA
γ
Nβ−1
¶ γ
γ−α
+
e
c
#
N
i.e.
max
N
A
µ
αA
γ
¶ α
γ−α
N
βγ−α
γ−α −
µ
αA
γ
¶ γ
γ−α
N
βγ−α
γ−α − e
c
N
max
N
"
A
µ
αA
γ
¶ α
γ−α
−
µ
αA
γ
¶ γ
γ−α
#
N
βγ−α
γ−α − e
c
N, (4.25)
illustrated graphically in Figure 4.5, where k =
·
A
³
αA
γ
´ α
γ−α −
³
αA
γ
´ γ
γ−α
¸
and η =
³
βγ−α
γ−α
´
. It is a matter of algebra to show that k is greater than
0 for any A, as is proved in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 4.1
A
µ
αA
γ
¶ α
γ−α
−
µ
αA
γ
¶ γ
γ−α
> 0.
Proof. By taking logarithms and after some algebra it is
lnA
µ
1 +
α
γ − α −
γ
γ − α
¶
| {z }
=0
>
µ
α
γ − α −
γ
γ − α
¶
| {z }
α−γ
γ−α=−1
ln γ|{z}
>0
+
µ
γ
γ − α −
α
γ − α
¶
| {z }
γ−α
γ−α=1
lnα|{z}
<0
| {z }
,
<0
that is always satisfied.
The first order condition of Problem (4.25) is
kηNη−1 − e
c
= 0
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We already know that k > 0. Moreover, under Assumptions 4.5 - 4.7, it
is η > 0. Therefore, we get:
N∗ =
µ
e
c
1
kη
¶ 1
η−1
> 0.
Since β < 1 by Assumption 4.7, the exponent of N , i.e. η = βγ−αγ−α , is
smaller than 1. This ensures that the firm’s problem inN has a maximum,
as it is easily seen by studying the second order condition of Problem
(4.25)"
A
µ
αA
γ
¶ α
γ−α
−
µ
αA
γ
¶ γ
γ−α
#
| {z }
>0
βγ − α
γ − α| {z }
>0
γ (β − 1)
γ − α| {z }
<0
N
γ(β−1)
γ−α −1| {z }
>0
< 0.
Notice that, given A, α, β and γ, it is always possible to define N¯ in such
a way that an interior solution for N is obtained (i.e. N∗ < N¯), which
implies the existence of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.
We can, finally, determine the optimal technology adopted by the firm.
Since by Equation (4.23) it is
t∗ (N) =
µ
αA
γ
Nβ−1
¶ 1
γ−α
,
it is immediate that
T ∗ = t∗ (N∗) =
Ã
αA
γ
µ
e
c
1
kη
¶β−1
η−1
! 1
γ−α
=
µ
αA
γ
¶ 1
γ−α
µ
e
c
1
kη
¶ 1
γ
.
In order to check the existence and uniqueness of an interior solution
(i.e. the result of inefficient technology adoption), we apply Proposition
4.1 introduced in Section 4.3.2. As for the existence part of the proposi-
tion, we only need to check whether the boundary Conditions (1) and (2)
are fulfilled. By substituting Equations (4.17) and (4.18) into Conditions
(1) and (2), we obtain respectively
AαTα−1Nβ |T=0| {z }
→+∞
> γT γ−1N |T=0| {z }
=0
, (4.26)
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and
AαTα−1maxN
β < γT γ−1maxN (4.27)
While inequality (4.26) is always satisfied, for Condition (4.27) to be
met, it is sufficient to define a Tmax such that Tmax > T ∗ = t∗ (N∗),
which is always possible as T ∗ is a finite number for any choice of the
parameter values. This follows immediately from the fact that (4.27) can
be rewritten as
Tmax >
µ
αA
γ
Nβ−1
¶ 1
γ−α
= t∗ (N) ,
where the equality is established by Equation (4.23). Finally, it is straight-
forward to notice that Assumption 4.4 holds for our Cobb-Douglas for-
mulation, which proves uniqueness.
4.5.2 A note on the concavity of the firm’s technology
By inspection of the Hessian matrix (4.28) for Problem (4.19), that is


α (α− 1)ATα−2Nβ − γ (γ − 1)T γ−2N| {z }
<0
αβATα−1Nβ−1 − γT γ−1| {z }
?
αβATα−1Nβ−1 − γT γ−1| {z }
?
β (β − 1)ATαNβ−2| {z }
<0

 ,
(4.28)
it is easy to see that, in general, Π (T,N) is not globally concave. By
performing a contour analysis as the one presented in Figure 4.6 it is easy
to check that, in general, the problem is not quasi-concave as well, since
the resulting upper contour set is not convex.16 Of course, it is always
possible to introduce restrictions on parameters values in such a way
that the problem becomes a concave one, but this turns out to be more
restrictive than needed.As shown above, we can not base our claim that
16The non-convexity of the upper contour set is a feature of the problem for a wide range of
parameter sets. Figure 4.6 - depicting contours Π (T,N) = const. - has been drawn by setting A = 4,
α = 0.5, β = 0.5, γ = 1.5 and ec = 1. The “biggest” contour corresponds to const. = 1.8 and
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FIGURE 4.6. Contour sets for Π (T,N)
the values T ∗ and N∗ are maximizers for Problem (4.19) on the concavity
or quasi-concavity of Π (T,N) . However, the values obtained with our
two steps procedure correspond to a global maximum of Problem (4.19).
In fact, if t∗ (N) is a global maximizer for the problem in T given N and
the second order condition of the problem in N is satisfied, the couple
(T ∗, N∗) identifies a global maximum for the original Problem (4.19).
By considering the left hand side of the first order condition (4.22), we
note that, given a specific N = N˜ , there is one and only one value of T
(i.e. t∗
³
N˜
´
) such that the derivative
dΠ(T,N˜)
dT is equal to 0. Given N˜ , for
all T < t∗
³
N˜
´
such a derivative is positive, while for all T > t∗
³
N˜
´
it is
negative. Since this is true for all N˜ ∈
£
0, N¯
¤
, t∗ (N) is a global maximizer
for the problem in T (given N) and not only a local one. Therefore, the
maximizers of such a problem, for each N , are described by the locus
t∗ (N) .
the others have been obtained by increasing monotonically the value const. The “smallest” contour
represented corresponds to const. = 2.15.
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4.5.3 The derivation of the loci t∗ (N) and n∗ (T )
In this subsection we provide for an alternative characterization of the
firm’s choices– showing again the existence and uniqueness of an interior
solution – that will prove useful in doing comparative statics exercises.
In order to do so, we first derive the loci t∗ (N) and n∗ (T ) .
We know that
t∗ (N) := argmax
T
ATαNβ −
h
T γ +
e
c
i
N, (4.29)
and, from the first order condition of Problem (4.29), for T 6= 0, it is
immediate to check that the expression for t∗ (N) is the one given by
Equation (4.23).
By letting
n∗ (T ) := argmax
N
ATαNβ −
h
T γ +
e
c
i
N,
and taking the first order condition of such problem we get
n∗ (T ) =
µ
T γ−α + ecT
−α
βA
¶ 1
β−1
. (4.30)
A graphical representation of the loci t∗ (N) and n∗ (T ) in the T − N
plane is provided in Figure 4.7, where the two loci have been plotted
using the following parameters values17
α = 0.25 β = 0.5 γ = 2 ec = 0.75 A = 10. (4.31)
We will use this parameters configuration as our base parameters set for
all numerical experiments unless otherwise noted.
The qualitative behavior shown in Figure 4.7 is easily confirmed by
observing that both t∗ (N) and n∗ (T ) are continuos functions and that
lim
N→0
t∗ (N) = +∞, lim
N→+∞
t∗ (N) = 0
17Given these parameter values, the two loci have a unique intersection at N∗ = 17.68 and T∗ =
0.5.
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FIGURE 4.7. The loci t∗ (N) (red line) and n∗ (T ) (black line)
and
lim
T→0
n∗ (T ) = 0, lim
T→+∞
n∗ (T ) = 0.
It is easy to show that the two loci t∗ (N) and n∗ (T ) have a unique
intersection. The corresponding equilibrium values for our Cobb-Douglas
economy are
T ∗ =
µ
αec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ
, (4.32)
N∗ =
"
Aα
α
γ
γ
µ e
c
βγ − α
¶α
γ−1
# 1
1−β
, (4.33)
and
w∗ =
αec
βγ − α +
e
c
=
βγ
βγ − α
e
c
. (4.34)
In order to show the uniqueness of the equilibrium, notice that Equa-
tions (4.23) and (4.30) can be written as
t∗
−1
(T ) :=
µ
αAT ∗
α
γT ∗γ
¶ 1
1−β
, (4.35)
n∗ (T ) :=
µ
βATα
T γ + ec
¶ 1
1−β
. (4.36)
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FIGURE 4.8. The loci t∗ (N) and n∗ (T ) for γ = 2 (black lines) and γ = 3
(red lines)
By defining ς (T ) := t∗
−1
(T )− n∗ (T ), one finds that ς (T ) has a unique
zero at T = T ∗, which proves uniqueness.18
4.5.4 Comparative statics
By having established the existence and uniqueness of the interior solu-
tion in T , we now turn to comparative statics. The position in the plane
of the unique intersection between the two loci t∗ (N) and n∗ (T ) is obvi-
ously affected by parameters values, as it is exemplified qualitatively by
Figure 4.8, where – for the benchmark parameters set used in Figure
4.7 – we plot the loci t∗ (N) and n∗ (T ) for different values of parameter
γ.19
18From Equations (4.35) and (4.36), one can see that it is ς (T ) = 0 if and only if
Tγ (βγ − α) = αe
c
. (4.37)
Since βγ > α by Assumption 4.7, it is
T∗ =
µ
α ec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ
,
as stated in (4.32). By substituting (4.32) into Equation (4.36) we get the N∗ defined in (4.33).
Finally, by substituting (4.32) into the no-shirking constraint (4.20), the value w∗ in (4.34) obtains.
19The equilibrium levels of employment and technology for the loci illustrated in Figure 4.8 are,
respectively, (N∗, T ∗) = (17.68, 0.5) when γ = 2, and (N∗, T ∗) = (22.5, 0.53) when γ = 3.
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In the following paragraphs, we study how the optimal values T ∗, N∗
and w∗ are affected by changes in the relevant parameters, mainly fo-
cusing on the distortionary impact of the disutility of effort and of the
probability to be caught shirking (reflecting the firm’s monitoring tech-
nology), (ec), and of the elasticity of the reservation utility function (γ).
The impact of changes in the disutility of effort/monitoring technology
e/c on T ∗, N∗ and w∗
We discuss the impact of changes in ec by focusing, without loss of
generality, on changes in the disutility of effort e.20 The impact of the
disutility of effort e on the choice of technology by the firm is determined
by differentiating Equation (4.32) with respect to e, obtaining
∂T ∗
∂e
=
1
γ
α
c (βγ − α)
µ
α ec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ−1
(4.38)
that, under Assumptions 4.5 - 4.7, is positive. This implies that the firm
adopts better technologies the higher the disutility of effort. Moreover,
from the non shirking constraint (4.20), it follows immediately that the
wage is increasing in the disutility of effort, as confirmed by Condition
(4.39):
∂w∗
∂e
=
βγ
c
1
(βγ − α) > 0. (4.39)
Finally, since labor demand is decreasing in wage and labor supply is of
infinite elasticity, the impact of e on optimal employment is a negative
one, as confirmed by Condition(4.40), obtained by differentiating (4.33):
∂N∗
∂e
=
1
1− β
"
Aα
α
γ
γ
µ e
c
βγ − α
¶α
γ−1
# 1
1−β−1
| {z }
>0
Aα
α
γ
γ| {z }
>0
·
20 It is important to recall that in our framework both the disutility of effort and the probability
to be caught shirking are modeled as exogenous parameters. We already discussed, however, the
implications of rendering endogenous the firm’s monitoring effort and hence the detection probability
c.
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·
µ
α
γ
− 1
¶
| {z }
<0
µ e
c
βγ − α
¶α
γ−2 1
c (βγ − α)| {z }
>0
< 0. (4.40)
It is important to notice that these results are specific to the Cobb-
Douglas formulation we adopted. In general, the sign of ∂T
∗
∂e can either
be positive or negative depending on the value of the elasticity of substi-
tution between factors. In this sense, the Cobb-Douglas case is a special
one since the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1 and, thus, when e
increases labor becomes more expensive, labor demand diminishes and
the firm substitutes N with T . However, it is immediate to notice that,
if the elasticity of substitution is smaller than 1, the sign of ∂T
∗
∂e becomes
negative as well. This can be easily illustrated considering a fixed propor-
tion Leontief production function for which the elasticity of substitution
is zero. In this case, in fact, when e increases labor demand and T (given
fixed proportions) must decrease, which implies ∂T
∗
∂e < 0.
21
21The impact of changes in the monitoring technology, c, is immediately derived by an analogous
argument. An increase of c affects positively the equilibrium demand of labor and negatively the
wage (by lowering the wage required to meet the incentive compatibility constraint). Formally:
∂N∗
∂c
=
1
1− β
"
Aα
α
γ
γ
µ e
c
βγ − α
¶ α
γ −1
# 1
1−β−1 Aα
α
γ
γ| {z }
>0
µ
α
γ
− 1
¶
| {z }
<0
µ e
c
βγ − α
¶ α
γ −2
| {z }
>0
µ
− e
c2 (βγ − α)
¶
| {z }
<0
> 0;
(4.41)
∂w∗
∂c
= − βγe
c2 (βγ − α)
< 0. (4.42)
Finally, since technology is labor saving and ∂N
∗
∂c > 0, it must be
∂T∗
∂c < 0, as confirmed by
Condition(4.43)
∂T∗
∂c
=
1
γ
µ
α ec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ−1 µ
− αe
c2 (βγ − α)
¶
| {z }
<0
< 0. (4.43)
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The impact of changes of γ on T ∗, N∗ and w∗
The impact of changes in the elasticity, γ, of the reservation utility
function on the equilibrium values depends on the sign of the derivative
∂T ∗
∂γ
=
1
γ
µ
α ec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ−1
µ
−
αβ ec
(βγ − α)2
¶
+µ
α ec
βγ − α
¶
ln
µ
α ec
(βγ − α)
¶µ
− 1
γ2
¶
,
that, after some algebra, can be rewritten as
∂T ∗
∂γ
= −1
γ
µ
αec
βγ − α
¶


µ
αec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ−1
µ
β
(βγ − α)
¶
| {z }
>0
+
1
γ
ln
µ
α ec
(βγ − α)
¶
| {z }
ζ(γ)
?
T0


.
(4.44)
The sign of (4.44) is undecided, given that the expression ζ (γ) can be
either greater or smaller than 0. It is immediate to notice that a sufficient
condition for Derivative (4.44) to be negative is22
γ ≤
α
¡
e
c + 1
¢
β
, (4.45)
that occurs when T ∗ ≥ 1, consistently with the view that for a sufficiently
high “technological grade” the elasticity of the reservation utility func-
tion has a negative effect on technology adoption due to the relevance of
spillover effects (externalities). Figure 4.9 – obtained for our base para-
meters set (4.31) – illustrates the switch in the sign of the derivative.
Moreover, Condition (4.45) makes apparent the link between γ and the
disutility of effort ec , as well as the production function coefficients α and
β. The value of γ at which the switch in the sign of the derivative oc-
curs is clearly a numerical issue depending on the specific parameters set
22Assumption 4.7 requires that γ > αβ . Moreover, condition γ ≤
α( ec+1)
β guarantees that
ln
³
α ec
(βγ−α)
´
≥ 0.
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FIGURE 4.9. Non-monotonic dependence of T ∗ on γ
considered. It is worth noticing that, as illustrated by Condition (4.45),
increasing the value of the disutility of effort (or relaxing the firm’s mon-
itoring technology, i.e. reducing c) increases the value of γ at which the
sufficient condition for γ begins to hold.23 This is shown in Figure 4.10
reporting simulations for different values of the disutility of effort (moni-
toring technology). The experiment is performed for the same parameter
set as in Figure 4.9 and for various ec values:
e
c = 0.25 (magenta line),
e
c = 0.5 (blue line),
e
c = 0.75 (black line),
e
c = 1 (red line), and finally
e
c = 1.5 (green line). This evidence suggests that the change in the sign
of the derivative depends on the distortionary impact of the disutility of
effort (or of the firm’s monitoring) on the firm’s choice of technology.
Turning to the impact of γ on w∗, it is immediate to observe that it is
always negative, as confirmed by the fact that the sign of
∂w∗
∂γ
=
β ec (βγ − α)− β
2 e
cγ
(βγ − α)2
= −
αβ ec
(βγ − α)2
(4.46)
23Further experimentations, not reported here, with different values of the parameters show that,
given ec and α, the value of γ at which the derivative turns positive becomes smaller when increasing
β. In the same way, given ec and β, the derivative becomes positive for a smaller value of γ when
decreasing α.
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FIGURE 4.10. Joint effects of ec and γ on T
∗ (ec = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, and 1.5)
is negative. This is an intuitive finding, given the behavior of ∂T
∗
∂γ .When
Condition(4.45) holds, it is ∂T
∗
∂γ < 0 and therefore the results follows
directly from Equation (4.20). When Condition (4.45) does not hold, it
is T ∗ < 1. Thus, again from Equation (4.20), it is immediate to conclude
that an increase in γ reduces the wage.
Finally, as for the behavior of N∗ with respect to γ, it is easy to show
(see Appendix A.1) that the sign of ∂N
∗
∂γ is undecided, as it depends
on the specific parameters values for the disutility of effort - monitoring
technology (ec), and for the production function parameters α and β.
24
The impact of changes in α and β on T ∗, N∗ and w∗
Changes in the parameters β and α reflect changes in the distributional
ratio between technology and labor expenditures. It is thus interesting to
investigate the impact of the quota spent in technology and labor by the
firm (the production function coefficients α and β respectively) on the
equilibrium values. From Equations (4.32) and (4.34) it is straightforward
to establish the signs of the derivatives of w∗ and T ∗ with respect to α,
24 See Appendix A.1 for numerical experiments investigating the impact of γ on the equilibrium
employment level.
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i.e.
∂w∗
∂α
=
βγ ec
(βγ − α)2
> 0, (4.47)
∂T ∗
∂α
=
1
γ
µ
α ec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ−1
| {z }
>0
µ e
c (βγ − α) + α
e
c
(βγ − α)2
¶
| {z }
>0
> 0. (4.48)
Similarly, by taking the derivatives with respect to β,we obtain
∂w∗
∂β
=
γ ec (βγ − α)− βγ2
e
c
(βγ − α)2
= −
αγ ec
(βγ − α)2
< 0, (4.49)
∂T ∗
∂β
=
1
γ
µ
α ec
βγ − α
¶ 1
γ−1
| {z }
>0
µ
−
γα ec
(βγ − α)2
¶
| {z } < 0
<0
. (4.50)
While the impact of α and β on equilibrium wage and technology is as
expected from economic intuition, the effect of the coefficients α and β on
the equilibrium level of employment turns out to be less clear-cut, since
the signs of ∂N
∗
∂β and of
∂N∗
∂α –depending on the specific parameters values
– are undecided.25 We consider ∂N
∗
∂α first. By differentiating Equation
(4.33) with respect to α, making use of Assumptions 4.5 - 4.7 and after
some algebra we get
∂N∗
∂α
=
1
1− β ξ
β
1−β
A
γ
µ
e/c
βγ − α
¶α
γ−1 α
α
γ
γ| {z }
>0


γ (β − 1)
βγ − α| {z }
<0
+ lnα
e/c
βγ − α| {z }
?
T0


,
(4.51)
where
ξ =
Aα
α
γ
γ
µ
e/c
βγ − α
¶α
γ−1
> 0. (4.52)
25 It is worth noticing that the issue can not be solved by studying directly the effect of the
distributional ratio αβ only. In fact, from Equation (4.33), one can easily conclude that N
∗ can not
be immediately expressed as a function of αβ .
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Although there are no immediate conditions fully characterizing the sign
of (4.51), it is easy to see that a sufficient condition for it to be negative
is
0 < α ≤ βγ
e/c+ 1
< 1. (4.53)
From Equation (4.32) it is clear that Condition (4.53) holds when it is
T ∗ ≤ 1, suggesting that the fraction of firm’s expenditures in technology
has a negative impact on equilibrium employment when the “technology
grade” is sufficiently low.26 Figure 4.11-(a) shows the behavior of N∗ (α)
for our benchmark parameters set (4.31). It is straightforward to no-
tice that, although N∗ (α) is decreasing everywhere, sufficient Condition
(4.53) is not fulfilled for all α.27 Panels (b) – drawn for e/c = 5 – and
(c) – for e/c = 10 – illustrate the possible non-monotonicity of N∗ (α)
when increasing, for example, the value of e/c.
As for the sign of ∂N
∗
∂β , by differentiating (4.33) with respect to β, and
using (4.52) and Assumptions 4.5 - 4.7, after some algebra we get
∂N∗
∂β
=
1
(1− β)2| {z }
>0
ξ
1
1−β|{z}
>0
ln ξ|{z}
?
T0
+ ξ
β
1−β|{z}
>0
e
c
γ−α
γ Aα
α
γ
(1− β)
³
e/c
βγ−α
´2−αγ
(βγ − α)2| {z }
,
>0
(4.54)
from which it is apparent that the sign of ∂N
∗
∂β is affected by the value of
ξ, that in turn depends on the specific parameters values. By inspection
of (4.54) it is, in fact, immediate to notice that a sufficient condition for
∂N∗
∂β > 0 is to require ξ ≥ 1, i.e.
1
γ

e
c
Ã
Aα
α
γ
γ
! γ
γ−α
+ α

 ≤ β < 1, (4.55)
26Notice that Condition (4.53) requires exactly the opposite than Condition (4.45) providing suf-
ficient conditions for ∂T
∗
∂γ to be negative.
27Condition (4.53) obviously holds for all admissible α if and only if βγ ≥ ec +1, a condition that is
not satisfied by our parameters set for which, instead, sufficient Condition (4.53) holds for α ≤ 0.57
only.
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FIGURE 4.11. The shape of of N∗ (α) for different values of e/c
that does not have a clear economic interpretation. The positively slope
curve in Figure 4.12-(a) is drawn for the base parameters set (4.31) for
which Condition (4.55) is satisfied for (almost) all admissible β, while
the curve in panel (b) is obtained by changing the value of A to A = 1
in order to show the possible non-monotonicity of N∗ (β).28
Appendix A.2 contains further numerical experiments investigating the
cross effects of γ and ec on N
∗ (α) and N∗ (β).
28For A = 1 there are no admissible values of β that fulfill Condition (4.55). For our benchmark
parameters set, Condition (4.55) is satisfied for 0.197 ≤ β < 1. Given the values of α and γ, it must
be β > 0.125 for Assumption 4.7 to hold. However, we do not report experiments with parameters
configurations such that (4.55) is met by all admissible values of β as ∂N∗ (β) /∂β tends to infinity
for very small values of β.
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4.6 Summary and Extensions
In this chapter we investigated, in a partial equilibrium setting, the tech-
nology adoption problem faced by a firm that is price maker on the
labor market and price taker on the goods market. The main feature of
our economy is the specific relationship between the reservation utility
of workers and the technology adopted by the firm. The adoption of a
superior technology improves the workers’ outside options, inducing an
increase in the wage the firm must pay in order to induce them to partic-
ipate in the employment relationship. It is proved that such increase in
the wage can be enough to dampen the adoption of better technologies.
The direct implication of this is an inefficiency result in the technol-
ogy adoption problem. However, as stressed in Chapter 3, the channel
through which this result is obtained differs substantially from those typ-
ically emphasized in the literature, that focuses mainly on the direct role
of adoption and adjustment costs to explain why firms do often choose
inferior technologies.
The chapter focused on a simple framework to highlight the role of
spillover effects, and most of the assumptions made, whether implicitly
or explicitly, are mainly motivated by this objective. In principle, the
same issues can be investigated in a broader and more general modelling
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environment. In the following, we briefly survey some of the limits and
outline specific extensions to the framework developed in the previous
sections.
Probability to be fired. The simplifying assumptions on the prob-
ability to be fired and to be re-hired can be generalized. By assuming
the probability to be re-hired being equal to zero, we rule out some fea-
tures that can be included in the model. In case N¯ is not big enough,
it may be possible that the number of workers fired because of shirk-
ing is bigger than the number of those never employed by the firm. If
this happens, on the one hand, the firm may be forced to hire workers
it fired in the past and this, of course, reduces the punishment associ-
ated with being fired. Moreover, as already observed, the assumption of
an ever-lasting unemployment phase becomes contradictory should the
economy be close to a full employment equilibrium. On the other hand,
in the case of labor-saving technical progress the likelihood of being re-
hired once fired is reduced, thus reducing the wages the firm must pay in
order not to induce shirking behaviors. This effect would be reinforced
by taking into account the heterogeneity of workers while evaluating the
probability of being re-hired. In fact, once fired, a shirker suffers a loss of
reputation, which makes more difficult for him (her) to be hired again.
Risk neutrality of workers and absence of a capital market.
In describing the economy, we have assumed a quasi-linear utility func-
tion and, hence risk neutrality of workers. In a more general framework
in which self-employed agents can transform into entrepreneurs – or
take advantage of their knowledge if employed by other firms (which
amounts to a more advanced modelling of workers outside options) –,
allowing for risk aversion would reduce the probability that a worker is
willing to convert into an entrepreneur (i.e. enter the “subsistence sec-
tor of the economy in the terminology of the previous sections) in order
to take advantage of the knowledge she acquires while working for the
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firm, provided uncertainty is higher when being self-employed than when
working for the firm. This of course amounts to a decrease in the value of
the worker’s outside option, that in turn reduces the importance of the
spillover effects associated to the adoption of a better technology and,
ultimately, the costs of innovation for the firm.
The presence of an (imperfect) capital market is likely to have a sim-
ilar impact, whenever one explicitly allows for positive adoption (devel-
opment) costs of technology. Maintaining the assumption of risk neu-
trality, a worker that wants to become an entrepreneur may not succeed
in doing so whenever she is unable to obtain the financial resources she
needs. Therefore, the possible relevance of binding financial constraints
may render impossible for workers to exploit the better outside options
originating from technology-induced spillovers. This, in turn, reduces the
importance of the latter in the firm’s decision to adopt a superior tech-
nology.
Number of firms. The assumption of a market sector characterized
by the presence of one firm only does not add to the realism of the analy-
sis, being as it is – in many cases – at odds with the empirical evidence.
We conjecture, nonetheless, that it may be a less restrictive assumption
than it appears at first. The central point in this chapter’s modelling
strategy is, in fact, the presence of market power on the labor market
and not the degree of competition in the final goods market. On the one
hand, allowing for many firms competing on the labor market certainly
complicates the analysis of the interaction between firms and workers,
possibly determining a strategic use of the adoption timing by different
firms.29 On the other hand, however, provided that the degree of com-
29The point has been discussed in Chapter 2. There are many papers investigating both theo-
retically and empirically the interaction among firms. For instance, Spence (1984) stresses that the
presence of spillovers reduces the production costs of rival firms generating free riding problems. At
the empirical level, Bernstein (1988) studies the impact of spillovers both at the inter-industry and
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plementarity among different industries is not too low (rendering firm-
specific the knowledge accumulated by workers, and hence reducing the
potential relevance of spillovers), the presence of many firms should in-
crease the dimension of the space of outside options available to workers,
eventually increasing the size of the technology-induced spillover effects
and, thus, the cost of technology adoption for the firm.
at the intra-industry level and Bernstein and Nadiri (1991) investigate private and social returns
from R&D investments.
5Technology Adoption with Production
Externalities:
A General Equilibrium Framework
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we further investigate the impact of the links between
market power and technology in impeding or slowing down the adoption
of superior technologies. As in Chapter 4, our main claim is that the
presence of perfectly competitive goods markets, and monopolistic fac-
tors markets can slow down the adoption of better technologies and thus
technical progress. The presence of an imperfectly competitive labor mar-
ket combined with that of production externalities – a new ingredient of
this chapter to model consistently the technology-induced spillovers –
can impede economic progress and drive the adoption of inefficient tech-
nologies, even in the absence of any form of coordination among agents.
The main contribution of this chapter with respect to our previous
analysis is that we now turn our attention to a general equilibrium econ-
omy, extending the partial equilibrium framework developed in Chapter
4. The structural characteristics of the economy developed here are the
same considered there, except that we model explicitly the relationship
between the technology adopted by the firm and the workers’ outside
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options (i.e. the spillover effects). One of the main disadvantages of the
partial equilibrium analysis in Chapter 4 is, in fact, that the dependence
of the workers’ reservation utility on technology – and thus the nature
of the spillover effects on which our arguments are based – remains un-
explained, being exogenously stated by assumption. As it will become
clear after the model is presented, the general equilibrium framework
studied in this chapter allows to render endogenous such relationship by
means of production externalities going from the market sector to the
self-employment sector of the economy.
Furthermore, in a general equilibrium framework, all feedback effects
arising from the link between technology and outside options – and in-
fluencing the consumers’ decisions on labor supply, the wages and the
firm’s choice of technology – are endogenous and fully taken into ac-
count. At the same time, the economy is closed, in the sense that all
monetary and real flows are accounted for, and the income determina-
tion process is both endogenous and complete, meaning that all income
generated is used.
The economy is made up of a consumption sector, characterized by
a finite number of identical consumers, and of a production sector –
producing a consumption good – composed of a price-taker firm (whose
shares are equally held by all agents in the economy), which we label as
the market sector, and a number of self-employed entrepreneurs (work-
ers). Excluding self-employment, the firm is a monopsonist in the labor
market and, besides technology, uses labor as the only input of its produc-
tion function. As for the self-employed, their labor productivity is affected
by a production externality depending on the technology adopted by the
firm. Finally, as in Chapter 4, and for the same reasons, we assume that it
is impossible for other firms to enter the industry. Consumers can there-
fore be in one of three situations: employed by the firm, self—employed
or unemployed.
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We focus on the choice of technology by the market sector firm under
two different scenarios. First, we assume that both the firm itself and
the self-employed entrepreneurs take the technology-induced externality
as an exogenous parameter (a situation that we label as Cournot - Nash
case). Under this assumption, that neglects the role of the externality and
therefore mimic a perfectly competitive environment, we show that the
presence of the externality does not imply neither labor nor technology
misallocation.
Second, we replace the Cournot setting with one in which the com-
petition among producers is à la von Stackelberg. For the sake of illus-
tration, one can see the competition between the market sector and the
self-employment sector as a two stage game of perfect information. In the
first stage, the market firm chooses the technology to be adopted and de-
termines its labor demand and wage. In the second one, workers decide
on their labor time when self-employed given the technology adopted by
the firm. Since the game is one of perfect information, it can be logically
solved by backward induction, assuming that the firm takes into account
the impact of its technology choice on the self-employed entrepreneurs’
decision problem (i.e. the endogeneity of the participation constraint in
technology). In this case, the adoption of a better technology generates a
positive externality that workers can exploit by becoming (self-employed)
entrepreneurs. This, in turn, renders the participation constraint the firm
must satisfy in order to induce a worker to remain employed – and the
corresponding wage offer – endogenous in the technology chosen. Fi-
nally, as in the partial equilibrium framework investigated in Chapter 4,
the increase in wage associated to the choice of a better technology can
become big enough to induce the market firm not to adopt it, giving rise
to technology misallocation with respect to the Cournot case.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 studies the economy
discussing the consumption and the production sector. Section 5.3 focuses
112 5. Technology Adoption with Production Externalities
on the Cournot competition among producers, showing the existence and
uniqueness of the Cournot - Nash equilibrium, and that there is not tech-
nology misallocation. Section 5.4 focuses on von Stackelberg competition,
proving that technology misallocation becomes possible. Different tech-
nology adoption regimes are identified, a definition of von Stackelberg
equilibrium is provided, as well as a discussion of the condition for its
existence and uniqueness. Section 5.5 provides an application of the chap-
ter results to a general equilibrium version of the Cobb-Douglas economy
introduced in Chapter 4. The last section concludes and outlines possible
extensions.
5.2 The economy
The economy is again composed of N¯ identical consumers and an in-
dustrial sector that produces a consumption good.1 Besides technology,
labor is the only input of production and the price of consumption is nor-
malized to unity without loss of generality. The choice of the numeraire
good has no real effects within the general equilibrium framework here,
although, in general, in economies with imperfect competition it affects
the equilibrium allocation (see Böhm, 1994, and Myles, 1995, Ch. 11).
The industry is composed of a firm, and a large number of self-employed
entrepreneurs/workers (denoted with f). We first describe consumers’
choices and then turn to producers’ behavior.
5.2.1 The consumption sector
Each consumer can supply one unit of labor (i.e. a fixed labor time given
exogenously) to the firm or work as a self-employed. She derives income
from labor and obtains an equal share of the profits generated by the firm.
All consumers in the economy are characterized by a utility function of
1Whenever not misleading, we stick to the notation introduced in Chapter 4.
5.2 The economy 113
the type
V (x, h) = x− ϕ(h), (5.1)
where x is consumption, ϕ(h) is the (consumption-equivalent) disutility
of labor and h denotes labor time, with
Assumption 5.1 ϕ ∈ C2, ϕ(0) = ϕ0(0) = 0, ϕ0 (h) > 0, ϕ00 (h) > 0, h >
0.
Quasi-linearity in x implies that there are no income effects in the
demand for the consumption good.
We assume that the firm has an imperfect monitoring technology and
hence we allow for the possibility of shirking by workers employed by the
firm.Without loss of generality, we take the disutility of labor for a shirker
to be equal to 0, which is standard in the efficiency wage literature. Since
labor time is exogenous and supplied inelastically when working for the
firm, the disutility of labor can take only one of two values. If a worker
does not exert effort it is ϕ(h) = 0; if she exerts the desired level of effort
it is ϕ(h) = e > 0. For a self-employed worker, labor disutility is ϕ(hf),
which depends on labor time. We assume that a self-employed does not
have an incentive to shirk (or, which has the same consequences, that
there is perfect monitoring in the self-employment sector). If an agent is
unemployed (u) she does not exert any effort.
Hence, each consumer makes a choice among four options: work for
the firm and shirk (s), work for the firm and not shirk (ns), to be self-
employed (f) and, finally, to stay unemployed (u). The utility levels as-
sociated to the four options are derived from the corresponding expected
utility maximization problems.
Consider first the case of workers employed by the firm. Two different
utility maximization problems have to be studied for shirker and non-
shirker workers. Since labor time is given exogenously, the disutility of
effort can take one of two values: ϕ(h) = e when the worker exerts the
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desired level of effort and 0 when she shirks. Therefore, a worker must
choose her optimal consumption level x and her level of effort (where
the latter is a binary choice).The non-shirkers are those who exert the
required level of effort (e). Recalling that the consumption good price is
set equal to 1, it is ½
max
x
V ns = x− e
s.t. x ≤ w + π , (5.2)
where w is the wage paid by the firm and π is the share of the firm profits
going to each consumer. As for the latter, along the same lines of Chapter
4, we assume that
Assumption 5.2 π = Π/N¯ , where Π are total profits.
We think of the firm as a corporation so that the N¯ identical con-
sumers, all making the same portfolio choice, hold a fraction 1/N¯ of
shares and hence receive dividends π. This assumption on the ownership
structure of the firm is obviously quite extreme and there are many pos-
sible alternative and more realistic profit distribution schemes that could
be considered. One can assume for instance that profits are accruing to a
subset of the population only. As far as a shareholder is not a worker of
the firm (or better can not benefit directly or indirectly of the adoption
of a superior technology by the firm), any profit distribution mechanism
would not interfere with her decisions on labor allocation. However, as
soon as an agent is at the same time a shareholder and a worker, she
should take into account the impact of technology choices both on the
share of profits (dividends) she is entitled to, and on the labor income
she receives from the firm. A scheme of this type, by introducing addi-
tional feedback effects to be taken into account in a general equilibrium
framework,would further complicate the analysis without however being
central to our argument.
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From Problem (5.2), it is immediate that x = w + π and the corre-
sponding expected utility level is specified by Equation (5.3).
V ns = w + π − e. (5.3)
Similarly, for the shirkers (exerting no effort) it is



max
x0,x1
V s = (1− c)x1 + cx0
s.t. x1 ≤ w + π
x0 ≤ π
, (5.4)
where x1 denotes consumption when a shirker is not caught shirking and
x0 when she is caught shirking and is fired, and c ∈ (0, 1) is the probability
to be caught shirking when employed by the firm. As in Chapter 4, we
take the firm’s monitoring technology as given exogenously, thus ruling
out the possible links among the firm’s technology choice and monitoring.
From Problem (5.4) it follows immediately that x1 = w + π and x0 =
π, and thus the corresponding expected utility level is
V s = (1− c)(w + π) + cπ. (5.5)
Turning now to the self-employed consumers, they maximize expected
utility both over labor time hf and consumption xf . By taking labor
time as given (we will solve explicitly for it in Problem (5.8) in the next
section), their expected utility level is derived in the same way as above,
obtaining
Vf = wf + π − ϕ(hf), (5.6)
where wf is gross-income of a self-employed worker. Finally, for the un-
employed agents it is
Vu = π. (5.7)
Notice that π is the only source of income for the unemployed. In partic-
ular, there are no unemployment benefits.
Each consumer chooses the option that maximizes her welfare, among
feasible options. Whenever any two options give the same utility level,
we assume that preferences are such that:
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Assumption 5.3 If V ns = V s then ns Â s. If V s = Vf then s Â f . If
Vf = Vu then f Â u.
5.2.2 The production sector
Self-employed entrepreneurs
Self-employed entrepreneurs are characterized by a production function
incorporating a production externality via the technology adopted by the
market sector firm of the form ghf , where g captures the production
externality. For any given g, hence, there are constant returns in labor.
The self-employed agents are unable to influence the technology adopted
by the firm and therefore take the production externality as a given
parameter, i.e. g = G, when solving their decision problem.
Given that, as we will show below, the firm’s problem includes the
participation constraint of workers (which takes into account the out-
side option represented by self employment), by Assumption 5.3 only
workers not employed by the firm are potentially interested in being self-
employed, which acts therefore as an outside option.
Self-employed workers solve the following problem
hf (G) := argmax
hf
Ghf − ϕ (hf) , (5.8)
which gives G = ϕ0 (hf) as a first order condition. By Assumption 5.1,
the optimal h is unique and non negative. Denoting the (labor) income
of a self-employed entrepreneur with Wf (G), it is2
Wf (G) := Ghf (G) . (5.9)
Hence the indirect utility of a self—employed is
Vf(G) :=Wf (G)− ϕ (hf (G)) + π. (5.10)
2 It is immediate to note that the marginal return on labor is equal to the (exogenous) marginal
productivity G.
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Notice, finally, that instead of self employment, we could have mod-
elled sector f as a perfectly competitive industry that uses only labor as
an input. This alternative specification is equivalent to the chosen one
provided that: a) there are constant returns to scale, i.e. the production
function of the individual firm j is of the type GN jf , where N
j
f is its labor
input; b) there is perfect monitoring in sector f .
The market sector firm
Next, we consider the market sector, i.e. the externality producer, prob-
lem. The firm has a production function Φ(N,T )–where N denotes the
labor input and T the technology adopted – satisfying the following as-
sumptions:
Assumption 5.4 Φ ∈ C2, ∀ (N,T )À 0 : ∂Φ
∂T
> 0,
∂Φ
∂N
> 0,
∂2Φ
∂N2
< 0,
lim
N→0
∂Φ
∂N
= +∞.
While we assume decreasing returns in labor input, we do not impose
any restriction on technology returns. Moreover, we assume that tech-
nology adoption is a costless and continuous choice available within an
exogenously given range.
Assumption 5.5 T ∈ [0, Tmax]. There are no adoption costs and no
price must be paid to install any available technology.
As already stressed when discussing the partial equilibrium model in
Chapter 4, the assumption that a superior technology can be chosen with-
out suffering adoption (or adjustment) costs, although clearly simplistic,
does not seem problematic in our framework, even though it requires
some cautions. On the one hand, the adoption costs often required in the
literature to explain why superior technologies are not installed – be-
sides being in many circumstances of too large a magnitude with respect
to what reported by the available empirical evidence (see the discussion
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in Chapter 2) – reinforce the role of the externality (i.e. spillover) dis-
cussed here in slowing down the adoption of a higher technology grade.
On the other hand, the idea that once introduced by a firm a technol-
ogy becomes freely available makes it easier for agents to put it at work
elsewhere as well.3 In our setting, the self-employment sector is just a
compact way to model the set of outside options available to workers.
The ability to exploit the externalities generated by the decision of the
firm to adopt a better technology increases workers’ productivity in the
self-employment sector, and thus their reservation income and their bar-
gaining power. Introducing an adoption cost (and/or a price) for the
technology would therefore make it more difficult for workers to directly
take advantage of the technology (for instance by adopting it as self-
employed entrepreneurs). This would not imply, however, that a worker
can not benefit elsewhere from the “skills” (i.e. technical knowledge) she
acquired operating the technology (benefits that are here modeled in the
form of a production externality), provided such skills are not entirely
specific.
Note, finally, that Tmax represents the best available technology given
the “state of the art” of current scientific know-how, which is publicly
available at no cost. Matters are different when the process of innova-
tion is explicitly taken into account. In this case, the technology frontier
(Tmax) becomes endogenous in the firm’s investments in R&D (or man-
agerial reorganization, and so on). Thus costs associated with moving
the frontier can be substantial and likely to become (as emphasized in
the literature discussed in Chapter 2) the most important factor behind
firms’ choices about technology developments. In this case, the spillover
effects we emphasize can be of second order only. It is, however, worth to
3As observed by Acemoglu (2002a), this is often the case in less developed countries where,
because of lack of intellectual property rights, new machine varieties invented in the North of the
world can be copied without paying royalties.
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emphasize that there are many circumstances in which already available
technologies are not adopted by firms and adoption/adjustment costs
are just not big enough to explain why. These are the cases in which
the strategic interactions developed in this dissertation are likely to be
important.
The firm solves the following profit maximization problem subject to
the participation and non-shirking constraints of workers:
max
N,T,w
Π = Φ(N, T )− wN
s.t. V ns ≥ V s, V ns ≥ Vf(G), V ns ≥ Vu,
where V ns, V s, Vf(G) and Vu are defined respectively by Equations
(5.3), (5.5), (5.10) and (5.7). The first constraint is the no-shirking con-
straint and the other two are the participation (individual rationality)
constraints.
In solving the firm’s decision problem, we consider two possible cases.
In the first one that we denote as Cournot-Nash, the firm itself takes
the externality it induces as a parameter given exogenously. In the sec-
ond one, which we will refer to as von Stackelberg case, the firm knows
the relationship between the technology it adopts and the production
externality it induces and takes it into account while solving its profit
maximization problem. In particular, we assume g to be increasing in T ,
so that the technology adopted by the firm increases the workers’ pro-
ductivity in the self-employment sector of the economy. More precisely:
Assumption 5.6 g ∈ C2, g(0) = 0, g0 (T ) > 0, ∀T ≥ 0.
This assumption is meant to capture the positive impact of the spillover
effects associated to the adoption of superior technologies. In this sense,
although we do not develop a formal argument, the link between the
technology operated in the market sector and the productivity of workers
in the self-employment sector can be rationalized along the lines discussed
in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4.
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The following section introduces the benchmark case in which technol-
ogy driven spillovers do not play any role, thus mimicking the behavior
of the economy under perfect competition. This case, labeled above as
Cournot-Nash, requires the firm to act myopically, ignoring the conse-
quence of its (technology) choice on the actions of self-employed entre-
preneurs.4 In the next section we will then turn to the analysis of the
more general case – that consistently with the previous one has been
denoted above as von Stackelberg case – in which the strategic interac-
tion between the firm and workers stemming from the technology driven
externalities (i.e. the complementarity between technology and outside
option) are relevant and affect the equilibrium outcome of the economy.
5.3 The Cournot-Nash case
We show that when the firm treats the externality as an exogenous pa-
rameter G and not as a function of technology its profit maximization
problem is not constrained by it. We assume, for the sake of simplifying
the analysis, that the Cournot firm assigns the same value as the self-
employed to the externality, and start focusing on the workers’ individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Assuming different
evaluations of the externality might have an impact on the firm’s ability
to satisfy labor demand. This would be the case if its valuation of the
externality is lower than the one by the self-employed. Insofar an higher
externality transfers into a better outside option, the wage offer by the
firm would not be enough to satisfy a self-employed’s participation con-
straint. This would imply complete rationing of the firm on the labor
market. In a framework of complete information, it seems natural to as-
sume that the firm is knowledgeable about the outside options available
4This is a type of bounded rationality in that the firm is assumed to be unable to contemplate
the strategic implications of its action.
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to self-employed agents and thus it takes the relevant externalities into
account when designing its wage offer.
Using (5.3), (5.5) and (5.10), the firm’s constraints V ns ≥ V s and
V ns ≥ Vf(G) can be written respectively as
w ≥ e/c, (5.11)
w ≥Wf (G) + e− ϕ (hf (G)) . (5.12)
There is no need to focus on the constraint V ns ≥ Vu (i.e. w ≥ e) since,
being 0 < c < 1, it is satisfied whenever the no-shirking constraint (5.11)
is satisfied. It is obviously in the firm’s interest to make w as small as
possible, while satisfying (5.11) and (5.12). Hence, these constraints are
to be taken as binding and written in compact form as
W (G) := max
ne
c
,Wf (G) + e− ϕ (hf (G))
o
. (5.13)
where W denotes the lowest wage compatible with the no-shirking and
participation constraints.5
Notice that the actual externality level will be determined in equilib-
rium. Given G, the firm’s decision problem is6(
max
N,T,w
Π = Φ (N, T )− wN
s.t. w ≥ max
©
e
c ,Wf (G) + e− ϕ (hf (G))
ª . (5.14)
We already know from the discussion of Equation (5.13) that the con-
straint in Problem (5.14) is binding. By Assumption 5.4, Φ (N, T ) is an
increasing function in T . Hence, from Problem (5.14), it follows immedi-
ately that the Cournot firm chooses to adopt the technology Tmax. This
5 In the special case in which labor time is the same both when a consumer is self-employed or
employed by the firm, i.e. h = hf (G), constraint (5.13) simplifies to
W = max
n e
c
,Ghf (G)
o
,
where e = ϕ (h) = ϕ
¡
hf (G)
¢
.
6We denote with w the generic wage level, and with W the wage level at the equilibrium.
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implies that labor demand follows from the first order condition of Prob-
lem (5.14) for an interior solution
∂Φ (N, Tmax)
∂N
=W (G) := max
ne
c
,Wf (G) + e− ϕ (hf (G))
o
,
(5.15)
which gives, by Assumption 5.4, Nˆ (Tmax,W (G)) as a unique solution.
We assume throughout
Assumption 5.7 N¯ is sufficiently large so that Nˆ < N¯ for all admissi-
ble parameters values.
This is a technical assumption to avoid the possibility of rationing of
labor demand by the firm that has no impact on the generality of our
results. By marking the equilibrium allocations with C, we can now define
a Cournot equilibrium as follows.
Definition 5.1 Given parameters e, c, N¯ and Tmax, a triple {wC , wCf , πC},
a technology TC ≥ 0, employment levels NC ≥ 0, NCf ≥ 0, NCu ≥ 0, and
an externality level GC constitute a Cournot equilibrium if the following
conditions are fulfilled:
(1) wC =W (GC),
(2) wCf =Wf(G
C) = GChf(GC),
(3) πC = ΠC/N¯, where ΠC = Φ(NC , TC)− wCNC ,
such that
(4) TC 5 Tmax,
(5) NC = Nˆ
¡
TC ,W (GC)
¢
, NCf = N¯ −NC , NCu = 0,
(6) GC = g(TC)
hold.
Existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium follow immedi-
ately from the above discussion. Conditions (1) and (2) follow directly
from Equations (5.13) and (5.9) respectively. Condition (3) derives from
the profit distribution scheme introduced by Assumption 5.2. TC andNC
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solve Problem (5.14), from which it is apparent that TC = Tmax; and the
values NCf and N
C
u follow from the fact that all workers not employed by
the firm prefer to work as self-employed instead of remaining unemployed
since V Cf > V
C
u . Finally, given Assumption 5.6, in equilibrium it must be
GC = g(TC), as stated by Condition(6).
Notice that albeit we adopt an efficiency wage setup there is always
full employment in equilibrium since workers not hired by the firm have
the option to work as self employed. Notice as well that in equilibrium all
workers employed by the firm are non-shirkers, since the wage paid by the
firm satisfies the workers’ incentive compatibility constraint. Moreover,
given that the externality is treated as an exogenous parameter, there is
no inefficiency in the technology adoption process as the firm does always
adopt the best available technology. Since TC = Tmax, in equilibrium
the firm fails to internalize all the externalities it generates neglecting
their impact, so that the first best outcome is achieved. In this sense,
the analysis of technology adoption under our Cournot-Nash scenario
achieves the same equilibrium and shares the same properties that would
be attained in a perfectly competitive framework.
5.4 The von Stackelberg case
We now turn to the von Stackelberg case, in which the firm considers the
strategic reaction of self-employed entrepreneurs in its response function.7
We show that allocative inefficiencies may arise that were absent in the
Cournot benchmark case.
The externality producer firm does take into account the impact of
its technology choice on the externality it induces. By Assumption 5.6,
7 Implicit in the von Stackelberg formulation is a staggering issue, as if one agent chooses ahead
of the other: the forward looking firm internalizes the response of self-employed entrepreneurs in its
optimal “reaction function”.
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the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints faced
by the von Stackelberg firm require that
w ≥ max
ne
c
, g (T )hf (g (T )) + e− ϕ (hf (g (T )))
o
. (5.16)
Hence, the firm’s decision problem can be written as8(
max
N,T,w
Π = Φ (N,T )− wN
s.t. w ≥ max
©
e
c , g (T )hf (g (T )) + e− ϕ (hf (g (T )))
ª . (5.17)
By focusing on Constraint (5.16), given the assumptions made, namely
e > 0, Assumption 5.6 and Assumption 5.1, it is immediate to see that
W (g (T )) :=
½
e/c, T ∈ [0, T˜ ),
g(T )hf(g(T ))− ϕ(hf(g(T ))) + e, T ∈ [T˜ , Tmax],
(5.18)
where T˜ solves the following equation in T
e
c
= g(T )hf(g(T ))− ϕ (hf(g(T ))) + e. (5.19)
8Problem (5.17) simplifies further in the special case in which labor time (and hence disutility of
effort) is the same for both self-employed entrepreneurs and workers employed by the firm. In fact,
in this case, Constraint (5.16) becomes
w ≥ max
(
ϕ
¡
hf (g (T ))
¢
c
, g (T )hf (g (T ))
)
.
Both expressions into brackets are increasing in T and equal to 0 for T = 0. By differentiating them
we get, respectively
ϕ0
¡
hf (g (T ))
¢ dhf (.)
dg
dg (T )
dT
> 0, g (T )
dhf (.)
dg
dg (T )
dT
+
dg (T )
dT
hf (g (T )) > 0.
Recalling that from the first order condition of Problem (5.8) it is g = ϕ0 (.) and given the
assumptions made on g (.) and h (.), the expression in the second inequality above is always greater
than the first one for all T greater than zero. Therefore, without loss of generality, one can write
W (T ) = g (T )hf (g (T )). Thus, the leader’s problem simplifies to
max
N,T
Π = Φ (N,T )−W (T )N
By studying this problem, we get results that are qualitatively equivalent to those obtained for
the general case.
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FIGURE 5.1. Wage setting by the leader
If it exists, it is T˜ > 0 and unique since the right hand side of Equation
(5.19) is equal to e < e/c at T = 0 and then is strictly increasing for
T > 0.9
In order to rule out uninteresting cases we assume that parameters c,
e and Tmax are such that
Assumption 5.8 T˜ < Tmax.
It is immediate to observe that if Assumption 5.8 does not hold, the
firm can always satisfy both the workers’ individual rationality and in-
centive compatibility constraints by setting W (g (T )) = e/c, implying
that technology spillovers would never influence the firm’s wage setting.
Equation (5.18) is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Up to T˜ , technological
spillovers are irrelevant for wage setting, since the dominant effect is
represented by the need to offer the no-shirking efficiency wage. Above
T˜ , on the contrary, technological spillovers become the main determinant
of wage setting by the firm.
9The first derivative of the right hand side is g0 (T )hf (g (T )) + g (T )
dhf (.)
dg(T ) g
0 (T ) −
ϕ0
¡
hf (g (T ))
¢ dhf (.)
dg(T ) g
0 (T ), which reduces to g0 (T )hf (g (T )) > 0 since g (T ) = ϕ0
¡
hf (g (T ))
¢
from
the first order condition of Problem (5.8). The fact that the firm exploits the latter property of g (T )
amounts implicitly to assume common knowledge of the economy’s structure.
126 5. Technology Adoption with Production Externalities
Before proceeding, it is worth stressing the impact of the workers’ effort
level and of the firm’s monitoring (expressed in terms of the probabil-
ity c) on the threshold technology grade T˜ . By implicitly differentiating
Equation (5.19) and after some algebra, we get
dT˜
de
=
µ
1
c
− 1
¶
1
g0 (T )hf (g (T ))
> 0
and
dT˜
dc
= − e
c2
1
g0 (T )hf (g (T ))
< 0.
The technology level at which externalities start becoming relevant in
the firm’s wage setting is thus increasing in the effort exerted by workers
and decreasing in the monitoring by the firm. The intuition behind
these results is that the higher the level of effort required to workers,
the higher is the wage necessary to satisfy their incentive compatibility
constraint regardless of the technology operated by the firm. In this sense,
an increase in effort mitigates the direct impact of spillovers. Conversely,
a better monitoring has exactly the opposite effect. An increase in the
probability that a shirker is caught shirking reduces the wage that the
firm must pay in order to satisfy the workers’ incentive compatibility
constraint independently of the technology used.
We can now define a von Stackelberg equilibrium as follows.
Definition 5.2 Given parameters e, c, N¯ and Tmax, a triple {w∗, w∗f , π∗},
a technology T ∗, employment levels N∗ ≥ 0, N∗f ≥ 0, N∗u ≥ 0 and an ex-
ternality level g∗ constitute a von Stackelberg equilibrium if
(1) (N∗, T ∗, w∗) is a solution of Problem (5.17),
(2) w∗ =W (g∗),
(3) w∗f = g
∗hf(g∗) = g∗h∗f ,
(4) π∗ = Π∗/N¯, where Π∗ = Φ(N∗, T ∗)− w∗N∗,
such that
(5) N∗ = Nˆ (T ∗, w∗) , N∗f = N¯ −N∗ and
(6) g∗ = g (T ∗)
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hold.
In order to discuss the existence and uniqueness of the von Stack-
elberg equilibrium, we concentrate on Problem (5.17). From Equation
(5.18), one can see thatW (g (T )) is continuous in T in the relevant range
[0, Tmax] but presents a kink at T = T˜ ; hence, its derivative dW (g (T )) /dT
is discontinuous at this point, jumping from dW (g (T )) /dT |T→T˜− = 0
to dW (g (T )) /dT |T→T˜+ = g0(T˜ )hf(T˜ ) > 0. Formally,
dW (g (T ))
dT
=
½
0, T ∈ [0, T˜ ) and T → T˜−
g0(T )hf(T ), T ∈ (T˜ , Tmax] and T → T˜+
. (5.20)
Substituting for W (g (T )) into the firm’s profit function, Problem
(5.17) becomes
max
N,T
Π = Φ (N, T )−W (g (T ))N. (5.21)
Consider first the choice of labor input, given T . The first order con-
dition for an interior solution is
∂Π
∂N
=
∂Φ (N, T )
∂N
−W (g (T )) = 0, (5.22)
which gives, by Assumption 5.4, Nˆ (T,W ) as a unique solution.10
By totally differentiating (5.22) we get11
∂Nˆ (T,W )
∂T
=
µ
dW
dT
− ∂
2Φ
∂N∂T
¶Á
∂2Φ
∂N2
. (5.23)
For T ∈ [0, T˜ ), (5.23) is positive whenever ∂2Φ∂N∂T > 0, since
dW
dT = 0
and ∂
2Φ
∂N2 < 0. In words, technology adoption brings about higher labor
demand if a better technology augments the marginal productivity of
labor. The relation between labor demand and technology adoption is less
clear-cut when T ∈ [T˜ , Tmax]. In this case, a better technology increases,
10The possibility of rationing of labor demand by the firm is ruled away by Assumption 5.7.
11 In order to save on notation, we write W instead of W (g (T )) and g instead of g (T ) whenever
this is not misleading.
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via the spillover effect, the wage the firm must pay (dW/dT > 0), and
this tends to reduce labor demand. Hence, if ∂
2Φ
∂N∂T > 0 the overall effect
is ambiguous, whereas if ∂
2Φ
∂N∂T < 0 then (5.23) is negative.
Substituting labor demand Nˆ(T,W ) into the profit function (5.21),
the problem of optimal technology adoption can now be written as
max
T
Πˆ (T,W ) = Φ(Nˆ (T,W ) , T )−WNˆ (T,W ) . (5.24)
By differentiating, we have that
∂Πˆ (T,W )
∂T
=



∂Φ(Nˆ, T )
∂T
, T ∈ [0, T˜ ) and T → T˜− (a)
∂Φ(Nˆ, T )
∂T
− Nˆ dW
dT
, T ∈ (T˜ , Tmax] and T → T˜+ (b)
.
(5.25)
Since ∂Φ/∂T > 0, (5.25a) is strictly positive and hence the optimal level
of technology adoption, T ∗, is never lower than T˜ . In other words, it
always pays to expand technology as long as spillovers are irrelevant.
Whether or not it is desirable to go further in the process of technology
adoption it all depends on the sign of (5.25) for T → T˜+ and on its
behavior for T > T˜ . As for the sign of ∂Πˆ∂T
¯¯¯
T→T˜+
, from (5.25b) and (5.20),
this is clearly ambiguous, as ∂Φ(Nˆ,T )∂T > 0 and
dW
dT > 0. In words, it is
positive if the marginal productivity of technology adoption is greater
than marginal labor costs induced by the spillover effect, whereas it is
negative when the latter effect dominates the former. As for the behavior
of ∂Πˆ∂T
¯¯¯
T>T˜
, it is characterized by the following equation, obtained by
differentiating (5.25b):
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
=
∂2Φ
∂T 2
− ∂
2Φ
∂N2
Ã
∂Nˆ
∂T
!2
− Nˆ d
2W
dT 2
, T ∈ (T˜ , Tmax], (5.26)
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where we have used (5.23) and the symmetry of cross partial derivatives
of Φ (.) to obtain the second term.12 The sign of Equation (5.26) depends
on the sign of three terms. The first is negative (positive) whenever there
are decreasing (increasing) returns in technology adoption. The second
term is always positive, since we have assumed decreasing returns in
labor inputs. Finally, the sign of the third term is ambiguous. A sufficient
condition for it to be negative is that g00 > 0, meaning that technology
adoption by the externality producer has an increasing marginal spillover
effect on the self-employed productivity, since in this case d
2W
dT 2 = g
00hf +
g0 dhfdT > 0. If, on the other hand, g
00 < 0, the sign of d
2W
dT 2 , and hence that of
the third term in (5.26), remains undetermined. Clearly, the overall sign
of (5.26) is an empirical matter, as there are no theoretical explanations
that can help to show which one of the three effects dominates over the
others.13
In order to ensure a unique solution to the problem of technology
adoption by the firm, it is sufficient to impose the following
Assumption 5.9 ∂Πˆ/∂T is monotone.
In principle, one could argue that the impact of technology on prof-
its is a function of the specific technology grade adopted. For example,
spillovers can be completely irrelevant until a certain threshold technol-
ogy. This, however, does not seem restrictive in the present framework. In
fact, it is enough that the “regularity” Assumption 5.9 holds to restrict
12More precisely, from (5.25) it is
∂2Πˆ
∂T2
=
∂2Φ
∂T2
+
∂2Φ
∂T∂N
∂Nˆ
∂T
− Nˆ d
2W
dT 2
− ∂Nˆ
∂T
dW
dT
=
∂2Φ
∂T2
−
µ
dW
dT
− ∂
2Φ
∂T∂N
¶
∂Nˆ
∂T
− Nˆ d
2W
dT 2
,
and by making use of (5.23), we obtain Equation (5.26).
13The solution of our two-step maximization – Problem (5.21) with T fixed and then Problem
(5.24)– is equivalent to the first order conditions of Problem (5.21), since Derivative (5.26) equals
to (minus) the determinant of the Hessian matrix for Problem (5.21) and ∂2Φ/∂N2 < 0.
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FIGURE 5.2. Optimal technology adoption
Equation (5.26) to have the same sign over the interval (T˜ , Tmax].This
amounts to require that the marginal impact of technology on profits
keeps going in the same direction as the technology grade improves, in
the interval where production externalities are potentially relevant.
Under Assumption 5.9, the optimal T is then characterized by the signs
of partial derivatives (5.25b) and (5.26). By Assumption 5.9, there are
four possible cases that may arise, each with a unique optimal T , which
are depicted in Figure 5.2. In the first one, it is either
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
> 0,
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T=Tmax
> 0 and
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T>T˜
≤ 0 (panel I ) or ∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
> 0 and
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∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T>T˜
≥ 0 (panel II), hence T ∗ = Tmax. Spillovers are weak so that the
firm always adopts the best available technology (technological frontier
regime). In the second one, it is either
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
< 0 and
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T>T˜
≤ 0
(panel III) or
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
< 0,
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T=Tmax
< 0 and
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T>T˜
≥ 0 (panel
IV), hence T ∗ = T˜ . Spillovers are so important to eliminate any in-
centive for the firm to adopt a superior technology and therefore tech-
nology adoption stops at T˜ (blocked adoption regime). In the third one
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
< 0,
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T=Tmax
> 0 and
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T>T˜
> 0 (panel V), so that
T ∗ = argmax
T
³
Πˆ
³
T˜
´
, Πˆ (Tmax)
´
. Spillovers are relevant, but they may
be dominated by increased productivity in the firm’s sector. Finally,
in the last case (a possible outcome of which, corresponding to the
case
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T=Tmax
< 0, is shown in panel VI) it is
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
> 0 and
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
¯¯¯¯
¯
T>T˜
< 0, hence T ∗ = min(Tˆ , Tmax), where Tˆ > T˜ solves the first
order condition
∂Πˆ
∂T
=
∂Φ(Nˆ, T )
∂T
− Nˆ dW
dT
= 0. (5.27)
Spillovers are important, but not so as to prevent the adoption of a su-
perior technology by the firm, although not necessarily the one at the
frontier. Notice that the above conditions for the last case do not guar-
antee that the technology adopted by the firm is not the one at the
technology frontier either, i.e. T ∗ = Tˆ ∈ (T˜ , Tmax), a case to which we
will refer to as spillover regime. It is, however, immediate to observe that
a necessary and sufficient condition for this case to occur is to require
that
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T=Tmax
< 0 and
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
> 0. This, combined with Assump-
tion 5.9 on the monotonicity of ∂Πˆ/∂T – ensuring that there is one and
only one T such that
∂Πˆ
∂T
= 0 –, guarantees that Tˆ ∈ (T˜ , Tmax) is the
132 5. Technology Adoption with Production Externalities
T~ max
* TT =
Πˆ
T
T~ max
* TT =
Πˆ
T
*~ TT = maxT
Πˆ
T
*~ TT = maxT
Πˆ
T
maxT
Πˆ
T
( ) ( )( )max* ˆ,~ˆmaxarg TTT ΠΠ=
T~ maxT
Πˆ
T
T~ Tˆ
( )max* ,ˆmin TTT =
FIGURE 5.3. The firm’s profit function
unique solution of the firm technology choice problem.14 Figure 5.3 illus-
trates the shape of the firm’s profit function and the technology chosen
for all the cases represented in Figure 5.2.
The above discussion is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 Under Assumptions 5.6 — 5.9, the technology chosen
by the firm is unique. Any one of the following three regimes may arise:
1. Blocked adoption regime: T ∗ = T˜ ;
14Assumption 5.9 on the monotonicity of the profit function is not necessary. In Section 5.5.2, we
consider an example for a Cobb-Douglas economy, deriving a technology spillover regime without
imposing any restriction on the sign of the second derivative of Πˆ (T ) .
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2. Technological frontier regime: T ∗ = Tmax;
3. Spillover regime: T ∗ = Tˆ ∈ (T˜ , Tmax).
The three graphs in Figure 5.4 – depicting in the (W (g (T )) , T )-space
the firm’s profit contours and the (incentive compatibility and individual
rationality) constraint on wages it faces – illustrate the choice of tech-
nology by the firm under the three regimes identified in Proposition 5.1:
spillover regime (graph a), technological frontier (graph b) and blocked
adoption (graph c).
 
maxTmax
* TT =maxTT~ T~ TT ~* =*T
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FIGURE 5.4. The firm’s technology choice
Proposition 5.1 identifies the unique T ∗ solving Problem (5.17) and
characterizes the different types of (unique) equilibria possibly arising in
our economy. Given T ∗, w∗ is uniquely defined by Equation (5.18), and
N∗ = Nˆ(T ∗, w∗). Furthermore, the unique equilibrium values g∗ = g (T ∗),
w∗f and π
∗ follow from Assumption 5.6, Equation (5.9) and Assump-
tion 5.1, and Assumption 5.2 respectively. Notice also that in the von
Stackelberg case, albeit the presence of an efficiency wage in the market
sector guaranteeing that the firm does not employ shirkers, in equilib-
rium there is always full employment, since workers not hired by the
firm have an incentive to make an earning with self employment, where
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they never shirk.15 This follows directly from Assumption 5.3 and by in-
spection of Equation (5.10). Hence, at the von Stackelberg equilibrium,
N∗ = Nˆ(T ∗, w∗),N∗f = N¯−N∗ ≥ 0, andN∗u = 0. Notice, also, that when-
ever superior technologies are labor saving the number of workers hired
by the firm will be higher in the von Stackelberg than in the Cournot
equilibrium. In the latter regime, in fact, it will always be TC = Tmax at
the equilibrium. This amounts to say that, although in both cases there
is no unemployment in equilibrium, there is a different distribution of
workers between the market sector and the self-employment sector of the
economy under the von Stackelberg and the Cournot-Nash regimes, with
lower employment in the market sector under the latter.
Finally, a subtle point is worth noting. Throughout the dissertation we
assume that the firm’s monitoring is not affected by the choice of tech-
nology. However, one could argue that the adoption of a higher grade
technology may have an impact on the firm’s ability to detect shirkers,
influencing monitoring costs. This, in turn, would affect the incentive
compatibility constraint and hence the wage the firm must pay to work-
ers. In this sense, the impact of technology adoption on monitoring can
either reinforce or weaken its effect on the workers’ outside options (cap-
tured by their productivity as self-employed entrepreneurs). In the case
that better technologies improve monitoring, for our argument to affect
firms’ decisions (by increasing wages), it is necessary that the impact of
technology adoption on incentive compatibility (i.e. on the probability to
be caught shirking) is of second order with respect to that on individual
rationality.
15Recall that we refer to the firm’s labor market with the expression “market sector”, as opposed
to “self-employment sector”.
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5.5 An example: Cobb-Douglas Economy
In this section, we extend the Cobb-Douglas partial equilibrium frame-
work developed in Chapter 4 to the general equilibrium economy studied
in this chapter and we use it to perform comparative statics exercises. In
order to do so, we describe the (technology-induced) production exter-
nality by letting
g(T ) := T γ, (5.28)
and we model the self-employed entrepreneurs (workers) labor disutility
by assuming
ϕ(hf) := h2f/2. (5.29)
The firm’s production function is described by Equation (4.17) in Section
4.5 of Chapter 4, i.e. Φ (N,T ) = TαNβ, and the Assumptions 4.5 - 4.7
made there continue to hold. All notation remains as in the previous
sections and, whenever without ambiguities, we will slightly abuse it in
order to ease the exposition. As it has been the case for the partial
equilibrium application to the Cobb-Douglas economy, we stress again
that the Assumptions 4.5 and 4.6 on α, β and γ account for a subset
only of the cases that can emerge in the general equilibrium framework
studied in the previous sections of the chapter.
5.5.1 The Cournot-Nash case
In the Cournot-Nash case, the firm behaves as the self-employed entre-
preneurs, in that it takes the externality as a given parameter (i.e. it
does not take into account the impact of its decisions on the externality
level). We denote, without loss of generality, this externality level with
G. Following the discussion in Section 5.3, the firm’s decision problem
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can be written as



max
N,T,w
Π (N,T ) = TαNβ − wN
s.t. w ≥ max
n
e
c , Ghf (G) + e−
hf (G)
2
2
o .
Since Π (N,T ) is increasing in T the profit maximizing technology
adopted by the Cournot firm is TC = Tmax. As for the optimal wage, we
already know that the constraint in the above maximization problem is
always binding and therefore it is
wC =W (G) = max
(
e
c
,Ghf (G) + e−
hf (G)
2
2
)
.
Finally, given TC = Tmax, the employment level is determined by the first
order condition
βTαmaxN
Cβ−1 =W (G) ,
and thus
NC =
µ
W (G)
βTαmax
¶ 1
β−1
. (5.30)
It is immediate to see that externalities do not play any role in the
choice of technology by the firm. On the other hand, they do affect para-
metrically the equilibrium level of wage and hence the firm’s employment.
5.5.2 The von Stackelberg case
We now apply to the Cobb-Douglas economy the analysis of the von
Stackelberg case studied in Section 5.4. In this scenario, the firm does
take into account the impact of the externalities it generates through
its technology choice. Knowing the labor choice of the self-employed,
hf = g (T ),16 and substituting for g(T ) = T γ, the decision problem of self-
employed entrepreneurs/workers (Equation (5.8) in Section 5.2.2) yields
16hf := argmax g (T )hf −
h2f
2
.
5.5 An example: Cobb-Douglas Economy 137
hf = T γ, and hence the corresponding utility level of a self-employed is
Vˆf =
T 2γ
2
+ π.
Given the specific functional forms we consider, the workers’ partici-
pation and incentive compatibility constraint (Equation (5.13)) becomes
W (T ) = max
½
e
c
,
T 2γ
2
+ e
¾
(5.31)
and the decision problem faced by the firm is
max
T,N,w
Π = TαNβ − wN (5.32)
s.t. w = max
½
e
c
,
T 2γ
2
+ e
¾
.
The technology threshold T˜ – at which externalities start becoming
relevant – follows immediately by solving
T 2γ
2
+ e =
e
c
,
i.e.
T˜ =
µ
2e (1− c)
c
¶ 1
2γ
. (5.33)
Since Π is monotonically increasing in T for T ∈ [0, T˜ ) and for any N ,
it is T ∗ = T˜ . Hence, the optimal level of technology is never lower than
T˜ . In order to understand if and when it pays to expand technology over
T˜ when T ∈ (T˜ , Tmax], we need to study the sign of ∂Π∂T for T → T˜+ and
its behavior for T > T˜ . From the first order condition with respect to N ,
given T ∈ (T˜ , Tmax], of Problem (5.32) it is immediate to get
Nˆ (T ) =
Ã
T 2γ
2
+ e
βTα
! 1
β−1
. (5.34)
By differentiating Problem (5.32) with respect to T, and using Nˆ (T ),
one obtains
∂Πˆ
³
Nˆ (T ) , T
´
∂T
= αTα−1Nˆβ − γT 2γ−1Nˆ T ∈ (T˜ , Tmax] and T → T˜+.
(5.35)
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By applying Proposition 5.1, we know that two regimes are possible
when it pays to expand technology over T˜ : either the firm adopts the
best available technology (i.e. the technological frontier case in which
T ∗ = Tmax) or it improves its technology, but not up to the frontier (i.e.
the spillover case, with T ∗ = Tˆ ∈ (T˜ , Tmax)).17 In order to determine Tˆ in
the latter regime, by substituting Nˆ (T ) into Equation (5.35) and after
some algebra, it isÃ
T2γ
2
+ e
βTα
! 1
β−1 ·α (T 2γ/2 + e)
βT
− γT 2γ−1
¸
= 0,
from which, being T 6= 0, it is18
Tˆ =
µ
2αe
2βγ − α
¶ 1
2γ
. (5.36)
In general, for a technology spillover regime to emerge, by apply-
ing the logic behind Proposition 5.1 – whose assumptions are satis-
fied by the Cobb-Douglas economy under exam – we need to require
that ∂Πˆ∂T |T→T˜+> 0 and ∂Πˆ∂T |T=Tmax< 0 are simultaneously satisfied. More
precisely, following the logic of Proposition 5.1, since Πˆ (T ) ∈ C2 in
(T˜ , Tmax] and there exists a unique Tˆ – given by Equation (5.36) –
such that
∂Πˆ(Tˆ)
∂T = 0, requiring that the two conditions
∂Πˆ
∂T |T→T˜+> 0 and
∂Πˆ
∂T |T=Tmax< 0 hold guarantees that Tˆ ∈ (T˜ , Tmax) is a maximum of the
firm’s decision Problem (5.32).
We check the two conditions on the first derivative of Πˆ (T ) in turn.
As for ∂Πˆ∂T |T→T˜+, since T is approaching T˜ from above, after substituting
17We omit to state and prove Proposition 5.1 for the Cobb-Douglas case, as it is an obvious
extension of the general case proved in Section 5.4.
18Notice that Tˆ > 0 requires 2βγ − α > 0, which is satisfied whenever Assumption 4.7 holds.
Moreover, in order to have Tˆ > T˜ , the following condition must be satisfied:
2βγ − α < c
1− c
.
One can immediately check that the latter is also a necessary and sufficient condition for
∂Πˆ
∂T
¯¯¯¯
¯
T→T˜+
> 0. That Tˆ is a global maximum of the firm’s problem in technology follows from
the same arguments developed in Section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4.
5.5 An example: Cobb-Douglas Economy 139
(5.34) into (5.35) – where we made use of the envelope theorem – and
evaluating it at T → T˜ , where T˜ is given in Equation (5.33), it is (after
some algebra)
∂Πˆ (T )
∂T
|T→T˜+=
³
Nˆ
³
T˜
´´β
T˜α−1 [α− 2βγ (1− c)] . (5.37)
The term in square brackets is positive if and only if α > 2βγ (1− c) . Since
under Assumptions 4.5 and 4.7 it is α < βγ, we can immediately conclude
that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the above inequality to
hold is c > 1
2
. For a spillover regime to emerge in this Cobb-Douglas
economy, it is therefore necessary for the firm to have a good monitor-
ing technology. In particular, coeteris paribus, the higher the probability
to catch a shirker, the more likely the emergence of a spillover regime.
Obviously, since α > 0, the above condition is satisfied in the special
case in which the firm has a perfect monitoring ability, i.e. c = 1, that is
therefore a necessary and sufficient condition, even though a restrictive
one.
As for ∂Πˆ∂T |T=Tmax, again by substituting (5.34-b) into (5.35-b) and after
some algebra, we get
∂Πˆ
∂T
|T=Tmax=
³
Nˆ (Tmax)
´β
Tα−1max
·
α− βγ T
2γ
max
T 2γmax/2 + e
¸
. (5.38)
It is immediate to see that ∂Πˆ∂T |T=Tmax< 0 if and only if
h
α− βγ 1
1/2+e/T 2γmax
i
< 0. Since γ > 1, for e > 0 and finite, a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for this inequality to hold requires Tmax → +∞. However, this is
obviously a more restrictive condition than needed. One can notice, for
instance, that since βγ > α by Assumption 4.7, a sufficient condition for
it to be negative is that
e <
1
2
T 2γmax. (5.39)
As already noticed in the general framework discussed in the previous
sections, Condition (5.39) highlights that it is the interplay between the
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parameter values for Tmax, γ and e to be responsible for the possible
emergence of a spillover regime. The following example illustrates the
point and derives a spillover equilibrium for a specific parameter set.
Example 5.1 Consider a situation in which the firm has a decreasing re-
turns to scale production function, and the self-employed production func-
tion is convex in the technology adopted by the firm. More precisely, as-
sume the following parameter set: c = 1/4, e = 3, α = 1/4, β = 1/2, γ =
2, and Tmax > 4
p
3/7. It is immediate to check that Assumptions 4.5 - 4.7
are satisfied for the above parameter values. Plain algebra allows as well
to check that these values guarantee that ∂Πˆ∂T |T→T˜+> 0 and ∂Πˆ∂T |T=Tmax< 0,
where the two derivatives are computed in Equations (5.37) and (5.38)
respectively. Notice finally that, for all 4
p
3/7 < Tmax ≤ 4
√
6, the deriv-
ative in Equation (5.38) is negative even though the sufficient condition
(5.39) is not satisfied.
In the framework developed in this dissertation, having assumed Tmax
and γ as exogenously given parameters seems rather innocuous. It is often
assumed that the arrival rate of new technologies is exogenous. Moreover,
as discussed in Chapter 2, there is a large literature investigating the
innovation processes that has developed several mechanisms explaining
the arrival rates of new technologies. Hence, the factors affecting the
technology frontier Tmax are well debated and understood. As for γ, it
captures the entity of the production externalities induced by the firm’s
technology choice and it is therefore natural to treat it as a parameter.
We need, nevertheless, to be more cautious in treating the level of
effort exerted by workers. Throughout the entire dissertation and in this
Cobb-Douglas application as well, we have considered it as an exogenous
parameter to keep our framework simple. In general however– as already
stressed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) – it is reasonable to assume that e
is a variable under the firm’s control (at least up to a certain extent,
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and if it is possible to write appropriate incentive-compatible contracts
as in our efficiency wage setup). Thus, it is reasonable to claim that it
is related in specific ways to the technology adopted by the firm, i.e. it
is a function e(T ) of the technology. Under the assumption that the firm
is aware of the specific form of e(T ), this implies that it should take it
into account in its decision problem, by considering explicitly the impact
that the adoption of a certain technology has on the effort workers are
required to exert. This, in turn, would affect the type of equilibrium
that emerges, without however implying that some of the three possible
regimes become unfeasible.
5.5.3 Comparative statics
We first look at the factors affecting the threshold at which production
externalities start distorting the firm’s decisions. As it has been for the
general case discussed in the previous sections, and obviously for the same
reasons, it is immediate to conclude that for the Cobb-Douglas economy
we are studying a rise in the level of effort exerted by workers implies an
increase of the technology grade at which externalities become relevant.
In the same way, a sharpening of the firm’s monitoring (as captured
by an increase in the probability, c, of catching a shirker) determines a
decrease in the threshold technology level T˜ . Analytically, both findings
follow immediately, by differentiating Equation (5.33) with respect to e
and c respectively, i.e.
∂T˜
∂e
=
1− c
cγ
µ
2e (1− c)
c
¶1−2γ
2γ
> 0,
∂T˜
∂c
= − e
γc2
µ
2e (1− c)
c
¶ 1−2γ
2γ
< 0.
In order to assess the impact of a change in the level of effort on
the firm’s labor demand, when the blocked technology adoption regime
applies (i.e. T ∗ = T˜ ), we substitute for T˜ into Equation (5.34). By dif-
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ferentiating with respect to e, after some algebra, we get
∂Nˆ
³
T˜
´
∂e
=
e (1− c) (α− 2γ)
βγc2 (1− β)
µ
e
βc
¶2−β
β−1
µ
2e (1− c)
c
¶α−2γ(1−β)
2γ(1−β)
. (5.40)
Since 0 < (c, β) < 1 and α < 2γ by Assumption 4.7, it is immediate
to notice that the first term in Equation (5.40) is negative, while the
other two are positive. Thus
∂Nˆ(T˜)
∂e < 0, meaning that an increase in the
level of effort exerted by workers has a negative impact on equilibrium
employment. This is a result following directly from the structure of the
efficiency wage framework. As is standard in the efficiency wage litera-
ture, an higher disutility of effort requires the firm to pay an higher wage
(at the equilibrium) in order to meet workers’ incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints. A higher wage, in turn, implies a
lower labor demand by the firm.
We turn now to the impact of effort on the firm’s technology choice
when the spillover regime applies (i.e. T ∗ = Tˆ ∈ (T˜ , Tmax)). By differen-
tiating Equation (5.36), we get
∂Tˆ
∂e
=
α
γ (2βγ − α)
µ
2αe
2βγ − α
¶ 1
2γ−1
, (5.41)
that is greater than 0 under Assumptions 4.5 and 4.7. An increase in the
workers effort determines an upward movement on the wage paid by the
firm (i.e. w∗ = T
∗2γ
2
+ e). This, in turn, is responsible for reducing the
impact of the adoption of a superior technology on wages, determining
an improvement of the technology grade chosen in equilibrium. By in-
spection of (5.36) it is apparent that, for the Cobb-Douglas economy we
are examining, the firm’s monitoring has no impact on the technology it
chooses in the spillover regime. As for the impact of effort on the equilib-
rium level of employment, by substituting for (5.36) and differentiating
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the relevant part of (5.34), after some algebra, it is
∂Nˆ
³
Tˆ
´
∂e
=
1
β − 1


e
2βγ−α + e
β
³
2e
2βγ−α
´ α
2γ


2−β
β−1
· (5.42)
"
eβ−1
µ
2βγ − α+ 1
2βγ − α
¶µ
2e
2βγ − α
¶− 2γ+α
2γ
µ
2γ − α
γ (2βγ − α)
¶#
.
It is easy to see that the term in square brackets in Equation (5.42)
is greater than 0 by Assumptions 4.6 and 4.7, and since the first term is
negative (by Assumption 4.6), an increase in the disutility of effort has
a negative impact on equilibrium employment.
As for the impact on T and N of parameters α, β and γ, complexi-
ties and cross-effects are similar to those already analyzed for the Cobb-
Douglas partial equilibrium economy, and discussed in Section 4.5.4 of
Chapter 4.
5.6 Summary of Results
This chapter investigated technology adoption in a general equilibrium
version of the economy introduced in Chapter 4. From a modeling point
of view, the main contribution of the chapter consists in making explicit
the link between the workers’ outside options and the technology adopted
by the firm, in the form of a technology-induced production externality
from the market sector to the self-employment sector.
The market sector firm, in choosing a technology, can either take into
account the impact of the externality on the entrepreneurs’ productiv-
ity in the self-employment sector of the economy (the von Stackelberg
case), or neglect it, treating the self-employed entrepreneurs’ produc-
tivity as an exogenous parameter (the Cournot-Nash case). As it is to
be expected, we have shown that in the latter case the presence of the
technology-induced externality does not affect the market sector firm be-
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havior. Since the firm fails to internalize the impact of the externality,
and being profits increasing in technology, it always chooses the highest
technology available. Hence, there is no technology misallocation and the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium gives rise to the same equilibrium that would
be observed in a perfectly competitive environment.
The situation changes when the firm behaves in a more sophisticated
manner (i.e. as a von Stackelberg leader in our terminology) by inter-
nalizing the externality. In this case, on the one hand, the adoption of
a superior technology increases the productivity of the firm’s employ-
ees and, thus, its profits. On the other hand, it provokes an increase in
the firm’s labor costs, needed to compensate for the better outside op-
tions (i.e. the increase in productivity under self-employment stemming
from the production externality) available to its employees experienced
with the new technology. In other words, whenever the firm knows and
takes explicitly into account the link between the technology it operates
and the productivity in the self-employment sector, the presence of the
externality renders workers’ participation (or individual rationality) con-
straint endogenous in the firm’s choice of technology. As a consequence,
the adoption of a superior technology may determine an increase in the
wage sufficient to induce the firm not to adopt it in the first place. The
two sources of non-marketed relations described – i.e. the positive exter-
nality on the production function of the self-employed entrepreneurs and
the negative pecuniary externality represented by the increase in labor
costs for the market sector firm – are thus responsible for the possibility
of technology misallocation in the von Stackelberg regime.
Note, finally, that the economy presented in this chapter shares in many
respects the same underlying structure as the economy studied in the par-
tial equilibrium setting of Chapter 4. Therefore, it suffers from many of
the same structural limits and leaves room for the same extensions out-
lined there (see Section 4.6). One further extension not mentioned there,
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and in principle relevant in a general equilibrium framework account-
ing for all feedback effects in the economy, concerns the links between
the disutility of effort, the cost of skills acquisition and the technology
adopted by the market sector firm (briefly discussed at the end of Sec-
tion 5.5.2 in the framework of the Cobb-Douglas example). One might
in fact argue that the technologies chosen by firms have an impact both
on workers’ (disutility of) effort and on the cost to acquire further skills.
As far as the adoption of a superior technology reduces the disutility of
effort or the costs of skill acquisition, it reduces the incentive of a worker
to shirk, and at the same time it is likely to increase the size of the ex-
ternality a self-employed entrepreneur can benefit from. This in turn has
an impact on the firm’s wage offers and, ultimately, on the possibility of
technology misallocation.
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6Market Failure and Policy Analysis
6.1 Introduction
When the market sector firm behaves like a von Stackelberg leader, the
general equilibrium economy studied in Chapter 5 presents two sources
of externality that are likely to produce inefficiencies of market alloca-
tions. On the one hand, technology adoption by the firm exerts a pos-
itive externality on the production function of self employed workers.
On the other hand, this positive externality generates a negative pecu-
niary externality on the firm, determined by increasing labor costs for
all technologies above a certain threshold level (due to spillover effects).
This double source of non-marketed relations may dampen technology
adoption by the firm and may also affect the labor distribution across
sectors. It is, therefore, natural to ask whether there is a role for the gov-
ernment in trying to overcome the inefficiencies induced by the presence
of externalities and to support Pareto efficient allocations.1 Building on
the framework developed in Chapter 5, this chapter focuses on the con-
1Various types of government intervention and their scopes have already been briefly discussed
in Chapter 2.
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sequences of the non-marketed relations discussed above and conduct a
normative analysis of the welfare implications of the presence of external-
ities in the technology adoption process. We first characterize the Pareto
efficient allocations that would be generated by a social planner internal-
izing all sources of externalities, and we compare them with the market
allocations derived in Chapter 5.
We then examine whether government intervention is able to overcome
market failure, in the simple framework in which the government’s bud-
get is assumed to balance, and all subsidies (taxes) are financed via a
lump sum tax (subsidy) on consumers. We study various types of policy
intervention schemes to overcome the possible inefficiencies in market al-
locations, ranging from non-linear (first best) subsidization mechanisms
to second best – but eventually more realistic – policy instruments
based on Pigouvian subsidies/taxes on labor input and/or technology
adoption. In particular, we show that by implementing a (first best) non-
linear subsidy, the government can overcome market failure by enforcing
at no cost truthful revelation of the choice variables on which the transfer
to the externality producer is contingent. We then take the information-
ally less demanding view that the government does not know the entire
structure of the economy and we implement less sophisticated (in terms
of the amount of information needed) policy instruments. In particular,
we introduce fixed unity Pigouvian subsidies (taxes) on workers employed
by the firm and/or on each unit of technology adopted and we show that
subsidies on technology can always increase social welfare, while a welfare
improving intervention on labor demand may require either a subsidy or
a tax.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 characterizes Pareto
efficient allocations and compares them with market allocations, paus-
ing as well on questions related to distribution and incentive compati-
bility. Section 6.3 deals with policy analysis focusing on non-linear first
6.2 Pareto efficient allocations 149
best subsidization, and on second best policy instruments in the form
of Pigouvian subsidies on labor input and on technology adoption. Sec-
tion 6.4 applies some of the analysis to the same Cobb-Douglas economy
investigated in the previous chapters. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Pareto efficient allocations
Throughout the chapter we deal with the same general equilibrium econ-
omy introduced in Chapter 5 and, hence, we maintain the same set of
assumptions made there. In this framework, Pareto efficient allocations
are characterized as follows. As a first step, we recognize that Pareto
efficiency must be compatible with the resource constraint of the econ-
omy, in the obvious sense that aggregate consumption must not exceed
aggregate output, that is:
ωN + ωfNf + ωuNu ≤ Φ(N, T ) + g(T )hfNf (6.1)
where ω, ωf and ωu denote the total consumption of the agent working
for the firm, the self-employed and the unemployed, respectively; N, Nf ,
Nu denote the number of workers employed by the firm, of self-employed
and of unemployed respectively, with
N ≥ 0, Nf ≥ 0, Nu ≥ 0, and N +Nf +Nu = N¯. (6.2)
From (6.1), subtracting from both sides eN + ϕ(hf)Nf we obtain
(ω − e)N + [ωf − ϕ(hf)]Nf + ωuNu ≤ Φ(N,T )− eN +
+(g(T )hf − ϕ(hf))Nf .(6.3)
The left hand side of (6.3) is aggregate social welfare (according to a
utilitarian social welfare function), whereas the right hand side is aggre-
gate production net of aggregate social cost, represented by labor effort
disutility which is expressed, by assumption, in equivalent consumption
units.
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From a normative point of view, Pareto efficient allocations must be
characterized by the absence of unemployment (i.e. Nu = 0), since the
labor productivity of all agents in the economy is strictly greater than
zero. Moreover, Pareto efficiency requires that there are no resources that
remain unused in equilibrium. Hence the third constraint in Condition
(6.2) must read N+Nf = N¯ . Turning to the optimal allocation problem,
irrespective of distributional choices (i.e. the choice of total consumption
levels), Pareto efficiency requires to maximize the right hand side of In-
equality (6.3) with respect to T , N , hf and Nf . In this respect, a first
result is immediately apparent: since ∂Φ/∂T > 0 and g0 > 0, the right
hand side of (6.3) is strictly increasing in T for all (N, hf , Nf) triples
provided that at least N or Nf is non-zero (with also hf > 0 in the
latter case), and hence at the optimum T = Tmax. Also, for any given
(T,Nf), hf must be chosen so that g(T )hf − ϕ(hf) is maximized, which
gives hf (g) as a solution as in market equilibrium. Hence, at the social
optimum, T ∗∗ = Tmax ≥ T ∗ and h∗∗f = h∗f . To distinguish Pareto efficient
allocations from market allocations, the former are marked with a double
asterisk.
Next we turn to the optimal allocation of labor. By maximizing the
right hand side of (6.3) with respect to N at T ∗∗ = Tmax and recalling
that Nf = N¯ −N , it is
∂Φ(N, Tmax)
∂N
− e− g(Tmax)h∗∗f + ϕ(h∗∗f ) = 0. (6.4)
Let N˘ be the value of N that solves (6.4). Given Assumption 5.4, N˘ is
positive and unique; also, under Assumption 5.7, N˘ < N¯ , meaning that
there will be self-employed entrepreneurs at the Pareto efficient equilib-
rium.
Notice that Condition (6.4) requires that the marginal return on labor
is the same in the market sector and in the self-employment sector of the
economy. In fact, by defining the aggregate net output in the right hand
6.2 Pareto efficient allocations 151
side of (6.3) as Y , we get
∂Y
∂N
¯¯¯¯
T=Tmax
≡ ∂Φ(N,Tmax)
∂N
− e = g(Tmax)h∗∗f − ϕ(h∗∗f ) ≡
∂Y
∂Nf
¯¯¯¯
T=Tmax
.
(6.5)
We can summarize the previous discussion by characterizing Pareto
efficient allocations through the following proposition:
Proposition 6.1 Given parameters e and Tmax, Pareto efficient alloca-
tions are as follows: T ∗∗ = Tmax, g∗∗ = g (T ∗∗), h∗∗f = h
∗
f , N
∗∗ = N˘ ,
N∗∗f = N¯ − N˘ , N∗∗u = 0.
In order to compare market allocations with Pareto allocations, we
prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2 When T ∗ < Tmax there is technology misallocation but
not labor misallocation. When T ∗ = TC = Tmax there are neither tech-
nology nor labor misallocation.
Proof. When T ∗ < Tmax we only need to prove that there is no labor
misallocation. We know, by Proposition 5.1, that in a market equilibrium
it must be T ∗ ≥ T˜ . Therefore, by Equation (5.18) it is W (g(T ∗)) =
g(T ∗)h∗f − ϕ(h∗f) + e. By substituting this expression for W (g(T ∗)) into
Equation (5.22), it is immediate to check that it reads exactly as Equation
(6.5), which proves the claim.
Also when T ∗ = Tmax we only need to prove that there is no labor
misallocation. This follows directly by the comparison of Equations (5.22)
and (6.5) using Condition (5.18).
Given Proposition 6.2, policy intervention is called for only when T ∗ <
Tmax. In other words, it turns out to be useful only in the von Stackelberg
case, while in the Cournot case market and Pareto allocations coincide.
Before turning to policy analysis, we note that, having determined the
allocations of inputs that maximize total output, the social planner can
move on focusing on distributional issues and on incentive compatibility.
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In our framework, these objectives are achieved by choosing the ω’s under
the constraint of Pareto efficiency. Formally, this requires the planner to
choose ω and ωf under the constraints ω − e ≥ 0, ωf − ϕ(h∗∗f ) ≥ 0 and
(ω − e)N∗∗ + [ωf − ϕ(h∗∗f )]N∗∗f ≤ Y ∗∗, (6.6)
where Y ∗∗ = Φ(N∗∗, Tmax)− eN∗∗ + g(Tmax)h∗∗f N∗∗f − ϕ(h∗∗f )N∗∗f .
Due to the focus on technology adoption problems, however, our mod-
elling of the economy abstracts from many important issues that should,
instead, be considered when dealing with income distribution (thus ren-
dering the study of problems like the one outlined by the inequality in
(6.6) a special case and a quite limited one in terms of economic insights).
Hence, we do not further pursue these topics, turning instead to policy
analysis.
6.3 Policy analysis
We now examine how government intervention is able to overcome (or at
least mitigate) market failure offsetting the production externality that is
not internalized by the firm, by considering various types of subsidization
policies.
6.3.1 Non-linear (first best) subsidization
It is a matter of algebra to show that the government can achieve a
Pareto efficient outcome by introducing non-linear subsidies. Suppose
the government grants the firm a subsidy S for each employee, which
is conditional on the level of technology adoption and on the level of
employment, of the form
S(T,N) :=



e/c− e+ [g(Tmax)hf (g (T ))+
−ϕ(hf (g (T )))] N¯−NN ,
T ∈ [0, T˜ )
g(T )hf (g (T ))− ϕ(hf (g (T )))+
[g(Tmax)hf (g (T ))− ϕ(hf (g (T )))] N¯−NN ,
T ∈ [T˜ , Tmax]
.
(6.7)
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The policy maker is assumed to move first by setting tax policy, and
then producers make their choices as described in Section 5.2.2. Gov-
ernment’s budget is assumed to balance; in particular any subsidy (tax)
paid (levied) to producers is financed with a lump sum tax (subsidy)
on consumers. The use of a lump sum tax is without loss of generality,
as other non-distortive tax instruments are available within this frame-
work. For instance, a proportional tax on the firm’s gross profits or on
consumers’ dividends does not affect the choices made by the firm, by
the self-employed workers and by consumers, and hence is equivalent to
a lump sum tax on consumers.
Under the subsidy defined in Equation (6.7), the firm’s profit function
becomes
Π = Φ (N, T )− (W (g (T ))− S (T,N))N
where W (g (T )) is defined as in (5.18). Since we have assumed away
income effects, the lump sum tax on consumers does not affect the par-
ticipation and incentive compatibility constraints. Hence, by Equations
(5.18) and (6.7), and after some algebra, we have
W (g (T ))− S (T,N) = e+ [ϕ(hf (g (T )))− g(Tmax)hf (g (T ))]
N¯ −N
N
for all T , and thus the problem of the firm reduces to
max
T,N
Π = Φ (N,T )−eN+[g(Tmax)hf (g (T ))− ϕ(hf (g (T )))]
¡
N¯ −N
¢
.
(6.8)
The solution of Problem (6.8) gives T = Tmax and a first order condition
for the choice of N that, once evaluated at T = Tmax, is identical to (6.5)
characterizing Pareto efficient allocations. This follows immediately from
the observation that, by differentiating Π with respect to T (recalling
that ∂ϕ (.) /∂hf (.) = g (T )), it is
∂Π
∂T
=
∂Φ (N, T )
∂T
+
dhf (g (T ))
dg
dg (T )
dT
[g(Tmax)− g (T )]
¡
N¯ −N
¢
> 0,
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and, moreover, that the first order conditions of Problem 6.8 with respect
to N is given by
∂Π
∂N
=
∂Φ (N, T )
∂N
− e− g(Tmax)hf (g (T )) + ϕ(hf (g (T ))) = 0.
Hence, with the non-linear subsidy (6.7), the decentralized market
equilibrium achieves a Pareto efficient allocation. Policy intervention cor-
rects for market failure and achieves a first best allocation. Indeed, the
externality producer is induced to maximize aggregate net output as in
the social planner problem, since the objective function in (6.8) is iden-
tical to the right hand side of (6.3).
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6.3 Policy subsidization through the non-linear subsidies
S (T,N) – defined in Equation (6.7) – corrects for market failure al-
lowing the economy to achieve the Pareto efficient equilibrium defined in
Proposition 6.1.
Figure 6.1 shows how the introduction of a non-linear subsidy per
employee leads to Pareto efficiency. Both graphs in the figure show that
the introduction of the subsidy S (Equation 6.7) affects the constraint
on wages faced by the firm (Equation 5.18) shifting it downward to the
point at which the optimal technology choice by the firm becomes Tmax.2
To implement the non-linear subsidy, the policy maker needs, however,
to have a great deal of information; indeed it needs to know the entire
structure of the economy, as is standard in optimal policy analysis. The
point is that it observes and can enforce truthful revealing at no cost (i.e
costless monitoring) of both N and T , which are the choice variables on
which the transfer to the firm is contingent. These information require-
ments are in many cases so demanding that the actual implementability
2Section 6.4 illustrates the impact of non-linear first best subsidization for the Cobb-Douglas
economy introduced in Chapter 5.
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FIGURE 6.1. Non-linear (first best) subsidization
of such first best policy instruments is greatly reduced if not impaired,
which suggests to look at instruments imposing a smaller informational
burden on the policy maker.
6.3.2 Second best policy instruments
We now consider two less sophisticated, but more realistic, policy instru-
ments affecting the marginal returns to work and technology. The first
one is a fixed unit subsidy, at rate s, on workers employed by the external-
ity producer; the second one is a fixed unit subsidy, at rate σ, on each unit
of technological adoption. Both s and σ are simple to implement, since
it is reasonable to assume that both the employment level and the type
of technology adopted are observed. Also, these kind of instruments are
widely employed in real tax systems: s can be assimilated to a (negative)
payroll tax, whereas σ resembles the kind of incentive schemes that gov-
ernments grant to induce firms to dismiss old equipments for new ones.3
Moreover, the introduction of second best policy instruments is needed
3A third tax instrument that can be used to indirectly affect the firm choices is a tax or subsidy
on self-employed workers’ labor input. It is immediate to show that this is equivalent to the subsidy
s on the firm labor inputs.
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whenever there is imperfect observability (or possibility of cheating on)
of T.
As a first step in addressing the effects of second best policy measures,
we start focusing on the problem faced by the firm, that becomes
max
N,T
Π = Φ (N, T ) + σT − (W (g (T ))− s)N, (6.9)
where W (g (T )) is defined as in (5.18).
Consider first the choice of labor input, given T . The first order con-
dition for an interior solution is
∂Π
∂N
=
∂Φ (N, T )
∂N
−W (g (T )) + s = 0, (6.10)
which gives Nˆ(T,W (g (T )) , s) as a solution. Clearly,
∂Nˆ/∂s = −
¡
∂2Φ/∂N2
¢−1
> 0,
so that labor demand is independent of σ.
Substituting Nˆ , Nˆ ≡ Nˆ(T,W (g (T )) , s), into the profit function (6.9),
the problem of technological adoption can now be written as
max
T
Πˆ = Φ(Nˆ, T ) + σT − (W (g (T ))− s)Nˆ.
Thus, given Nˆ , the first order condition for an interior solution is
∂Πˆ
∂T
=
∂Φ(Nˆ, T )
∂T
+ σ − Nˆ dW (g (T ))
dT
= 0. (6.11)
Let the solution be T (s, σ). By totally differentiating (6.11) with re-
spect to s – and recalling that Nˆ is a function of s – we get
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
dT
ds
+
∂2Φ(Nˆ, T )
∂T∂N
∂Nˆ
∂s
− ∂Nˆ
∂s
dW (g (T ))
dT
= 0. (6.12)
From Equation (5.23) it is
dW (g (T ))
dT
=
∂Nˆ
∂T
∂2Φ(Nˆ, T )
∂N2
+
∂2Φ(Nˆ, T )
∂T∂N
,
and substituting into (6.12), we get
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dT
ds
=
∂2Φ
∂N2
∂Nˆ
∂T
∂Nˆ
∂s
,
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
(6.13)
Finally, by differentiating (6.11) with respect to σ, we obtain
dT
dσ
= −
Ã
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
!−1
(6.14)
where, again by making use of (5.23), it is4
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2
=
∂2Φ
∂T 2
− ∂
2Φ
∂N2
Ã
∂Nˆ
∂T
!2
− Nˆ ∂
2W (g (T ))
∂T 2
. (6.15)
By inspection of Equations (6.13) and (6.14), it is immediate to notice
that the signs of dTds and
dT
dσ are undecided, depending on the sign of
∂2Πˆ
∂T2
that remains an empirical matter.
As for policy analysis, let us now consider each tax instrument in turn.
Pigouvian subsidy on labor input
Let σ = 0. We wish to analyze whether social welfare can be increased
by using the subsidy on labor input, s, while balancing the budget with
the lump sum tax, Θ, that has no influence on work incentives because of
the linearity assumption. Assuming a utilitarian social welfare functional,
the policy maker solves the following problem
max
s,Θ
V = V ns∗N∗ + V ∗f N∗f (6.16)
s.t. sN∗ = ΘN¯.
Since, in a market equilibrium, N∗f = N¯ − N∗ and V ns∗ = V ∗f , the
social welfare function can be written as
V =
µ
w∗f − ϕ(h∗f (g (T ∗))) +
Π∗
N¯
−Θ
¶
N¯ =
[g(T ∗)h∗f (g (T
∗))− ϕ(h∗f (g (T ∗)))]N¯ +Π∗ −ΘN¯. (6.17)
4The following equation is the same as Equation (5.26), but (6.15) is defined for all T whereas
(5.26) only for T > T˜ .
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Substituting in (6.17) the budget constraint, we can finally write the
optimal tax Problem (6.16) as
max
s
V = [g(T ∗ (s))h∗f (g (T ∗ (s)))−ϕ(h∗f (g (T ∗ (s))))]N¯+Π∗ (s)−sN∗ (s) .
(6.18)
Differentiating V with respect to s, the first order condition of Problem
(6.18) is
dV
ds
= [h∗f (g(T
∗ (s)))
∂g(T ∗ (s))
∂T
∂T ∗ (s)
∂s
+
+g(T ∗ (s))
∂h∗f (g(T
∗ (s)))
∂g
∂g(T ∗ (s))
∂T
∂T ∗ (s)
∂s
+
−
∂ϕ(h∗f (g(T
∗ (s))))
∂hf
∂h∗f (g(T
∗ (s)))
∂g
∂g(T ∗ (s))
∂T
∂T ∗ (s)
∂s
]N¯+
+
∂Π∗ (s)
∂s
−N∗ (s)− s∂N
∗ (s)
∂s
= 0
which can be rewritten as½
h∗f (g(T
∗ (s)))
∂g(T ∗ (s))
∂T
∂T ∗ (s)
∂s
+·
g(T ∗ (s))−
∂ϕ(h∗f (g(T
∗ (s))))
∂hf
¸
∂h∗f (g(T
∗ (s)))
∂g
∂g(T ∗ (s))
∂T
∂T ∗ (s)
∂s
¾
N¯+
+
∂Π∗ (s)
∂s
−N∗ (s)− s∂N
∗ (s)
∂s
= 0. (6.19)
By the envelope theorem it is ∂Π
∗(s)
∂s = N
∗ (s), and by the first order
condition of the self-employed workers’ utility maximization problem (i.e.
Problem (5.8)) it is g(T ∗ (s)) =
∂ϕ(h∗f (g(T
∗(s))))
∂hf
. Thus Equation (6.19)
reduces to
h∗f (g(T
∗ (s)))
∂g(T ∗ (s))
∂T
∂T ∗ (s)
∂s
N¯ − s∂N
∗ (s)
∂s
= 0.
Therefore, if an interior solution exists, s is defined implicitly by
s =
N¯h∗f (g(T
∗ (s))) ∂g(T
∗(s))
∂T
∂T∗(s)
∂s
∂N∗(s)
∂s
. (6.20)
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The optimal s can be both negative or positive, meaning that social
welfare can be increased by using either a fixed unity subsidy or tax
on labor input depending on whether it is a subsidy (s > 0) or a tax
(s < 0) that induces higher technology adoption than in the laissez faire
equilibrium. This matter can not be solved analytically. In fact, s is
greater or smaller than zero depending on the sign of ∂T ∗/∂s at the
numerator of Equation (6.20). The sign of ∂T ∗/∂s, defined by Equation
(6.13), depends in turn on the sign of ∂Nˆ∂T and
∂2Πˆ
∂T 2 . While, as noticed by
discussing Equation (5.23), it is easy to characterize the sign of ∂Nˆ∂T , it
is not possible to provide general conditions for the sign of ∂
2Πˆ
∂T2 which
remains an empirical matter, as emphasized when studying Equation
(5.26).
The above discussion is summarized, slightly abusing notation, in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6.4 If there exists an interior optimal s∗, then s∗ satisfies
the necessary condition
s∗ =
g0h∗fN¯(∂T
∗/∂s)
∂N∗/∂s
.
Therefore, s∗ is negative (a tax) if ∂T ∗/∂s and ∂N∗/∂s have opposite
sign; otherwise it is positive (a subsidy).
Pigouvian subsidy on technology adoption
Let s = 0. The tax instrument used by the policy maker is now the
fixed unit subsidy on technology σ. Using (6.17), and after substituting
for the budget constraint σT = ΘN¯ , the optimal tax problem is
max
σ
V = [g(T ∗ (σ))h∗f (g (T ∗ (σ)))−ϕ(h∗f (g (T ∗ (σ))))]N¯+Π∗ (σ)−σT ∗ (σ) .
(6.21)
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The first order condition of Problem (6.21) can be written as
dV
dσ
= [
∂g (T ∗ (σ))
∂T
∂T ∗ (σ)
∂σ
h∗f (g (T
∗ (σ)))+
+g(T ∗ (σ))
∂h∗f (g (T
∗ (σ)))
∂g
∂g (T ∗ (σ))
∂T
∂T ∗ (σ)
∂σ
+
−
∂ϕ(h∗f (g (T
∗ (σ))))
∂T
∂h∗f (g (T
∗ (σ)))
∂g (T ∗)
∂g (T ∗ (σ))
∂T
∂T ∗ (σ)
∂σ
]N¯+
+
∂Π∗ (σ)
∂σ
− T ∗ (σ)− σ∂T
∗ (σ)
∂σ
= 0.
Recalling that ∂g(T
∗(σ))
∂T =
∂ϕ(h∗f (g(T
∗(σ))))
∂T , we get
∂g (T ∗ (σ))
∂T
∂T ∗ (σ)
∂σ
h∗f (g (T
∗ (σ))) N¯ +
∂Π
∗
(σ)
∂σ
− T ∗ (σ)− σ∂T
∗ (σ)
∂σ
= 0.
(6.22)
Since by using the envelope theorem it is ∂Π(σ)∂σ = T (σ), we obtain the
following implicit equation for σ
σ =
∂g (T ∗ (σ))
∂T
h∗f (g (T
∗ (σ))) N¯ > 0, (6.23)
which shows that a Pigouvian subsidy unambiguously gives the proper
incentive to foster technology adoption. In this sense, it is better than
a Pigouvian subsidy on labor input since it gives rise unambiguously to
a welfare improvement. Moreover, being levied on the variable that the
policy maker needs to affect (i.e. T ), it is more direct than a fixed unity
subsidy (or tax) on labor input that acts only indirectly through N∗.
Figure 6.2 illustrates how a subsidy σ on technology adoption affects the
technology chosen by the firm, and Proposition 6.5 summarizes the above
arguments.
Proposition 6.5 A Pigouvian subsidy on technology, σ∗, defined implic-
itly by Condition (6.23), always fosters technology adoption. Differently
from a Pigouvian subsidy on labor input, it gives rise unambiguously to
a welfare improvement.
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6.4 An example: Cobb-Douglas economy
In this section, we discuss welfare analysis for the same Cobb-Douglas
economy considered in the previous chapters, by briefly focusing on Pareto
efficiency and on policy intervention, for the latter investigating non-
linear first best subsidies only.5
All assumptions made in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4 and in Section 5.5 of
Chapter 5 continue to hold here too. In order to determine Pareto efficient
allocations, we need to maximize aggregate production net of aggregate
social costs, as defined by the right hand side of Inequality (6.3), that for
the Cobb Douglas economy under scrutiny specializes into:
max
T,N,hf ,Nf
Y (T,N, hf , Nf) := TαNβ − eN +
¡
T γhf − h2f/2
¢
Nf (6.24)
By mimicking the same arguments developed in the previous sections for
the general case, it is immediate to notice that Y is strictly increasing in
T, for all (N,hf , Nf) triples, provided N or (hf , Nf) are different from
5The study of second best policy measures proves to be algebraically demanding under the Cobb-
Douglas specification studied here. The problems at hand can be solved only for specific parameters
configurations. A full characterization of parameter regions, however, does not add much in terms of
economic insights, and thus we omit it.
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zero. Thus T ∗∗ = T ∗ = Tmax. (Recall that we use a double asterisk
to denote Pareto efficient allocations). Moreover, for any (T,Nf), hf is
chosen so as to maximize T γhf − h2f/2, and thus h∗∗f = h∗f = T γmax. As
for the optimal labor allocation, it must be that the marginal return on
labor is the same in the market sector and in the self-employment sector
of the economy (see Equation (6.5)), and hence:
βTαmaxN
β−1 − e = T 2γmax −
T 2γmax
2
,
i.e.,
βTαmaxN
β−1 = e+
T 2γmax
2
, (6.25)
from which it follows
N∗∗ = N˘ =
µ
e+ T 2γmax/2
βTαmax
¶ 1
β−1
. (6.26)
Policy intervention is called for whenever the market equilibrium is
such that T ∗ < Tmax. This implies that there is a role for an active fiscal
policy only under the von Stackelberg scenario. Indeed, it is immediate
to notice that in the Cournot-Nash framework, market allocations and
Pareto allocations coincide.6
As already stated above, we only consider the set of instruments pro-
posed in Section 6.3.1 in order to overcome market failure: that is, non-
linear first best subsidies.
By introducing a per-employee subsidy S (T,N), the firm’s profit func-
tion is
Π = TαNβ − (W (T )− S (T,N))N,
6The technology adopted by the firm is Tmax in both cases and, comparing Equations (6.26) and
(5.30) where
W (G) = e+
T2γmax
2
,
by making use of Equation (6.25), it is immediate to note that also the employment level is the same.
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where W (T ) is defined in Equation (5.31) and the subsidy S (T,N) is
equal to
S (T,N) =



e
c − e+
³
T γmaxT
γ − T 2γ
2
´
N¯−N
N T ∈
h
0, T˜ )³
T γmaxT
γ − T 2γ
2
´
N¯−N
N +
T2γ
2
T ∈
h
T˜ , Tmax
i .
By substituting for W (T ) and S (T,N), the firm’s problem becomes
max
T,N
TαNβ +
µ
T γmax −
T γ
2
¶
T γ
N¯ −N
N
− eN. (6.27)
Since the above program is increasing in T , it is immediate to observe
that, following the introduction of the non-linear subsidy, it is T ∗ = Tmax.
Moreover, it is also straightforward to notice that at T = Tmax, Problem
(6.27) gives a first order condition for the choice of employment identical
to the condition characterizing the optimal (Pareto efficient) allocation
of labor, i.e.
βTαmaxN
β−1 = e+
T 2γmax
2
. (6.28)
Hence, non-linear subsidization conditional on the level of technology and
employment allows to eliminate the distortion in technology adoption
without introducing any distortion in the allocation of labor.
6.5 Concluding remarks
The inefficiencies created by the presence of external effects set the stage
for the consideration of government intervention. In this chapter we stud-
ied the market failures generated by the production and pecuniary exter-
nalities arising in the framework developed in Chapter 5, and discussed
the problems they pose from a normative point of view, investigating
the tools that can be used in order to improve social welfare. We first
characterized the Pareto efficient allocations that are generated by a so-
cial planner internalizing all sources of externalities and compared them
with the market allocations derived in Chapter 5, showing when tech-
nology misallocation is likely to be observed. Second, we investigated
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different government intervention policies that can mitigate or overcome
market failure, starting with non-linear subsidization, that proves capa-
ble to achieve Pareto efficiency by rendering the adoption of an inefficient
technology a dominated strategy. We then turned to second best policy
instruments proving that Pigouvian subsidies on technology always help
in increasing social welfare. Interventions on labor demand have instead
an ambiguous impact on welfare, in the sense that, depending on the
circumstances, either a fixed unity tax or a subsidy on labor input can
induce higher technology adoption.
The way the government’s activity is modeled remains very simple
throughout the chapter. In the static setting we consider, all issues of
commitment or time consistency of the government’s actions possibly
arising from the presence of production externalities are ruled away.7
The budget is assumed to balance and all interventions are financed via
a lump sum tax on consumers, or other equivalent non-distortive tax in-
struments. In a more complicated framework such non-distortive taxes
may not be readily available and, in general, it is likely that taxes intro-
duce distortions in agents’ behavior. One would therefore have to face
a trade-off between the costs deriving from the distortionary impact as-
sociated with the design of the tax system and the means it provides
to correct the externalities. Whenever non-distortive taxes are not at
hand, the design of the tax system becomes important to guarantee that
no worse distortions are introduced by taxing agents in order to finance
7 In a dynamic framework, when there is an externality, the time consistency problem appears
even if there are no differences in preferences between private agents and the government. For an
overview of this issue, see Cooper (1999). A problem of time consistency can emerge in a dynamic
version of our model, so that the order of moves matters. Suppose that the government commits
to subsidize technology adoption in order to achieve a Pareto efficient allocation, but moves after
the private agents. Under the assumption that the investment implied in technology is irreversible,
once the firm has chosen the frontier technology the government does no longer have an incentive
to pay the subsidy. The firm would recognize this and the government would be powerless to affect
technology adoption and, thus, to offset the production externality.
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subsidies aimed at eliminating the distortions determined by production
externalities. Tax rates become in fact endogenous variables and, in the
presence of inefficiencies in the strategic interaction between the firm and
the self-employed entrepreneurs, the government’s taxation policies and
their timing may alter agents’ choices.
Moreover, as stressed in Chapter 2, there are several other ways in
which government intervention can affect the firm’s incentives to adopt a
superior technology besides the tax system, that we do not consider. For
example, regulations can be passed preventing former workers (managers)
to start a new business, or accept offers from competitors, for a certain
time period after leaving the firm, thus eliminating (or at least reducing
the value of) the possible outside options. Furthermore – even though
it is generally acknowledged that their efficacy is in many cases limited
– patent protection schemes, by making it difficult (or costly) to copy a
technology, reduce the value of the outside options insofar the production
externality requires the use of some of the technology components to be
effective (i.e. the possible spillovers are to some extent complementary to
the specific technology components).
Finally, while throughout the dissertation the public sector does not
play any role as a producer or consumer, in reality it is a heavy con-
sumer (and, more generally, adopter) of technology. In this perspective,
governments could substantially affect technology adoption directly, by
means of their decisions. For instance, by adopting massively a frontier
technology, a government might be able to increase the average skill level
of the workers in the economy. This, in turn, would reduce the size of
(technology-induced) externalities and, therefore, their impact on wages,
thus stimulating the adoption of superior technologies by private firms.
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7Conclusions
In this dissertation we addressed the issue of technology adoption by em-
phasizing the effects of the interaction between technologies and wages
on firms’ technological choices. We have stressed the existence of a direct
link between the choice of a technology and wage, caused by technology
driven spillovers determining an upskilling of workers and entailing, in
turn, an increase of their productivity and an improvement of their out-
side options. Insofar as the improvement in workers’ occupational choices
can transfer on wages, the adoption of superior technologies by firms de-
termines an increase of the wages they must pay in order to retain work-
ers. There is thus a double source of externalities generated by a firm’s
decision to adopt a superior technology – a positive externality bene-
fiting workers, through the increase in their productivity, and a negative
pecuniary externality imposed on the firm, via the increase in the level
of wages it must correspond to workers – that can possibly discourage
or dampen the adoption of the better technology.
We have shown in a simple general equilibrium efficiency wage frame-
work that this can indeed be the case when a firm does take fully into
account the impact of externalities in its decision problem. Due to the
168 7. Conclusions
presence of production externalities (and of the associated negative pecu-
niary externalities), firms may never have an incentive to upgrade their
techniques to the frontier and can remain stuck with old and inefficient
technologies; a further variant of the lock-in problem.
The comparison of market allocations with the Pareto-efficient ones
achieved by a social planner internalizing all sources of non-marketed
relations has shown the possibility of technology misallocation, which in-
troduces a clear scope for government intervention in order to overcome
or mitigate market failure. We have shown that a policy maker is able
to re-establish Pareto-efficiency by means of first-best (non linear) subsi-
dization. Furthermore, when non-linear subsidies prove too cumbersome
to be implemented, welfare improvements can always be achieved by
means of second-best instruments as Pigouvian subsidies on technology
adoption, while the effects of interventions on firms’ labor demand are
ambiguous in that either a (Pigouvian) tax or a subsidy can be welfare
improving, depending on the relative impact of the subsidy on labor and
technology.
The key ingredients behind the dissertation results are not new to the
technology adoption and diffusion literature. The role of labor endow-
ments and the effects of wages on technology choices have been carefully
investigated, and the same holds true for the impact of market power and
of strategic interaction. Nonetheless, the way they are mixed here origi-
nates quite different results from those obtained in other contributions,
as can be appreciated from the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3. One such
difference that is particularly striking is with the literature on vintage
human capital – often referred to as providing for a major engine of
technology adoption – where workers’ skills play the opposite role. In
fact, in our framework it is the existence of transferrable human capital –
responsible for the emergence of production externalities – to generate a
delay in the adoption of the frontier technology via its impact on wages,
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while in the human capital model it is specific human capital responsi-
ble for firms’ lock-in in inefficient technologies, whereas transferability of
knowledge would favor the adoption of superior technologies. Our model
may also account for the fact that, even though the more intense users
of existing technologies (the richer countries) are those having more to
loose from the adoption of a superior technology according to the hu-
man capital model, they are the ones that adopt faster, consistently with
the observed trickle down mechanism. As far as skills are more uniform
in advanced economies, the impact of a superior technology on workers’
outside options and hence on wages should be lower, which encourages
adoption. The opposite occurs in poorer countries, where a more un-
equal and scarce distribution of technical knowledge (skills) discourages
the choice of superior technologies, in contrast with the predictions of
the vintage human capital theory.
It is worth emphasizing that this dissertation approach is consistent
with the idea of complementarity between technology and skills and that
of the existence of a direct nexus between technology and wages, two facts
largely confirmed and stressed by the empirical evidence on technical
change, at least since the late forties of the past century.
Moreover, although our static framework does not allow for a complete
analysis of the point, our theory seems to be at least qualitatively con-
sistent with several characteristics of technical change patterns found in
the literature. First the S-shaped diffusion process of technologies. One
can conjecture that the adoption of a technology is slow at first because
it gives rise to significant externalities of the sort discussed in the thesis,
so that the marginal benefits of choosing the frontier technology are over-
come by the marginal increase in wages it entails. However, as the skills
required by the technology become more abundant, they will no longer
generate better outside options, thus having a lower (or no) impact on
wages, and firms will be more willing to adopt. Finally, as is standard in
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the literature, the market becomes eventually saturated and the adoption
rate slows down.
Similarly, the increasing uniformity of adoption rates among richer
countries and the trickle down hypothesis advanced in the growth lit-
erature to explain the divergence in cross-country rates of adoption be-
tween industrialized and less developed countries can be interpreted in
the light of our framework. As already noticed, more advanced countries
are characterized by relatively more homogeneous economic conditions
(for example, in terms of their human capital) than poorer countries.
This can imply, on the one hand, that the adoption of a superior tech-
nology is more likely to spill over richer economies because of the greater
homogeneity of the ex-ante technical knowledge (that renders new knowl-
edge more transferable) but, on the other hand, the induced externalities
can be less of a problem exactly for the same reason (they have a lower
impact on workers’ outside options and hence on wages). As far as the
second effect dominates the first, production externalities may contribute
to explain why technologies are first adopted in leader countries (and the
increasing uniformity of their technological choices) and trickle down to
less developed countries only at a later stage.
A major drawback of our framework is that it is a static one, which
impedes a careful investigation of the issues of timing and implemen-
tation of technologies, and hence of their diffusion processes. To model
the strategic interactions between firms and employees, and the ensuing
externalities in a dynamic environment, is a priority for future research.
A further addition will be to introduce uncertainty about the size of
technology-induced spillovers and, consequently, of production external-
ities, that can provide a further rationale to explain the observed delays
in the adoption of superior technologies along the same lines suggested
by the real options approach. As firms are uncertain about the value of
workers’ outside options induced by their choice of technology – a value
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that can change over time due, for example, to changes in education and
schooling, or to advancements of the technology frontier over time –
they will adopt only when the expected benefits from adoption are well
above the expected costs (i.e. the increase in labor costs), that is when
the option is well in the money.
Finally and at a greater level of generality, by working out dynamic
formulations of our static models, it will eventually be possible to provide
for a natural framework to investigate the role of technology in explaining
growth and fluctuations, in a setting largely consistent with the stylized
facts.
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Appendix A
Cobb Douglas Economy: Comparative
Statics
A.1 The impact of γ on the equilibrium level of
employment
We first show that the sign of ∂N
∗
∂γ is undecided. From Equation (4.33) it
follows that
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FIGURE A.1. The behavior of N∗ for ec = 1.5 (magenta line),
e
c = 0.75 (black
line), ec = 0.5 (red line) and
e
c = 0.25 (blue line)
It is immediate to observe that the sign of Derivative (A.1) is unde-
cided, as it depends on the sign of log
³ e
c
βγ−α
´
, that in turns is affected
by the values of the disutility of effort and monitoring technology (ec),
and of the production function parameters α and β.1 Moreover, there
are no compact analytical conditions that characterize the sign of the
derivative.
Focusing on the impact of changes of the disutility of effort and/or of
the firm’s monitoring, Figures A.1 and A.2 report experiments on the
cross effects of γ and ec on N
∗ for the benchmark parameter set (4.31).
1 In order to show that 

−Aα
α
γ
³
α
γ logα+ 1
´
γ2

 < 0,
it is easy to prove that it can not be αγ logα+ 1 < 0. Note that
lim
α→0
α
γ
logα = 0 and lim
α→1
α
γ
logα = 0.
Moreover, it is αγ logα < 0 for all 0 < α < 1. From the first order condition of the minimization
problem for such a function, we get its argmin
1
γ
logα+
α
γ
· 1
α
= 0 ⇐⇒ logα = −1, i.e. α = 1
e
.
By evaluating αγ logα+ 1 at α =
1
e , we obtain
1
γe
(−1) + 1 > 0,
which proves the claim.
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FIGURE A.2. The shape of N∗ for ec = 7.5 (blue line),
e
c = 15 (red line), and
e
c = 22.5 (green line)
As it is to be expected from standard economic theory, the employ-
ment locus shifts upwards the lower the disutility of effort, or the higher
the probability to catch a shirker (i.e. the better the firm’s monitoring
technology). Furthermore, numerical experiments (see again Figures A.1
and A.2 for a qualitative illustration) suggest that there exists a thresh-
old for ec (depending on the specific parameters configurations chosen:
e
c = 7.5 in the case of the parameters set used here) such that below
it a switch in the sign of the derivative is no longer observed and the
derivative remains positive. Additional numerical experiments show that
there exists a γ − threshold as well, such that above it the equilibrium
level of employment is increasing in γ, whatever the value of ec .
The cross effects of γ and ec on the equilibrium employment and tech-
nology levels can be further appreciated in terms of the loci n∗ (T ) and
t∗ (N) . Figure A.3 – drawing them in the N −T plane for our standard
parameter set (4.31) – shows the positive impact of γ (for low values of
γ) on the optimal levels of employment and technology when ec = 0.75.
The loci represented with black lines correspond to the case in which
γ = 2, while the red lines represents the same loci for γ = 3. It is im-
mediate to observe that both the equilibrium level of employment and of
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FIGURE A.3. The positive impact of γ on N∗ and T ∗ when ec = 0.75
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FIGURE A.4. The negative impact of γ on N∗ and T ∗ when ec = 20
the technology grade increase (from 17.68 to 22.5 and from 0.5 to 0.53,
respectively ) when γ increases (from 2 to 3).
Figure A.4 shows the same loci drawn for the same benchmark para-
meter set, but for ec = 20. As it can be seen from the figure, in this case,
an increase of γ (the black lines correspond to γ = 2 and the red lines
to γ = 3) has a negative impact on the equilibrium levels of employment
and technology.
A.2 The impact of α and β on the equilibrium level of
employment
Inequalities (4.53) and (4.55) provide sufficient conditions to characterize
the sign of ∂N
∗
∂α and
∂N∗
∂β respectively. More generally, however, the shape
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FIGURE A.5. N∗ (α) for ec = 0.75, 1.5, 3, 6
ofN∗ (α) andN∗ (β) is affected in a non-monotonic way both by the wage
determination process (through the impact of γ and ec) and by techno-
logical factors (through the quota spent by the firm in the labor input,
β, and the one spent in the technology input, α, respectively), which
renders impossible to fully characterize the behavior of labor demand,
and to immediately assess the direction of the cross-effects at play. In
order to illustrate this point, we do not attempt to provide an analytical
characterization, limiting instead ourselves to investigate the joint effects
of parameters γ and ec on N
∗ (β) (and N∗ (α)) by means of numerical
experiments.
Figure A.5, drawn for the benchmark parameter set (4.31), documents
the behavior ofN∗ (α) following changes in the disutility of effort (and/or
in the monitoring technology) affecting the ratio ec . As it is to be expected,
the locus N∗ (α) shifts downward as the disutility of effort increases (or
the firm’s monitoring decreases), the black line in the figure correspond-
ing to ec = 0.75 and the cyan line to
e
c = 6. The same holds true for
the effect of ec on N
∗ (β) as shown in Figure A.6, where we distinguish
between different values of A to highlight the fact that they affect the
shape of N∗ (β).2
2 In the study of N∗ (α), there is no need to distinguish between different values of A, since it
does not affect the shape of the locus (see Equation 4.51).
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FIGURE A.6. N∗ (β) for ec = 0.75, 1.5, 3, 6 and A = 10 (left chart), A = 1
(right chart)
As for the impact of γ on N∗ (α), Figure A.7 illustrates the effects of
changes in γ on the shape of the locus and on the equilibrium level of
employment for different values of the disutility of effort.
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FIGURE A.7. N∗ (α) for γ = 2, 3, 4, 5 and ec = 0.75 (left graph),
e
c = 10 (right
graph)
Notice that when the disutility of effort is low (for example, at the
level set in our standard parameter set, ec = 0.75, used in the left graph),
increases in γ – γ = 2, 3, 4, 5, with the black line corresponding to γ = 2
and the cyan line to γ = 5 – have a positive impact on employment for
any α in the definition range; while, when the disutility of effort is high
(ec = 10 in the right graph), N
∗ (α) is no longer monotonic and increases
in γ imply an increase in the values of α at which the (first) switch in
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the sign of ∂N
∗(α)
∂α occurs. Note also that, for values of γ high enough, the
sign of the derivative remains negative for all admissible values of α.
Figure A.8, whose upper charts are drawn for the base parameter set
withA = 10, shows how γ affectsN∗ (β) for different values of ec (
e
c = 0.75
in the left graphs, and ec = 10 in the right graphs). Notice that N
∗ (β)
is increasing in γ – from γ = 2 (black line) to γ = 5 (cyan line) – for
all β when the disutility of effort is low (ec = 0.75), while – coherently
with the sign of ∂N∗/∂γ being undecided – the impact of γ becomes
non-monotonic when ec increases (to
e
c = 10 in the figure), although our
numerical experiment suggests that the locus N∗ (β) shifts upward when
γ increases. This tendency is confirmed by the two lower charts, repeating
the same exercise for A = 1.
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180 Appendix A. Cobb Douglas Economy: Comparative Statics
References
Acemoglu, D. (1996): “A Microfoundation for Social Increasing RE-
turns in Human Capital Accumulation,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 111(3), 779—804.
(1997): “Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labor Mar-
ket,” Review of Economic Studies, 64(3), 445—464.
(1998): “Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Di-
rected Technical Change and Wage Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 113(4), 1055—1089.
(1999): “Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An
Alternative Theory and Some Evidence,” American Economic Review,
89, 1259—1278.
(2002a): “Directed Technical Change,” Review of Economic
Studies, 69, 781—810.
(2002b): “Technical Change, Inequality and the Labor Market,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 7—72.
182 References
(2003a): “Patterns of Skill Premia,” Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 70(2), 199—230.
(2003b): “Technology and Inequality,” NBER Winter Report
2002-2003.
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, and G. Violante (2002): “Technical
Change, Deunionization, and Inequality,” Carnegie-Rochester Confer-
ence Series On Public Policy.
Acemoglu, D., and J.-S. Pischke (1998): “Why Do Firms Train?
Theory and Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 79—
119.
(1999): “The Structure of Wages and Investment in General
Training,” Journal of Political Economy, 107(3), 539—572.
Acemoglu, D., and R. Shimer (2000): “Wage and Technology Dis-
persion,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 585—607.
Acemoglu, D., and F. Zilibotti (2001): “Productivity Differences,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 563—606.
Aghion, P. (2002): “Schumpeterian Growth Theory and the Dynamics
of Income Inequality,” Econometrica, 70(3), 855—882.
Aghion, P., C. Harris, P. Howitt, and J. Vickers (2001): “Com-
petition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation,” Review
of Economic Studies, 68, 467—492.
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt (1992): “A Model of Growth Trough Cre-
ative Destruction,” Econometrica, 60, 323—351.
(1998): Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press.
References 183
Aghion, P., P. Howitt, and G. Violante (2002): “General Purpose
Technology and Wage Inequality,” Journal of Economic Growth, 7,
315—345.
Aghion, P., and J. Tirole (1994): “The Management of Innovation,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1185—1209.
Allen, S. (2001): “Technology and the Wage Structure,” Journal of
Labor Economics, 19(2), 440—483.
Anant, T., E. Dinopoulos, and P. Segerstrom (1990): “A Schum-
peterian Model of the Product Life Cycle,” American Economic Re-
view, 80(5), 1077—1091.
Arrow, K. (1962): “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention,” in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. New
York: Princeton University Press.
Arthur, B. (1989): “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and
Lock-In by Historical Small Events,” Economic Journal, 99, 116—131.
Autor, D., L. Katz, and A. Krueger (1998): “Computing Inequal-
ity: Have Computers Changed the Labor Market?,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 113(4), 1169—1215.
Ball, L., and D. Romer (1990): “Real Rigidities and the Non-
Neutrality of Money,” Review of Economic Studies, 57, 183—204.
Banerjee, A. (1992): “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 107, 797—817.
Barro, R. (1991): “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 407—443.
Barro, R., and X. Sala-I-Martin (1997): “Technological Diffusion,
Convergence and Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth, 2, 1—26.
184 References
Bartel, A., and F. Lichtenberg (1987): “The Comparative Advan-
tage of Educated Workers in Implementing New Technologies,” Review
of Economics and Statistics, 69(1), 1—11.
(1991): “The Age of Technology and Its Impact on Employee
Wages,” Economic Innovation: New Technology, 1(3), 215—31.
Basu, S., and D. Weil (1998): “Appropriate Technology and Growth,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1025—1054.
Ben-David, D. (1994): “Converging Clubs and Diverging Economies,”
CEPR Working Paper No. 922.
Benhabib, J., and R. Farmer (1994): “Indeterminacy and Increasing
Returns,” Journal of Economic Theory, 63, 19—41.
Benhabib, J., and M. Spiegel (1994): “The Role of Human Capital
in Economic Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country
Data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 34, 143—173.
Berman, E., J. Bound, and S. Machin (1998): “Implications of
Skill-Biased Technological Change: International Evidence,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1245—1280.
Bernstein, J. (1988): “Costs of Production, Intra- and Interindus-
try R&D Spillovers: Canadian Evidence,” Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 21, 324—347.
Bernstein, J., and M. Nadiri (1991): “Product Demand, Cost of
Production, Spillovers, and the Social Rate of Return to R&D,” NBER
Working Paper No. 3625.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirschleifer, and I. Welch (1992): “A The-
ory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and Cultural Change as Informational
Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 992—1026.
References 185
Blanchard, O., and N. Kiyotaki (1987): “Monopolistic Competition
and the Effects of Aggregate Demand,” American Economic Review,
77, 647—666.
Böhm, V. (1994): “The Foundation of the Theory of Monopolistic Com-
petition Revisited,” Journal of Economic Theory, 63(2), 208—218.
Boldrin, M., and D. Levine (2002a): “Factor Saving Innovation,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 105(1), 18—41.
(2002b): “Perfectly Competitive Innovation,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Staff Report: 303.
Booth, A., M. Francesconi, and G. Zoega (2002): “Oligopsony,
Institutions and the Efficiency of General Training,” IZA Discussion
Paper No. 618.
Booth, A., and D. Snower (eds.) (1996): Acquiring Skills: Market
failures, their symptoms and policy responses. Cambridge (UK): Cam-
bridge University Press.
Booth, A., and G. Zoega (1999): “Do Quits Cause Under-Training?,”
Oxford Economic Papers, 51, 374—386.
Bordignon, M., L. Colombo, and U. Galmarini (2003): “Fiscal
Federalism and Endogenous Lobbies’ Formation,” CESIfo Working
Paper No. 1017.
Bresnahan, T. F., E. Brynjolfsson, and L. Hitt (2002): “Informa-
tion Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled
Labor: Firm-Level Evidence,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1),
339—376.
186 References
Brezis, E., P. Krugman, and D. Tsiddon (1993): “Leapfrogging in
International Competition: A Theory of Cycles in National Technolog-
ical Leadership,” American Economic Review, 83, 1211—1219.
Brown, C., and B. Campbell (2002): “The Impact of Technological
Change on Work and Wages,” Industrial Relations, 41(1), 1—33.
Bryant, J. (1983): “A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type
Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 525—529.
(1987): “The Paradox of Thrift, Liquidity Preference and Animal
Spirits,” Econometrica, 55, 1231—1236.
Brynjolfsson, E., and L. Hitt (2000): “Beyond Computation: Infor-
mation Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Per-
formance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 23—48.
Caballero, R., and M. Hammour (1994): “The Cleansing Effects of
Recession,” American Economic Review, 84, 1350—1368.
(1998): “The Macroeconomics of Specificity,” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 106(4), 724—767.
Cabral, L. (1990): “On the Adoption of Innovations with Network Ex-
ternalities,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 19, 299—308.
Card, D. (1996): “The Effect of Unions on the Structure of Wages: A
Longitudinal Analysis,” Econometrica, 64, 957—979.
Caroli, E., and J. van Reenen (2002): “Skill-Biased Organizational
Change: Evidence from a Panel of British and French Establishments,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1449—1492.
Caselli, F. (1999): “Technological Revolutions,” American Economic
Review, 87, 78—102.
References 187
Caselli, F., and W. Coleman (2001): “Cross-Country Technology
Diffusion: The Case of Computers,” American Economic Review -
AEA Papers and Proceedings, 91, 328—335.
(2003): “The World Technology Frontier,”mimeo, Harvard Uni-
versity, and NBER Working Paper No. 7904, 2002.
Caselli, F., and D. Wilson (2004): “Importing Technology,” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 51, 1—32.
Chamley, C., and D. Gale (1994): “Information Revelation and
Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment,” Econometrica, 62, 1065—
1085.
Chari, V., and H. Hopenhayn (1991): “Vintage Human Capital,
Growth and the Diffusion of New Technology,” Journal of Political
Economy, 99(6), 1143—65.
Cheung, Y., and A. Pascual (2001): “Market Structure, Technol-
ogy Spillovers, and Persistence in Productivity Differentials,” CESifo
Working Paper No. 517.
Choi, J. (1997): “Herd Behaviour, the Penguin Effect and the Suppres-
sion of Informational Diffusion,” Rand Journal of Economics, 28, 407—
425.
Christensen, C. (1997): The Innovator’s Dilemma. Boston: Harvard
Business School Press.
Coe, D., and E. Helpman (1995): “International R&D Spillovers,”
European Economic Review, 39, 889—887.
Coe, D., E. Helpman, and W. Hoffmaister (1997): “North-South
R&D Spillovers,” Economic Journal, 107, 134—149.
188 References
Cohen, W., and D. Levinthal (1989): “Innovation and Learning: The
Two Faces of R&D,” Economic Journal, 99, 569—596.
Comin, D., and B. Hobijn (2004): “Cross-Country Technology Adop-
tion: Making the Theories Face the Facts,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 51(1), 39—83.
Cooley, T., R. Marimon, and V. Quadrini (2003): “Aggregate Con-
sequences of Limited Contract Enforceability,” NBER Working Paper
No. 10132.
Cooper, D. (2001): “Innovation and Reciprocal Externalities: Informa-
tion Transmission Via Job Mobility,” Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 45, 403—425.
Cooper, R. (1994): “Equilibrium Selection in Imperfectly Competitive
Economies with Multiple Equilibria,” Economic Journal, 104, 1106—
1123.
(1999): Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeco-
nomics. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, R., and J. Haltiwanger (1993): “The Macroeconomic Im-
plications of Machine Replacement: Theory and Evidence,” American
Economic Review, 83, 360—382.
Cooper, R., and A. John (1988): “Coordinating Coordination Failures
in Keynesian Models,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 441—463.
Cooper, R., and A. Johri (1997): “Dynamic Complementarities: A
Quantitative Analysis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 40, 97—119.
Crespi, F. (2004): “Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-
Perspective Analysis,” FEEM Working Paper No. 42.
References 189
Dalmazzo, A. (2002): “Technological Complexity, Wage Differentials
and Unemployment,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(4),
515—530.
David, P. (1975): Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth:
Essays on American and British Experience in the 19th Century. Lon-
don: Cambridge University Press.
(1990): “The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Per-
spective on the Modern Productivity Paradox,” American Economic
Review, 80, 355—361.
Davidson, C., and P. Segerstrom (1998): “R&D Subsidies and Eco-
nomic Growth,” RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 548—577.
Diamond, P. (1982): “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equi-
librium,” Journal of Political Economy, 90, 881—894.
Dixit, A., and R. Pindyck (1994): Investment Under Uncertainty.
Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
Durlauf, S. (1991): “Multiple Equilibria and Persistence in Aggregate
Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, 81, 70—74.
Easterly, W., and R. Levine (2001): “What Have We Learned from
a Decade of Empirical Research on Growth? It’s Not Factor Accu-
mulation: Stylized Facts and Growth Models,”World Bank Economic
Review, 15(2), 177—219.
Eaton, J., and S. Kortum (2001): “Trade in Capital Goods,” European
Economic Review, 45(7), 1195—1235.
Eeckhout, J., and B. Jovanovic (2002): “Knowledge Spillovers and
Inequality,” American Economic Review, 92, 1290—1307.
190 References
Farrell, J., and G. Saloner (1985): “Standardization, Compatibility
and Innovation,” Rand Journal of Economics, 16, 70—83.
(1986): “Installed Base and Compatibility,”American Economic
Review, 76, 940—955.
Freeman, C., and L. Soete (1997): The Economics of Industrial In-
novation. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
Gale, D. (1996a): “Delay and Cycles,” Review of Economic Studies, 63,
169—198.
(1996b): “What Have We Learned from Social Learning?,” Eu-
ropean Economic Review, 40, 617—628.
Galor, O., and D. Tsiddon (1997): “Technological Progress, Mobility
and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review, 87(3), 363—382.
Geroski, P. (1995a): “Do Spillovers Undermine the Incentive to In-
novate?,” in Economic Approaches to Innovation, ed. by S. Dowrick.
Aldershot: Edward Elghar.
(1995b): “Markets for Technology: Knwoledge, Innovation and
Appropriability,” in Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and
Technical Change, ed. by P. Stoneman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
(2000): “Models of Technology Diffusion,” Research Policy, 29,
603—625.
Gersbach, H., and A. Schmutzler (2001): “A Product Market The-
ory of Training and Turnover in Firms,” IZA Discussion Paper No.
327.
(2003): “Endogenous Spillovers and Incentives to Innovate,”
Economic Theory, 21(1), 59—79.
References 191
Goldin, C., and L. Katz (1998): “The Origins of Technology-Skill
Complementarity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 693—732.
Goldin, C., and R. Margo (1992): “The Great Compression: The
Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 107(1), 1—34.
Gottschalk, P., and M. Joyce (1998): “Cross-National Differences
in the Rise in Earnings Inequality: Market and Institutional Factors,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 80, 489—502.
Greenwood, J., and B. Jovanovic (1999): “The Information Tech-
nology Revolution and the Stock Market,” American Economic Re-
view, 89(2), 116—122.
Griliches, Z. (1957): “Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics
of Technological Change,” Econometrica, 25, 501—522.
(1969): “Capital-Skill Complementarity,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 51(4), 465—468.
(1992): “The Search for RD Spillovers,” Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, 94(Supplement), 29—47.
Grossman, G., and E. Helpman (1991): Innovation and Growth in
the Global Economy. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
(1995): “Trade Wars and Trade Talks,” Journal of Political
Economy, 103(4), 675—707.
(2001): Special Interest Politics. Cambridge (MA): The MIT
Press.
Gruber, H., and F. Verboven (2001): “The Diffusion of Mobile
Telecommunications Services in the European Union,” European Eco-
nomic Review, 45, 577—588.
192 References
Hall, B. (2004): “Innovation and Diffusion,” NBERWorking Paper No.
10212.
Hall, B., and B. Khan (2003): “Adoption of New Technology,” NBER
Working Paper No. 9730.
Hall, R., and C. Jones (1997): “Levels of Economic Activity across
Countries,” American Economic Review - AEA Papers and Proceed-
ings, 87, 173—77.
Hannan, T., and J. McDowell (1984a): “The Determinants of Tech-
nology Adoption: The Case of the Banking Firm,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 15(3), 328—335.
(1984b): “Market Concentration and the Diffusion of New Tech-
nology in the Banking Industry,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
66(4), 686—691.
Hart, O. (1982): “A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian
Features,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 109—138.
Helpman, E., and M. Trajtenberg (1998): “Diffusion of General
Purpose Technologies,” in General Purpose Technologies and Eco-
nomic Growth, ed. by E. Helpman, pp. 86—119. Cambridge (MA): The
MIT Press.
Holmes, T., and A. Schmitz (2001): “A Gain From Trade: From
Unproductive to Productive Entrepreneurship,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 47, 417—446.
Howitt, P., and P. McAfee (1988): “Stability of Equilibria with Ex-
ternalities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 261—277.
References 193
Jaffee, A., M. Trajtenberg, and M. Fogarty (2000): “Knowledge
Spillovers and Patent Citations: Evidence from a Survey of Inventors,”
American Economic Review, 90(2), 215—218.
Jaffee, A., M. Trajtenberg, and R. Henderson (1993): “Geo-
graphical Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent
Citations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 577—598.
Johansen, L. (1959): “Substitution Versus Fixed Production Coeffi-
cients in the Theory of Economic Growth: A Synthesis,” Econometrica,
27, 157—176.
Jovanovic, B. (1998): “Vintage Capital and Inequality,”Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics, 1, 497—530.
Jovanovic, B., and S. Lach (1989): “Entry, Exit and Diffusion with
Learning by Doing,” American Economic Review, 79(4), 690—99.
Jovanovic, B., and G. MacDonald (1994): “Competitive Diffusion,”
Journal of Political Economy, 102, 24—52.
Jovanovic, B., and Y. Nyarko (1996): “Learning by Doing and the
Choice of Technology,” Econometrica, 64, 1299—1310.
Jovanovic, B., and D. Stolyarov (2000): “Optimal Adoption of
Complementary Technologies,” American Economic Review, 90(1),
15—29.
Kamien, M., and N. Schwartz (1972): “Timing of Innovations Under
Rivalry,” Econometrica, 40(1), 43—60.
Katz, L., and D. Autor (1999): “Changes in the Wage Structure
and Earnings Inequality,” in The Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol.
3A, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science,
North-Holland.
194 References
Katz, L., and K. Murphy (1992): “Changes in Relative Wages
1963:1987: Supply and Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 107(1), 35—78.
Katz, M., and C. Shapiro (1985): “Network Externalities, Competi-
tion and Compatibility,” American Economic Review, 73, 424—440.
Keller, W. (2002a): “Geographic Localization of International Tech-
nology Diffusion,” American Economic Review, 92(1), 120—142.
(2002b): “International Technology Diffusion,” CEPR Working
Paper No. 3133, forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Literature.
Kiyotaki, N., and R. Wright (1993): “A Search Theoretic Approach
to Monetary Economics,” American Economic Review, 83, 63—77.
Klenow, P., and A. Rodrìquez.Clare (1997): “The Neoclassical Re-
vival in Growth Economics: Has It Gone Too Far?,” in NBER Macro-
economic Annual, ed. by B. Bernanke, and J. Rotemberg, pp. 73—102.
Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
Kremer, M. (1993): “The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 551—575.
Krueger, D., and K. Kumar (2004): “US-Europe Differences in
Technology-Driven Growth: Quantifying the Role of Education,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 51, 161—190.
Krusell, P., L. Ohanian, J. Ríos-Rull, and G. Violante (2000):
“Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic
Analysis,” Econometrica, 68(5), 1029—1053.
Laffont, J., and D. Martimort (2002): The Theory of Incen-
tives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton (NJ): Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
References 195
Laitner, J., and D. Stolyarov (2003): “Technological Change and
the Stock Market,” American Economic Review, 93(4), 1240—1267.
Lizzeri, A., and N. Persico (2003): “Why Did the Elites Extend the
Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Applica-
tion to Britain’s "Age of Reform",” mimeo, forthcoming in Quarterly
Journal of Economics.
Lucas, R. (1990): “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Coun-
tries?,” American Economic Review - AEA Papers and Proceedings,
80, 92—96.
(1993): “Making a Miracle,” Econometrica, 61, 251—272.
Machin, S., and J. V. Reenen (1998): “Technology and Changes in
Skill Structure: Evidence From Seven OECD Countries,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1215—1244.
Macho-Stadler, I., and J. Pérez-Castrillo (1997): An Introduc-
tion to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Maddison, A. (1995): Monitoring the World Economy: 1820-1992.
Paris: OECD Development Centre.
Mankiw, N. (1995): “The Growth of Nations,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 1, 275—310.
Mansfield, E. (1961): “Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation,”
Econometrica, 29(4), 741—766.
(1963): “The Speed of Response of Firms to New Technologies,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 77, 290—311.
196 References
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts (1990): “Rationalizability, Learning and
Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Economet-
rica, 58, 1255—1278.
Mokyr, J. (1990): The Lever of Riches. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
(2002): The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge
Economy. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
Myles, G. (1995): Public Economics. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Nadiri, M. (1993): “Innovations and Technological Spillovers,” NBER
Working Paper No. 4423.
Nelson, R., and E. Phelps (1966): “Investment in Humans, Techno-
logical Diffusion and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review,
56(1/2), 69—75.
North, D. (1981): Structure and Change in Economic History. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company.
(1991): “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1),
97—112.
Oster, S. (1982): “The Diffusion of Innovations Among Steel Firms:
The Basic Oxigen Furnace,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 45—56.
Parente, S. (2000): “Learning-by-Using and the Switch to Better Ma-
chines,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 3(4), 675—703.
Parente, S., and E. Prescott (1994): “Barriers to Technology Adop-
tion and Development,” Journal of Political Economy, 102, 298—321.
References 197
(1999): “Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(5), 1216—1233.
(2000): Barriers to Riches. Walras-Pareto Lectures, Vol.3. Cam-
bridge (MA): The MIT Press.
Parker, P., and L. Roeller (1997): “Collusive Conduct in Duopolies:
Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone
Industry,” Rand Journal of Economics, 28(2), 304—322.
Puhakka, M., and J. Wissink (1995): “Strategic Complementarity,
Multiple Equilibria and Externalities in Cournot Competition,” CAE
Working Paper No. 95-18, Cornell University.
Quirmbach, H. (1986): “The Diffusion of New Technology and the Mar-
ket for Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 33—47.
Reinganum, J. (1981a): “Market Structure and the Diffusion of New
Technology,” Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 618—624.
(1981b): “On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theo-
retic Approach,” Review of Economic Studies, 48, 395—405.
Romer, P. (1990): “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 98(5), 71—102.
Rose, N., and P. Joskow (1990): “The Diffusion of New Technolo-
gies: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 21, 354—373.
Rosenberg, N. (1976a): “Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technol-
ogy,” in Perspectives on Technology, pp. 189—212. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
(1976b): “On Technological Expectations,” Economic Journal,
86(343), 523—535.
198 References
Sachs, J., and A. Warner (1997): “Fundamental Sources of Long-Run
Growth,” American Economic Review - AEA Papers and Proceedings,
87, 184—188.
Sala-I-Martin, X. (1994): “Regional Coehsion: Evidence and Theories
of Regional Growth and Convergence,” CEPR Discussion Paper No.
1075.
(1997): “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions,” American Eco-
nomic Review - AEA Papers and Proceedings, 87, 178—183.
Salanié, B. (1997): The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Cambridge
(MA): The MIT Press.
Saloner, G., and A. Shepard (1995): “Adoption of Technologies with
Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of Automated Teller Ma-
chines,” Rand Journal of Economics, 26(3), 479—501.
Schmalensee, R. (1982): “Product Differentiation Advantages of Pio-
neering Brands,” American Economic Review, 72, 349—365.
Schumpeter, J. (1942): Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New
York: Harper.
Shapiro, C., and J. Stiglitz (1984): “Equilibrium Unemployment as
a Worker Discipline Device,” American Economic Review, 74, 433—44.
Shleifer, A. (1986): “Implementation Cycles,” Journal of Political
Economy, 94, 1163—1190.
Solow, R. (1960): “Investment and Technical Progress,” in Mathemat-
ical Methods in Social Sciences, ed. by K. Arrow, Karlin, and Suppes.
Stanford University Press.
Spence, M. (1984): “Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Per-
formance,” Econometrica, 52, 101—121.
References 199
Stevens, M. (1996): “Transferable Training and Poaching Externali-
ties,” in Acquiring Skills, ed. by A. Booth, and D. Snower, chap. 2, pp.
19—40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stoneman, P. (2001): The Economics of Technological Diffusion. Ox-
ford: Blackwells.
Sutton, J. (1998): Technology and Market Structure: Theory and His-
tory. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.
Tirole, J. (1994): The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge
(MA): The MIT Press.
Tybout, J. (2000): “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries:
How Well Do They Do, And Why?,” Journal of Economic Literature,
38(1), 11—44.
Violante, G. (2002): “Technological Acceleration, Skill Transferability,
and the Rise in Residual Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
117(1), 297—338.
Vives, X. (1990): “Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementari-
ties,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 19, 305—321.
(1999): Oligopoly Pricing. Old Ideas and New Tools. Cambridge
(MA): The MIT Press.
Weil, P. (1989): “Increasing Returns and Animal Spirits,” American
Economic Review, 79, 889—894.
Weitzman, M. (1982): “Increasing Returns and the Foundation of Un-
employment Theory,” Economic Journal, 92, 787—804.
Wozniak, G. (1987): “Human Capital, Information and the Early Adop-
tion of New Technology,” Journal of Human Resources, 22, 101—112.
200 References
Zeira, J. (1998): “Workers, Machines and Economic Growth,”Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1091—1117.
